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I. INTRODUCTION 
In late 2002, while grabbing headlines for boldly promising to slash the 
federal civilian workforce in half,1 the Bush Administration was at the 
same time discreetly hiring private contractors to relieve Special Forces 
troops of their duty to protect President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.2 In 
the more celebrated declaration regarding workforce reductions—perhaps 
the culmination of a decade-long, bipartisan initiative to reinvent and 
streamline government3—the President attempted to allay concerns by 
 1. See Edwin Chen, Bush Aims To Privatize Many Federal Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at 
A1; Paul C. Light, Editorial, The End of the Civil Service?, WASH. POST, May 9, 2003, at A35; Ellen 
Nakashima, Bush Opens 40,000 Federal Workers’ Jobs to Competition; Goal: Put 425,000 Positions 
Up for Grabs to Contractors, WASH. POST, June 8, 2001, at A27 [hereinafter Nakashima, Bush 
Opens]; Ellen Nakashima, Bush Plan Could Cut Federal Workers, WASH. POST, Aug. 26, 2001, at A1 
[hereinafter Nakashima, Bush Plan]; Richard W. Stevenson, Government May Make Private Nearly 
Half of Its Civilian Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2002, at A1 [hereinafter Stevenson, Government] 
(describing President Bush’s plan to transfer 850,000 government jobs to private contractors); Richard 
W. Stevenson, The Incredible Shrinking Government, Bush Style, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, at D4 
[hereinafter Stevenson, Incredible Shrinking]; Edward Walsh, OMB Details Outsourcing Revisions, 
WASH. POST, May 30, 2003, at A21 (describing President Bush’s plan to speed up the process of 
opening up hundreds of thousands of federal jobs to private sector competition). For the announcement 
of this policy proposal, see EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND 
BUDGET, CIRCULAR NO. A-76 (Revised) (Nov. 14, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
omb/circulars/a076/a76_111402.doc (last visited June 4, 2004) [hereinafter CIRCULAR NO. A-76]. 
 2. See James Dao, U.S. Company To Take Over Karzai Safety, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at 
A24; Michael Elliott, The Trouble with Saving the World, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 109; Eric Pape & 
Michael Meyer, Dogs of Peace, NEWSWEEK: INT’L ED., Aug. 25–Sept. 1, 2003, at 22; Leslie Wayne, 
America’s For-Profit Secret Army, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2002, at C1.  
 3. See Nakashima, Bush Plan, supra note 1 (“Bush’s management package is but one in a series 
of attempts to remake the government bureaucracy over the years, from Jimmy Carter[] . . . to Ronald 
Reagan[] . . . to Al Gore. . . .”); Stevenson, Incredible Shrinking, supra note 1 (“[I]f Mr. Bush prevails, 
he could end up doing more to overhaul the Civil Service and to advance the conservative small-
government agenda than any of his predecessors, Mr. Reagan included.”); see also E.S. SAVAS, 
PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 3, 11–12 (2000) (describing the dominance of 
the domestic privatization agenda over the past decade); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms 
Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1292–93 (2003) (describing aims of leaders of both 
parties to reduce the size and cost of the federal government); Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and 
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stressing that the proposed job cuts would not intrude on any functions 
that are “inherently governmental;” these cuts would instead be focused 
more narrowly on reaping economic benefits by privatizing commercial 
responsibilities such as catering, gardening, and clerical work. 
Unfortunately, in replacing Special Forces troops with private military 
contractors, the Administration offered no comparable words of comfort. 
Since then, although the government has subsequently scaled back its 
ambitious domestic downsizing and privatizing initiatives, it nevertheless 
has expanded and intensified its military privatization agenda. This has 
especially been the case in Iraq, where today over 20,000 contractors are 
securing key American installations, participating in armed raids against 
insurgents, and—most infamously—serving as interrogators in the 
occupation’s most notorious prisons.4
Who would have thought that when the modern wave of government 
privatization began decades ago with cities experimenting with the 
contracting out of their sanitation responsibilities,5 it would swell to 
encompass the privatization of prisons and welfare services,6 let alone the 
Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused 
Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 861–62 (2000) (noting how the 1990s were a decade “marked by 
bipartisan agreement on the need to reform and reduce ‘Big Government’” and how downsizing was 
understood to require shrinking the size of the federal workforce); Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like 
Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
17, 27 (2001). 
 4. See, e.g., Spencer Ante, The Other U.S. Military, BUS. WK., May 31, 2004, at 76; David 
Barstow et al., Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19. 2004, at A1; James 
Dao, Private Guards Take Big Risks, for Right Price, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at A1; Seymour M. 
Hersh, Chain of Command: How the Department of Defense Mishandled the Disaster at Abu Ghraib, 
NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 38, 42; Renae Merle, DynCorp Took Part in Chalabi Raid, WASH. 
POST, June 4, 2004, at A17; Dana Priest, Private Guards Repel Attack on U.S. Headquarters, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 6, 2004, at A1; Dana Priest & Mary Pat Flaherty, Under Fire, Security Firms Form an 
Alliance, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2004, at A1; P.W. Singer, Editorial, Have Guns, Will Travel, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2003, at A15; Barry Yeoman, Soldiers of Good Fortune, MOTHER JONES, May/June 
2003, at 38.  
 5. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 58–68 (1989) (describing 
privatization in municipal sanitation); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 85–89 
(1998); see also SAVAS, supra note 3, at 14–16 & nn.20–25 (describing the early history of 
privatization in the post-WWII era). 
 6. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 174 (1999) 
(characterizing the differences between sanitation collection and prison management in terms of how 
much responsibility and discretion is extended to private actors). For discussions of welfare 
privatization, see, for example, JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY (1996); Matthew 
Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739 (2002) 
[hereinafter Diller, Form]; Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, 
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000) [hereinafter Diller, 
Revolution]; Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 569 (2001); David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 
231 (1998); and, Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573 (2004). For 
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privatization of foreign policy and national defense? Even staunch 
libertarians, proponents of the Nozickean night-watchman’s state, have 
long-conceded that when stripped to its core, a nation still must maintain 
its public commitments to national defense.7 Indeed, just a few years ago, 
leading privatization scholars dismissed as implausible the idea that we 
privatize national security functions.8
These individuals, like many others,9 would thus not have expected 
Washington—over the past decade under Democrats and Republicans 
discussions of prison privatization, see, for example, John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Duty To Govern: A 
Critical Perspective on the Private Management of Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST 155 (Douglas C. McDonald ed., 1990); Anne Larason Schneider, Public-Private 
Partnerships in the U.S. Prison System, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 199 (Pauline 
Vaillancourt Rosenau ed., 2000); Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1838, 1868 (2002); Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359 (1996); Richard 
Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 267 (2001); Clifford J. Rosky, Force, Inc.: The 
Privatization of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879, 
897–903 (2004); and, E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 895 (1987). See 
also Rosky, supra, at 883 (calling military force a sacred government function and noting that whereas 
a “liberal state must monopolize the supply of military force . . . [it] need not monopolize the supply of 
punishment,” i.e., prisons). 
 7. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26–27 (1974); see also Rosky, supra 
note 6, at 885 (noting that “even in the most minimal accounts, the liberal state encodes rights into 
laws and uses threats and acts of physical coercion to enforce them . . . The state has, must have, or 
should have a monopoly of force”). 
 8. See SAVAS, supra note 3, at 71, 303 (alluding to the fact that in times past some conflicts 
were fought using mercenaries and indicating that the area of national security is “the last refuge of 
antiprivatization forces”); Freeman, supra note 3, at 1300 (describing foreign policy and national 
defense as fields “where privatization seems unfathomable”); Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of 
Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1155–56, 1158–59 (1997) 
(noting that contracting out foreign policy responsibilities is too dangerous because private providers 
could refuse to carry out their responsibilities in an effort to seek better contractual terms); Michael J. 
Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1444 
(2003) (“An extreme example [of a government activity too difficult and sensitive to outsource] is the 
formulation and implementation of a country’s foreign or defense policy, because complexity of 
objectives and unforeseeable contingencies render delegations of these functions to private actors 
highly problematic.”); see also Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, 
Unchecked, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15 (“Thomas E. White, who was secretary of the Army 
until April 2003 and a leading advocate of privatization in the military said in an interview Thursday 
that he was surprised when he learned this week that employees of private companies were now 
involved in intelligence work, which suggests how abruptly the trend took off.”) (emphasis added); 
Norman Macrae, A Future History of Privatisation, 1992–2022, ECONOMIST, Dec. 21, 1991, at 15 
(suggesting that military protection is a core public good, not suitable for privatization); Barbara 
Whitaker, Fed by the Hand that Bites, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1998, at G6 (quoting the director of a 
private prison corporation as suggesting “national security” is a uniquely “inherently governmental” 
function that should not be privatized). 
 9. Consider former Congressman Gephardt’s words about the privatization of sensitive, national 
security functions. Not so long before military contractors exploded onto the scene in the wake of 
America’s interventions into Afghanistan and Iraq, Gephardt, who at the time was House Minority 
Leader, said: 
Federal law enforcement patrols the shores of the United States. They guard our borders. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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alike—to employ private agents to do its military bidding in the Latin 
American drug wars, the Balkans, the Middle East, Rwanda, Afghanistan, 
and now, in Iraq. In short, since the first Persian Gulf War, private soldiers 
working for “military firms” under contract with the U.S. government 
have seen active duty in most conflicts involving the United States (and 
also some in which the United States has had no official military 
involvement). In another era, we would call these agents “mercenaries” 
and label their sponsor governments immoral and illegitimate; could it be 
that, today, these actors are just another set of government contractors, and 
the United States is just outsourcing one more governmental function? 
Observers who react with dismay over the outsourcing of military 
functions might see it as the modern, or perhaps post-modern, embodiment 
of President Eisenhower’s famous warning in 1961, when the former 
Supreme Allied Commander portended the rise of the military-industrial 
complex.10 But while Eisenhower’s prescient words continue to resonate 
today11—as we witness the awarding of hundreds of contracts to private 
firms, often to those quite friendly with high-ranking government officials, 
to rebuild the infrastructure and restore the institutions of Iraq and 
Afghanistan as well as scores of additional contracts for defense 
hardware12—even he could not have foreseen the government’s current 
policy of delegating highly sensitive responsibilities to private soldiers in 
and near zones of conflict.13  
They track terrorists down . . . . I ask all of you, do you want to contract out the Capitol 
Police? Do you want to contract out the U.S. Marines? Do you want to contract out the F.B.I. 
and the Customs Service? I do not think so. 
147 CONG. REC. H7631 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Gephardt). 
 10. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address (Jan. 17, 1961), available at 
http://www.eisenhower.utexas.edu/farewell.htm (last visited June 22, 2004). 
 11. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Kenneth Bredemeier, Thousands of Private Contractors Support U.S. Forces in 
Persian Gulf, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2003, at E1; Kathleen Day, In Haiti, Covering the Bases: 
Pentagon Cuts Give Private Firms Opportunity To Provide Services to Military, WASH. POST, Sept. 
23, 1994, at D1; Anthony Faiola & Scott Wilson, U.S. Took Risks in Aiding Peru’s Anti-Drug Patrols, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2001, at A1; Juan Forero, Role of U.S. Companies in Colombia Is Questioned, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2001, at A3; Bradley Graham, Ex-GIs Work To Give Bosnian Force a Fighting 
Chance, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 1997, at A1 [hereinafter Graham, Bosnia]; Bradley Graham, U.S. Firm 
Exports Military Expertise: Role in Training Croatian Army Brings Publicity and Suspicions, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 11, 1995, at A1 [hereinafter Graham, Croatia]; Renae Merle, More Civilians 
Accompanying U.S. Military: Pentagon Is Giving More Duties to Contractors, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 
2003, at A10; Ken Silverstein, Privatizing War: How Affairs of State Are Outsourced to Corporations 
Beyond Public Control, NATION, July 28–Aug. 4, 1997, at 11; P.W. Singer, Editorial, National 
Builders and Low Bidders in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2004, at A23; Jonathan D. Tepperman, Out of 
Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 25, 2002, at 10; Wayne, supra note 2; see also supra note 4. 
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Indeed the delegation of combat responsibilities presents a qualitatively 
different and more dangerous privatization agenda than that which 
troubled Eisenhower. His concerns would be reflected today in the recent 
allegations of “sweetheart” deals between the federal government and the 
likes of, say, Halliburton for energy services in Iraq14 or Boeing for Tanker 
aircraft.15 But the harms that flow from those types of contracts, however 
troubling and possibly even scandalous, fit comfortably within the 
conventional privatization framework of outsourcing functions that are not 
inherently governmental, but rather are commercial in nature.16 They are 
problems of accountability, and result mainly from poor oversight, 
improper contract management, and insufficient fidelity to (or simply 
inadequate) conflict-of-interest laws.17 And although these contracts and 
the harms that may accompany them are worrisome from an array of 
policy perspectives, conceptually speaking they are unremarkable: Driven 
by the same market-efficiency impulses that motivate the outsourcing of 
sanitation, catering, and even prison management responsibilities, the 
contracts to rebuild roads and schools in failed states and to manufacture 
new weapons do not compel us to rethink our basic understandings of 
American privatization.18  
 14. DAN BRIODY, THE HALLIBURTON AGENDA: THE POLITICS OF OIL AND MONEY (2004); Dan 
Baum, Nation Builders for Hire, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 34 (suggesting that 
although it certainly helped that Vice President Cheney was a former chair of Halliburton when its 
subsidiary, Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”), received a $7 billion contract to manage the Iraqi Oil 
Fields, KBR did not really need the Vice President’s assistance since “by now [KBR is] so enmeshed 
with the Pentagon that it was able essentially to assign the contract to itself”); Kenneth R. Bazinet, 
Legislators Seek Investigation as Halliburton Contracts Rise, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2003, at 
A3; Joshua Chaffin, Halliburton ‘Reaps Nearly $500 million’ from Iraq-Related Projects, FIN. TIMES, 
May 30, 2003, at P2; Erik Eckholm, A Top U.S. Contracting Official for the Army Calls for an Inquiry 
in the Halliburton Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A13 (describing how the Army permitted 
Halliburton officials to attend internal meetings regarding contracting decisions); Jeff Gerth & Don 
Van Natta, Jr., Halliburton Contracts in Iraq: The Struggle To Manage Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2003, at A1 (describing a $2 billion contract awarded to Halliburton by the federal government 
without first soliciting competitive bids and noting the close ties between the company and Vice 
President Cheney); Jane Mayer, What Did the Vice-President Do for Halliburton, NEW YORKER, Feb. 
16, 2004, at 80; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Friends in Deed, In the Company of Vice President, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2003, at D5; David E. Rosenbaum, A Closer Look at Cheney and Halliburton, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004, at A16. 
 15. See Renae Merle, Air Force-Boeing Negotiator Criticized, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2003, at 
A11; Leslie Wayne, A Growing Military Contract Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at C1 
[hereinafter Wayne, Growing]; Leslie Wayne, Air Force Asks for Broader Inquiry into Charges of 
Favoritism in Boeing Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at C2 [hereinafter Wayne, Air Force]; 
Leslie Wayne, Ex-Pentagon Official Gets 9 Months for Conspiring To Favor Boeing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 2, 2004, at C1 [hereinafter Wayne, Ex-Pentagon]. 
 16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; infra notes 33–35, 37 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
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Military privatization of combat duties, on the other hand, decidedly 
does. It has the potential to introduce a range of novel constitutional, 
democratic, and strategic harms that have few, if any, analogues in the 
context of domestic, commercial outsourcing. Military privatization can 
be, and perhaps already has been, used by government policymakers under 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to operate in the shadows of 
public attention, domestic and international laws, and even to circumvent 
congressional oversight. For a variety of political and legal reasons, the 
Executive may at times be constrained in deploying U.S. soldiers. The 
public’s aversion to a military draft, the international community’s disdain 
for American unilateralism, and Congress’s reluctance to endorse an 
administration’s hawkish foreign goals may each serve to inhibit, if not 
totally restrict, the president’s ability to use U.S. troops in a given zone of 
conflict. In such scenarios, resorting to private contractors, dispatched to 
serve American interests without carrying the apparent symbolic or legal 
imprimatur of the United States, may be quite tempting. 
In those instances, it would not necessarily be the cheaper price tag or 
specialized expertise that makes private contractors desirable. Rather, it 
might be the status of the actors (as private, non-governmental agents) vis-
à-vis public opinion, congressional scrutiny, and international law that 
entices policymakers to turn to contracting. Indeed, “tactical 
privatization,” as I call it, is motivated at least in part by a desire to alter 
substantive policy: Private agents would be used to achieve public policy 
ends that would not otherwise be attainable, were the government confined 
to relying exclusively on members of the U.S. Armed Forces. Tactical 
privatization thus stands in contradistinction to what is widely understood 
to be the conventional privatization agenda, driven by economic goals, 
that strives for verisimilitude in replicating government responsibilities 
(only more efficiently).19 To elude public debate, circumvent Congress’s 
coordinate role in conducting military affairs, and evade Security Council 
dictates may help an administration achieve short-term, realpolitik ends; 
but in the process, the structural damage to the vibrancy and authenticity 
of public deliberation, to the integrity of America’s constitutional 
architecture of separation of powers, and to the legitimacy of collective 
security may prove irreparable.  
What is perhaps worse, the structural harms introduced by decisions to 
privatize may not substantially lessen even if, or when, combat 
privatization is undertaken relatively transparently and mainly for more 
 19. See infra Part II.C. 
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traditional, commercial reasons. Since much of Congress’s chief 
warmaking powers flow from its legal authority over the Armed Forces 
(especially to authorize armed intervention), even assuming the aims of 
privatization are purely economic and unconnected to any tactical motives 
to subvert Congress, constitutional harms do not disappear. In those 
situations and however inadvertently, privatization would still 
circumscribe Congress’s role in military affairs, thus prompting 
separation-of-powers concerns not altogether dissimilar to those that 
would exist were the circumvention intentional. Additionally, and also 
irrespective of the Executive’s motives for privatizing, the introduction 
onto the battlefield of for-profit contractors, motivated to fight primarily 
by money and regulated loosely by contract, rather than by the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice, breeds an array of strategic and psychic harms 
for the military commanders, for uniformed soldiers in the field, and for 
Americans at home. Accordingly, privatization of military functions poses 
a slew of problems too complicated and varied to resolve merely by 
enhancing accountability, strengthening contract laws, and tightening 
contract management. 
It is, therefore, the present aim of this Article to identify in yet 
unexplored ways the profound and pervasive dangers that this new 
modality of privatization introduces. To date, commentators writing about 
military privatization have primarily focused on the tangible misdeeds that 
privateers have perpetrated in zones of conflict and on the reform 
measures necessary to improve battlefield accountability.20 But what these 
scholars have overlooked are the deeper, structural problems. Accordingly, 
this Article seeks to look beyond economic efficiency and accountability 
concerns—the principal foci of privatization scholarship21—to explore 
 20. See P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY (2004); Singer, supra note 13; see also Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of 
War: Private International Security Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 75 (1998); Thomas Catan et al., Private Companies on the Frontline, FIN. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2003, at A15; Dao, supra note 4; Mary Pat Flaherty & Dana Priest, More Limits Sought for 
Private Security Teams, WASH. POST, Apr. 13, 2004, at A15; Juan Forero, Private U.S. Operatives on 
Risky Missions in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A3; Nicholas von Hoffman, Contract 
Killers: How Privatizing the U.S. Military Subverts Public Oversight, HARPER’S, June 1, 2004, at 79; 
Joshua Kurlantzick, Outsourcing the Dirty Work, AM. PROSPECT, May 2003, at 17; T. Christian 
Miller, Contract Flaws in Iraq Cited, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at A1; Robert O’Harrow Jr., 
Democrats Criticize Management Contracts, WASH. POST, May 19, 2004, at A17; Tepperman, supra 
note 13; Yeoman, supra note 4. See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: 
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (2003) (defining accountability as 
“being answerable to authority that can mandate desirable conduct and sanction conduct that breaches 
identified obligations”). 
 21. See infra Part II.C. 
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how covert and, at times, even transparent delegations of sensitive military 
responsibilities threaten to (1) violate the constitutional imperatives of 
limited and democratic government, (2) undermine the institutional 
excellence of (and patriotic support for) the U.S. Armed Forces, and (3) 
jeopardize the already shaky diplomatic and moral standing of the United 
States in the eyes of the rest of the world. Given the current state of 
military policy in America (and the apparent need to rely increasingly on 
private troops for the foreseeable future),22 this Article raises urgent and 
important arguments and prescribes a set of structural reforms that merit 
the immediate attention of legal scholars and public policymakers alike.  
This Article proceeds in six parts. I begin in Part II first by tracing the 
modern evolution of military privatization and next by discussing six 
contemporary case studies. Then, I attempt to locate some of the 
normative impulses motivating this new wave of privatization and to 
situate them within the broader pattern of American privatization policy; 
this last section serves to frame the principal conceptual differences 
between combat-related and more conventional forms of privatization, 
which will be important in understanding the unique structural harms 
introduced by decisions to outsource military responsibilities. 
 22. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Editorial, Feeling the Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at A27 
(finding it unbelievable that the United States will not need to bring back a draft and citing a Pentagon 
study that said the United States has an inadequate number of troops to sustain the current scope of 
operations into the future). Krugman further states that President Bush’s claim “that we don’t need any 
expansion in our military is patently unrealistic; it ignores the severe stress our Army is already under. 
And the experience in Iraq shows that pursuing his . . . foreign policy doctrine . . . would require much 
larger military forces than we now have.” Id.; see also Mary H. Cooper, Private Affair: New Reliance 
on America’s Other Army, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2194 (2004) (describing America’s servicemen 
and women as overworked and suggesting that the United States will likely need additional troops); 
James Dao, The Option Nobody’s Pushing. Yet, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004, at D1 (noting how 
overextended the American military is, how fresh soldiers are desparately needed, and how 
government officials nevertheless refuse to entertain the idea of reintroducing the draft); Michael R. 
Gordon, The Strategy To Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at A1 
(noting that there are not enough American troops to sustain the scope of overseas commitments and 
indicating that NATO, the Gulf States, and India all declined to commit forces in Iraq); David M. 
Halbfinger, Kerry Attacks on Economy and a Draft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A11 (describing 
presidential candidate John Kerry as expressing concern that the U.S. military, at its current size, is 
overworked and overcommitted); John Hendren & Mark Mazzetti, Army Implicates 28 U.S. Troops in 
Deaths of 2 Afghan Detainees, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2004, at A13 (characterizing the military 
leadership’s concern over the lack of trained intelligence officers and its fear that reliance on 
contractors at Abu Ghraib contributed greatly to the abuses that occurred there); Eric Schmitt, General 
Warns of a Looming Shortage of Specialists, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2004, at A16; Eric Schmitt, Its 
Recruitment Goals Pressing, the Army Will Ease Some Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at A24; 
Thom Shanker & Brian Knowlton, Troop Number Too Low, Military Poll Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2004, at A21; Peter Spiegel, US ‘Must Increase Troop Numbers’ to Fulfil Commitments, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Sept. 27, 2004, at 8. 
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In Part III, I commence with the inquiry’s critical analysis: 
understanding these structural harms. In this Part, I describe how the 
Executive can use military contractors to direct national security policy 
with greater impunity and less oversight than it could if it only had U.S. 
troops at its disposal. To the extent that Congress’s warmaking authority is 
tied primarily to its regulatory and war-authorizing powers over the 
American military qua U.S. Armed Forces, a president interested in 
exercising more unilateral control might hire private contractors in lieu of 
U.S. soldiers and hence avoid having to collaborate as closely with the 
legislative branch. In circumventing congressional authority, the Executive 
violates the two principal constitutional imperatives: limited government—
by bypassing Congress and preventing it from checking the ambitions of 
the president—and democratic government—by acting covertly (i.e., 
without congressional or, by extension, the People’s input) and thus failing 
to make inclusive policy decisions legitimated by popular consent. While a 
paradigm case of tactical privatization would involve executive intent to 
evade congressional monitoring and to avoid having to request 
authorization for engaging troops in hostilities, harms along these lines 
would nevertheless ensue even if the president had no such insidious 
objective—and was instead focused mainly on maximizing economic 
efficiency. Simply and even inadvertently operating outside of the 
carefully arranged framework of coordinate military policymaking over 
the U.S. Armed Forces still has the effect of limiting Congress’s formal 
and informal involvement in decisionmaking.  
Then, in Part IV, I characterize how the introduction of private troops, 
either integrated into a larger contingent of U.S. military personnel or 
instructed to operate independently, creates considerable institutional 
harms, strategic liabilities, and morale problems. First, because privateers 
are not bound by the dictates of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but 
rather often only by the terms of their contract, there is a much greater 
likelihood that they might abandon or distort a mission, ultimately 
prioritizing some economic goal or their own personal security over the 
task at hand. Importantly, I argue that this harm goes beyond mere 
battlefield accountability concerns since it is not so much the potential for 
privateers to botch a mission that represents the foremost problem; rather, 
because contractors cannot be regulated as stringently as U.S. troops, also 
at issue here is the legal dilution of military justice and discipline, on and 
off the battlefield. The contractors’ presence, their uncertain legal status, 
and their relative impunity from courts-martial could destabilize the 
delicately balanced constitutional arrangements associated with civil-
military relations and democratic warmaking. And, second, I examine how 
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the presence of contractors (to the extent they are publicly perceived as 
profit-seekers rather than as patriots) on the same hostile terrain as regular 
soldiers may ultimately threaten the privileged and honored status the 
military has historically enjoyed among the American public. 
In Part V, the penultimate part, I discuss the international/diplomatic 
harms privatization engenders. I describe how military privatization can 
exacerbate foreign critics’ worst fears and suspicions about the United 
States: No longer will the United States retain the moral high ground by 
risking its own young men and women of a volunteer army in the name of 
freedom. Instead, a critic assumes, outsourcing gives Washington freer 
rein by allowing the government to indemnify itself against casualties and 
other “sticky” political situations and therefore permits it broader license 
to purchase strategic outcomes. Moreover, privatization, to the extent that 
it allows the United States to bypass international agreements and Security 
Council authorization, undermines the legitimacy and vitality of collective 
security. Although these harms are felt primarily by the outside, non-
American world, they nevertheless have adverse consequences for 
American foreign policy, for American integrity, and for the interests of 
containing and regulating the proliferation of even more odious strains of 
military profiteering that exist in other parts of the world. Therefore, I 
argue, these international implications should weigh heavily on any 
structural assessment of the virtues and vices of using private soldiers. 
Note that whereas the harms explored in Part III chiefly occur when 
Congress’s role is subordinated, the problems analyzed in Parts IV and V 
do not necessarily depend on circumventing congressional participation in 
military privatization. 
Part VI concludes by first roughly sketching out a set of reform 
measures that might help to reduce the legal and symbolic status 
differentials between contractors and soldiers that underlie many of the 
manifest structural harms described above. Having proffered some reform 
proposals, I then consider which status disparities may prove the most 
difficult to eliminate. Finally, I discuss whether these reforms, if 
successful, might actually reduce, if not altogether destroy, military 
privatization’s raison d’etre. 
II. THE MODERN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH MILITARY 
PRIVATIZATION 
By way of introduction, this Part offers some background on defense-
related contracting over the last few decades, during which time it has 
expanded from an exclusively commercial arrangement to one that now 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/6
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includes the delegation of sensitive combat responsibilities.23 Throughout 
much of the Cold War era, defense “privatization” mainly involved the 
federal government purchasing weapons and hardware from the private 
sector and contracting out some clerical, custodial, and other support 
functions.24 The specter of that military-industrial complex imbued 
generations with the fear that defense industrialists (or, perhaps, war 
profiteers) were influencing foreign policymaking. Yet, alone, those 
concerns could not have prepared us for the range of problems that now 
arise as modern mercenaries emerge on the contemporary American 
national security landscape. Indeed, over the last ten years, the federal 
government has entrusted such private agents to thwart the drug trade in 
Latin America, interrogate enemy combatants and safeguard American 
installations in Iraq, provide personal security for President Karzai in 
Afghanistan, train and advise military forces in the Balkans, and protect 
American diplomats in the Middle East. 
Since exchanging gunfire with Iraqi insurgents, Serbian irredentists, 
and Colombian drug lords is a far cry from staffing the mess halls or even 
building Army helicopters, it is helpful to commence this study with a 
brief look at the advent of combat-related military privatization. 
Accordingly, Section A describes some of the more conventional patterns 
and practices associated with commercial military privatization. Section B 
then introduces some of the new concepts in combat-related privatization 
initiatives today and presents six case studies. Finally, Section C frames 
the key conceptual differences between military and more conventional 
forms of privatization.  
 23. This is not to say that military privatization is in any way a distinctively modern 
phenomenon. Its long and varied history is, however, well beyond the scope of this inquiry. In this 
Article, I am exploring a particularly modern and particularly American strain of military privatization, 
which is distinguishable from the longer history not just because of its recent vintage, but also because 
it arises today from the ashes of a wholly delegitimatized landscape. In centuries past, there was not 
the same taboo as exists now regarding mercenaries. But their re-emergence, today, in light of the 
relatively recent repudiation, marks a new chapter. See, e.g., R. ERNEST I. DUPUY & TREVOR N. 
DUPUY, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY FROM 3500 B.C. TO THE PRESENT 6 (2d ed. 
1986); G.T. GRIFFITH, THE MERCENARIES OF THE HELLENISTIC WORLD (1935); CHARLES W. 
INGRAO, THE HESSIAN MERCENARY STATE: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND REFORM UNDER FREDERICK 
II, 1760–1785 (1987); ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE NEW MERCENARIES 5, 6, 45, 58 (1985); LYNN 
MONTROSS, WAR THROUGH THE AGES (3d ed. 1960); H.W. PARKE, GREEK MERCENARY SOLDIERS 
FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE BATTLE OF IPSUS (1933); Maj. Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-
Colonial Myopia: A Call To Recognize and Regulate Private Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1 
(2003); Rosky, supra note 6, at 913.  
 24. Samantha M. Shapiro, Iraq, Outsourced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 76. 
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A. Commercial Privatization in National Defense  
With scores of high-profile, multimillion dollar contracts to rebuild 
Iraq and Afghanistan and to modernize and upgrade America’s weapons of 
war recently awarded to private firms with particularly close ties to 
government decisionmakers, it is not surprising that contemporary 
observers have been echoing President Eisenhower’s warnings against the 
union of government officials and defense industrialists aligned in their 
foreign policy aims and financial interests.25 At the close of his second 
term in the White House, Eisenhower cautioned: 
 In the councils of government, we must guard against the 
acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, 
by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous 
rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 
 We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our 
liberties or democratic processes . . . . [O]nly an alert and 
knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of huge 
industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful 
methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper 
together.26
Over the decades since Eisenhower’s famous speech, concerns 
regarding the defense industry’s influence over American foreign policy 
have persisted and continue to unsettle us.27 Exacerbating these long-
 25. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS COOPERATION, 1945–1964: CORPORATISM IN THE POST-
WAR ERA (Robert F. Himmelberg ed., 1994); THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND UNITED 
STATES FOREIGN POLICY (Omer L. Carey ed., 1969); SEN. WILLIAM PROXMIRE, REPORT FROM 
WASTELAND: AMERICA’S MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1970); STEPHEN ROSEN, TESTING THE 
THEORY OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (1973); SINGER, supra note 20.  
 26. See Eisenhower, supra note 10.  
 27. See, e.g., Brian Duffy et al., The Enemy Within, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 4, 1988, at 
16; Eric Gelman et al., A Giant Under Fire: General Dynamics Faces Numerous Charges of Fraud, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 1985, at 24; Anthony Lewis, Editorial, The Military-Industrial Complex, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1985, at A31; William Proxmire, Editorial, Cleaning Up Procurement: Why Military 
Contracting Is Corrupt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1985, at C3; Christopher H. Schmitt, Wages of Sin, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 13, 2002, at 28 (“In the past dozen years, 30 of the 43 largest federal 
contractors have racked up more than 400 enforcement cases, resulting in at least 28 criminal 
convictions, 286 civil settlements, and 88 administrative settlements, mostly involving their 
government contracts.”); Hugh Sidey, Ike’s Nightmare Is Upon Us, TIME, Sept. 14, 1987, at 24; Leslie 
Wayne, Pentagon Brass and Military Contractors’ Gold, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2004, at C1. 
 For a sampling of earlier discussions of war profiteering, see DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 
256–80 (1992); WALTER MILLIS, ROAD TO WAR: AMERICA 1914–1917 (1935); Sam Nunn, The 
Impact of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Federal Policy, 21 GA. L. REV. 
17, 19–21 (1986). 
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standing concerns today, of course, are the exceedingly cozy relationships 
between the government and the defense industry,28 the elevated levels of 
military spending in the aftermath of September 11, 2001,29 and an 
ongoing war and occupation in Iraq. These temporally converging and 
reinforcing narratives combine to make the military-industrial story of 
today a particularly riveting and troubling one. Indeed, this story has 
invited the public to wonder whether decisions to intervene overseas are 
ever influenced by the contractors who supply the weaponry and services 
necessary to vanquish our enemies?30 To ask if military alliances are 
 28. See supra note 15; SINGER, supra note 20; Edmund L. Andrews & Elizabeth Becker, Bush 
Got $500,000 from Companies that Got Contracts, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2003, at A8; 
Baum, supra note 14 (“Of the 30 members of the Defense Policy Board—the influential Pentagon 
advisory panel from which Richard Perle was recently forced to resign—at least nine are directors or 
officers of companies that won $76 billion in defense contracts in 2001 and 2002.”); Bryan Bender, 
Study Finds Cronyism in Iraq, Afghanistan Contracts, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2003, at A1; Bob 
Herbert, Editorial, Spoils of War, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at A27 (describing former Secretary of 
State Schultz’s role as both a director of Bechtel and as chairman of “the advisory board of the 
Committee for the Liberation of Iraq, a fiercely pro-war group with close ties to the White 
House. . . [that is] committed . . . to work beyond the liberation of Iraq to the reconstruction of its 
economy”); P.W. Singer, Editorial, The Enron Pentagon, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2003, at L12; Tim 
Shorrock, CACI and Its Friends, NATION, June 21, 2004, at 6 (emphasizing the important relationship 
between the rapidly growing government contractor CACI—one of the companies implicated in the 
Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal—and Richard Armitage, a key State Department official); Wayne, 
supra note 27 (“288 top government officials since 1997 have taken positions at the 20 largest military 
contractors at levels high enough that they were disclosed in federal regulatory filings.”). 
 29. See Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Urges Congress To Increase Military Budget, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 16, 2002, at A8; James Dao, Bush Sees Big Rise in Military Budget for Next 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 2, 2002, at A1; James Dao, Warm Reaction to Bigger Pentagon Budget, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2002, at A28; Ellen McCarthy, Post-9/11 Mergers Brought Problems: Government Service Firms 
Often Leaped Before They Looked, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2004, at E1; Editorial, Spending Spree at 
the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2003, at A22; Leslie Wayne, Rumsfeld Warns He Will Ask 
Congress for More Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2003, at A23; Tim Weiner, A Vast Arms Buildup, Yet 
Not Enough for Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at C1; Jonathan Weisman & Thomas E. Ricks, 
Increase in War Funding Sought: Bush to Request $70 Billion More, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2004, at 
A1. 
 30. See William D. Hartung, Editorial, The Booming Defense Business, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2003, at B15; Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissmann, Arms Sellers Calling Shots, BALT. SUN, May 
16, 1999, at 1C; Shorrock, supra note 28 (commenting on defense contractor CACI’s “unabashed . . . 
back[ing] of Bush’s foreign policy and . . . key support[] of the military campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan”); Ken Silverstein & Chuck Neubauer, Advisor Perle Has Given Seminars on Ways To 
Profit from Possible Conflicts Discussed by Defense Board He Sits On, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 2003, at 
A1; Leslie Wayne, After High-Pressure Years, Contractors Tone Down Missile Defense Lobbying, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2000, at A6; see also Anthony Bianco & Stephanie Anderson Forest, 
Outsourcing War, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2003, at 68 (describing the Pentagon’s heavy reliance on 
private military companies); Day, supra note 13 (describing KBR’s growing responsibilities as a result 
of the Defense Department’s desire to reduce costs and downsize its payroll); James Surowiecki, 
Army, Inc., NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 2004, at 27 (noting that the U.S. military is “more like a complex 
partnership between the armed forces and a select group of private companies; one half expects to see 
the C.E.O.s of Halliburton and Bechtel on the Joint Chiefs of Staff”). See generally P.W. Singer, 
Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and its Ramifications for 
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likewise ever promoted by those who will most benefit from new lucrative 
opportunities to sell weaponry in untapped markets?31 And finally, to 
query whether any of the impetus behind so-called “nation building” in 
failed states is led by those very contractors who will, ultimately, bid for 
the rights also to rebuild the nation?32  
But this story and the questions it provokes, however politically 
exciting and scandalous, actually belong in yesterday’s news cycle—at 
least when it comes to privatization. Analytically speaking, these 
commercial defense contracts, which range from building satellites to 
emptying latrines, introduce few, if any, novel problems from the 
standpoint of understanding and theorizing privatization as a legal or 
normative phenomenon.33 Instead, these arrangements, precisely because 
they are commercial in nature and do not involve the delegation of 
International Security, 26 INT’L SECURITY 3, 186 (2001), available at 2002 WLNR 200092. 
 31. See Terence O’Hara, Carlyle Disavows Plan to Get Kuwait Business, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 
2004, at E1; Steven Pearlstein, Defense Contractors Lobbying for Increased Sales to Countries in the 
Persian Gulf Area, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1991, at C1; Eric Schmitt, Arms Makers’ Latest Tune: “Over 
There, Over There,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1992, at C5; Katharine Q. Seelye, Arms Contractors Spend 
To Promote an Expanded NATO, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at A1; Tim Smart, Fighting for Foreign 
Sales: Arms Firms Increasingly Dependent on Deals Abroad, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1999, at E1; 
Ralph Vartabedian & Tyler Marshall, U.S. Defense Industry Heeds Call to Arms—by Foreigners, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 30, 1993, at A1. See generally MORTON H. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND 
FOREIGN POLICY (1974) (characterizing ways in which private interest groups, including defense 
contractors, will seek to influence foreign policy); James M. Lindsay, Getting Uncle Sam’s Ear: Will 
Ethnic Lobbies Cramp America’s Foreign Policy Style, 20 BROOKINGS REV. 37 (2002); LARRY 
MAKINSON, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, OUTSOURCING THE PENTAGON: WHO BENEFITS 
FROM THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY? (2004), at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/pns/report.aspx?aid=385 (last visited Dec. 19, 2004) (noting that the 
top 737 contractors have contributed approximately $214 million dollars to political campaigns 
between 1998 and 2003). 
 32. See Baum, supra note 14; Bender, supra note 28; Herbert, supra note 28; Hartung, supra 
note 30; Keith Naughton & Michael Hirsh, Fanning the Flames: Cheney’s Halliburton Ties, 
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 2003, at 6; Lorraine Woellert, Richard Perle Is Not Alone, BUS. WK., Apr. 7, 
2003, at 42; Editorial, War Profiteering, NATION, May 12, 2003, at 3.  
 33. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1507, 1522 (2001). Professor Beermann writes: 
No business produces all the goods it uses, and the same reasons that lead firms to contract 
out should lead government to contract out. Government may, for example, shut down a 
heating plant used to heat government buildings and purchase heat from private sources. . . . 
 In my view, contracting out of support goods and services does not raise serious 
accountability issues since the source and quality of such goods and services are not normally 
something the public cares much about. Of course, corruption in the procurement process 
may be an issue, and obviously procurement fraud does not exist without procurement, but 
government officials remain accountable for overspending on goods and services, and the 
savings from competition to sell to the government is likely to dwarf any increased potential 
for fraud that procurement entails. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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sensitive (let alone lethal) policy discretion,34 are conceptually 
indistinguishable from other, “garden-variety” contracting-out initiatives 
currently coursing through the veins of American government.35 Thus, 
notwithstanding the fact that the privatized tasks may bring contractors to 
international hotspots, authorize them to work on top secret projects, and 
(as an essential, or sole-source, supplier) even give them leverage over the 
U.S. government,36 the tasks themselves still comport well with the current 
President Bush’s promise to outsource only those services that are not 
“inherently governmental.”37 Indeed, any harms that may flow from this 
 34.  See id. (noting that “contracting out of support goods and services does not raise serious 
accountability issues”); Guttman, supra note 3, at 896 (indicating that “[w]here [contractors] are relied 
upon solely for ‘commercial’ products or services (e.g. janitorial service, office supplies, utilities, 
weaponry) there is logic to their governance by distinct sets of rules”); Rosky, supra note 6, at 906 
(emphasizing that “early defense contractors were [not] private military institutions . . . They did not 
fight wars; they produced military equipment and supplies”); see also Federal Activities Inventory 
Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-270, § 2(a), 112 Stat. 2382 (requiring executive agencies to 
submit lists of non-inherently governmental jobs to the Office of Management and Budget to have 
them earmarked for potential outsourcing); CIRCULAR NO. A-76, supra note 1; John J. DiIulio, Jr., 
Response Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1271 (2003); Freeman, 
supra note 3; Minow, supra note 19. 
 35. See infra Part II.C; see also SAVAS, supra note 3, at 118–20 (describing the overwhelming 
motivation driving privatization initiatives as being grounded in a desire for greater efficiency and cost 
savings).  
 36. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 3, at 873, 888 (highlighting the problems that may arise when 
entities outside of the government possess technical and technological expertise that the government 
itself no longer possesses); Stan Crock, Editorial, The Way the Military Does Business, WASH. POST, 
July 22, 1997, at A15 (noting that when there is limited competition among private sector contractors, 
the government may become dependent on one or a handful of companies); Michael Hirsh, The Great 
Technology Giveaway?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 2 (noting how consolidation of the defense 
industry has left the United States with very few suppliers of essential governmental goods and 
services); MAKINSON, supra note 31 (detailing the scope of sole source, no-bid contracts); cf. Dru 
Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 
83, 89–92 (2003) (describing how a single contractor operating in a market with high start-up costs can 
exert a great deal of pressure on its governmental clients); Jonathan Rabinovitz, In Connecticut, A 
Privately Run Welfare Program Sinks into Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1997, at B1 (underscoring the 
difficulties for government agencies to reform a program once they come to rely on a private 
contractor).  
 37. See Guttman, supra note 3, at 891–94; Stevenson, Government, supra note 1; see also 48 
C.F.R. § 7.301 (1999) (“It is the policy of the Government to . . . rely generally on private commercial 
sources for supplies and services” except with regard to inherently governmental functions); GEN. 
ACCT’G OFFICE, NO. GGD-92-11, ARE SERVICE CONTRACTORS PERFORMING INHERENTLY 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS? (1991); Office of Federal Procurement Policy: Policy Letter on 
Inherently Governmental Functions, 57 Fed. Reg. 45,096 (Sept. 30, 1992); Freeman, supra note 6, at 
172 (characterizing a set of core governmental functions—including national defense—as inherently 
governmental and not easily outsourced); Stevenson, supra note 36, at 83 (describing the Bush 
administration’s order for federal agencies to take inventory of their functions and determine which 
ones should be subject to privatization and which ones should be preserved as inherently 
governmental); Oliver E. Williamson, Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost 
Economics Perspective, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 322–24 (1999); Baum, supra note 14 (describing 
Circular No. A-76 as a Reagan administration memorandum urging outsourcing in all aspects of 
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sort of privatization result principally from poor contract management, 
inadequate oversight, and insufficient fidelity to conflict-of-interest laws;38 
they speak mainly to issues of corruption and mismanagement rather than 
to improper delegations of government responsibilities.39 After all, food, 
custodial, maintenance, and even construction projects characterize that 
which is ancillary to America’s national security apparatus—or, for that 
matter, to America’s public policymaking prerogatives more generally. 
B. Transitioning to Combat-Related Privatization 
But, of late, a radical new development in military privatization has 
quietly and slowly begun to take hold—adding new complexity to the 
military-industrial dyad. Confined for decades strictly to commercial 
functions, defense-oriented privatization over the past ten years has 
expanded in directions that would seemingly belie any stock assurances 
government programs when it is efficient to do so).  
 38. See, e.g., Guttman, supra note 3, at 888 (noting that many of the key federal conflict-of-
interest laws do not govern the behavior of federal contractors); Deaver Was in White House When His 
Firm Was Set Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1986, at A34; Renae Merle, Recruiting Uncle Sam: The 
Military Uses a Revolving Door to Defense Jobs, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2004, at E1; Renae Merle & 
Jerry Markon, Ex-Pentagon Official Admits Job Deal, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2004, at A1; Judith 
Miller, Navy Secretary Said to Keep Ties to Company Aiding Arms Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 
1982, at A1; see also R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Deal To Lease Tankers Criticized: Report: Procedures 
Waived for Boeing, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2004, at E1; Jackie Spinner & Thomas E. Ricks, Halliburton 
Unit Probed for Possible Overbilling of U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003, at A1; Wayne, Growing, 
supra note 15; Wayne, Air Force, supra note 15; Wayne, Ex-Pentagon, supra note 15. See generally 
Beth Nolan, Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of 
Government Officials, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 57 (1992).  
 39. See Beermann, supra note 33, at 1522; Guttman, supra note 3, at 921–22; Gillian E. Metzger, 
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1462 (2003). Improper, of course, may not 
mean illegal or unconstitutional. The non-delegation doctrine has not been robustly interpreted, and 
moreover, it refers chiefly to congressional delegations, rather than executive ones. See, e.g., Indus. 
Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (noting that 
the non-delegation doctrine ensures that important decisions are made by “the branch of our 
Government most responsive to the popular will”); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 277 (1967) 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting that congressional delegations are at times improper when they 
transfer policymaking functions to executive agencies not as responsive to the People); Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (describing the non-delegation 
doctrine as crucial to ensuring that “fundamental policy decisions . . . will be made not by an appointed 
official but by the body immediately responsible to the people”); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 
(1892) (“[T]hat Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally 
recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the 
Constitution.”); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 6, at 1871. Hence I am not drawing a 
direct comparison to the constitutional principle of non-delegation, but rather I am simply suggesting 
that outsourcing sensitive military functions may be illegitimate to the extent it engenders an array of 
constitutional and prudential problems. 
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that “inherently governmental” responsibilities would remain untouched 
and unaffected by the current privatization revolution.40  
1. “[T]hey are not just running the soup kitchens.”41
Today, the U.S. military contracts out more than just catering and 
laundry responsibilities; and more than just billion dollar infrastructure or 
fighter-jet contracts. The federal government now also outsources a host of 
combat-related tasks and responsibilities in zones of conflict. For example, 
it is becoming increasingly commonplace to find private agents at the situs 
of conflict as communications specialists, intelligence operatives, target 
selectors, surveillance pilots, armed security and peacekeeping agents, 
hostage rescuers, interrogators, and weapons systems operators. 
Additionally, contractors serve as strategic planners and military advisors 
in the field, in the Pentagon, for foreign armies, and across the United 
States as ROTC instructors.42 As such, their places in sensitive positions of 
authority and policy discretion and their pivotal roles in lethal 
engagements often set them apart from mere commercial contractors and, 
moreover, have the effect of blurring the distinction between commercial 
contractor and battlefield soldier,43 in ways civilians staffing the mess halls 
or designing submarines never did.  
In a word, then, we are witnessing the emergence of contemporary 
“mercenaries” carrying out the assignments that were previously and 
exclusively reserved for uniformed American soldiers entrusted with 
combat-related responsibilities and disciplined through the military chain-
of-command. For what it is worth, today’s military contractor operating in 
the United States has come a long way in shedding the baggage of and 
disavowing kinship to his predecessors, largely known as pirates and 
scoundrels who would offer their murderous service to the highest 
bidder.44 But, however civilized, skilled, and professional he may be, he is 
 40. See infra Part III.A.  
 41. Wayne, supra note 2 (quoting John H. Hamre, deputy secretary of defense under President 
Clinton).  
 42. See also Major Lisa L. Turner & Major Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip of the Spear, 51 
A.F. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2001); Bianco & Forest, supra note 30 (describing Secretary Rumsfeld’s desire 
to expand the military’s fighting capabilities without increasing the size of the regular army); Wayne, 
supra note 2 (describing the extent to which the U.S. government relies on private support); Yeoman, 
supra note 4. 
 43. Although within the vernacular of the U.S. military “soldiers” typically refers only to 
members of the U.S. Army (and not to Marines, or sailors, or airmen), I will, at times, use the term 
more generically to describe all military personnel. 
 44. See James Dao, ‘Outsourced’ or ‘Mercenary’, He’s No Soldier, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, 
at D3 (contrasting less scrupulous mercenaries of earlier generations with the more professional breed 
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still not an American soldier, sworn to uphold the Constitution and 
governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice; instead, he is a private 
agent, principally motivated by profit.45  
2. The Advent of Combat-Related Privatization 
Combat-related military privatization arose in the 1990s at a time when 
considerable cutbacks in the size of the U.S. Armed Forces were 
underway,46 when technological and geostrategic changes transformed 
that currently occupies an important role in the American military); Pape & Meyer, supra note 2 
(quoting British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw as saying “[t]oday’s world is a far cry from the 1960s, 
when private military activity usually meant mercenaries of the rather unsavory kind involved in 
postcolonial or neocolonial conflicts”); Yeoman, supra note 4, at 42 (describing the contractors as 
patriots still eager to serve their country). But see SINGER, supra note 20, at 115–18 (noting how 
private military firms still conduct business with and help bolster repressive regimes). 
 Legally, most American privateers are not actually “mercenaries,” at least as defined by 
international law. Mercenaries are a subset of contractors who fight for a nation that is not their own 
native or adopted one. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art. 47, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3; see also SINGER, supra note 20, at 42–44; Susan S. Gibson, Lack of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction over Civilians: A New Look at an Old Problem, 148 MIL. L. REV. 114 (1995); Herbert M. 
Howe, The Privatization of International Affairs: Global Order and the Privatization of Security, 22 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 1 (1998); Dino Kritsiotis, Mercenaries and the Privatization of Warfare, 22 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 11, 18 (1998); L.C. Green, The Status of Mercenaries in International Law, 
9 MANITOBA L.J. 201, 203 (1979). 
 45. See Wayne, supra note 2 (“In war, while providing functions crucial to the combat effort, 
they are not soldiers. Private contractors are not obligated to take orders or to follow military codes of 
conduct. Their legal obligation is solely to an employment contract, not to their country.”); Yeoman, 
supra note 4 (“We have individuals who are not obligated to follow orders or follow the Military Code 
of Conduct. Their main obligation is to their employer, not their country.”) (quoting Congresswoman 
Jan Schakowsky); cf. Bianco & Forest, supra note 30 (quoting a U.S. Army publication 
acknowledging that “[c]ontractor loyalty [is] to the almighty dollar”); Wesley Clark, America’s Virtual 
Empire, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1, 2003, at 20 (noting how members of America’s volunteer army 
have no passion for glory, fortune, or fame and prefer instead to accomplish a mission and return to 
their families). 
 Another category of non-U.S. military combatant is the foreign soldier working for the United 
States, either for money or out of a commonality of interest. These contributors, which include 
members of the Northern Alliance and Kurdish nationals, have been on display most recently in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively. See, e.g., Michael Ware, Lying in Wait in Kurdistan, TIME, Mar. 3, 
2003, at 48; Kevin Whitelaw, War in the Shadows, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 11, 2002, at 48; 
see also ROBERT M. BLACKBURN, MERCENARIES AND LYNDON JOHNSON’S “MORE FLAGS”: THE 
HIRING OF KOREAN, FILIPINO, AND THAI SOLDIERS IN THE VIETNAM WAR (1991) (describing the 
United States’s use of foreign soldiers in Vietnam); JANICE E. THOMPSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, 
AND SOVEREIGNS: STATE-BUILDING AND EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE 
94 (1994) (same). Although these actors’ relationship to the United States is quite interesting, such an 
examination is well beyond the scope of this Article. 
 46. Recall how the demise of the Soviet Union sparked a massive downsizing of the U.S. 
military. The absence of a large-scale nuclear threat coupled with Americans’ demand for a fiscal 
peace dividend for winning the Cold War (which had been won at the expense of balanced budgets and 
low national debts) emboldened efforts to slash the U.S. military. See David A. Kaplow & Philip G. 
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national security practices,47 and when traditional types of covert 
operations, utilized in Southeast Asia in the 1970s and Latin America in 
the 1980s, had fallen into serious disfavor.48  
Schrag, Carrying a Big Carrot: Linking Multilateral Disarmament and Development Assistance, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 993, 1038 (1991); McGeorge Bundy, From Cold War Toward Trusting Peace, 
FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1990, at 197; Alan Tonelson, Superpower Without a Sword, FOREIGN AFF., June 
1993, at 166; see also Merle, supra note 13 (describing the heavy downsizing that began in 1991 as a 
“push to privatize anything and everything”) (quoting P.W. Singer).  
 Between the first Gulf War and the months leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S. 
Army personnel numbers were nearly cut in half, from 780,000 to 480,000; during the same period, 
the overall active military shrunk by 500,000. See Wayne, supra note 2; see also Tepperman, supra 
note 13 (noting that this shrinkage has not only “caused manpower shortages within the services [but 
also] . . . a glut of retired officers flooding the private sector”). 
 47. During the 1990s, the Pentagon began shifting away from a “forward deployed” Army with 
sizable military forces positioned overseas to a smaller, “power projection” Army with most of its 
personnel stationed in the United States. This change in force size and force location created a number 
of sensitive military jobs that—because they are far removed from the frontlines—have the apparent 
trappings of commercial service provision, but actually involve the exercise of inherently 
governmental, lethal responsibilities. See DANA PRIEST, THE MISSION (2003); Gibson, supra note 44; 
Bredemeier, supra note 13 (noting that today, “[l]ogistics . . . is the heart of warfare, and much of it 
has been privatized”); Kurlantzick, supra note 20, at 17. Simply put, no longer are the frontline 
soldiers with guns and grenades the only real combatants in a military campaign. See Matthew 
Brzezinski, The Unmanned Army, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, at F38 (quoting a high-ranking Air 
Force official as saying that “[i]t’s possible, that in our lifetime we will be able to run a conflict 
without ever leaving the United States”); Wayne, supra note 2 (noting the sensitive work private 
agents perform and how critical such work is to successful combat operations); see also Michael N. 
Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century War and Its Possible 
Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051, 1061–64 (1998); John M. 
Broder, Far Behind the Front, But Not Out of Danger, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2003, at B2; Vernon 
Loeb, An Unlikely Super-Warrior Emerges in Afghan War: U.S. Combat Controllers Guide Bombers 
to Precision Targets, WASH. POST, May 19, 2002, at A16. Technology has made traditional—and 
even modern—forms of warfare quite primitive.  
 If much of a given war is waged from the air or from gunships and battle cruisers hundreds of 
miles from the physical targets, there may be a need to extend and enlarge the conventional definition 
of a combat zone and of a “combatant,” if only for the purposes of identifying what range of actors are 
being delegated responsibilities for exercising lethal force and managing national security interests. 
Accordingly, this possible need for a definitional expansion comes at a particularly vexing moment: 
The definition of combatant may be broadening just as the breadth of the citizen-soldier’s role in the 
American military narrows; in his or her stead, oftentimes, we may find an employee of a private 
corporation intimately involved in operating the machinery of war. See, e.g., Major Michael E. 
Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubicon?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 
111 (2001); Turner & Norton, supra note 42, at 25–27 (2001); see also Merle, supra note 13 
(suggesting that in modern warfare, the frontline is becoming an increasingly irrelevant term since 
actors traditionally understood as “staff” may be the ones launching the missiles). 
 48. Covert operations and proxy wars, hallmarks of the extended reach of the American Cold 
War national security apparatus for the past half-century, were in the 1990s increasingly untenable due 
to a range of legislative, popular, and diplomatic constraints. Perhaps private military firms today 
perform some of the tasks and serve in some of the functions previously undertaken by special covert 
intelligence forces and/or leaders of American-supported regimes. The Pentagon and the State 
Department, increasingly constrained in their use of “black” operations, may instead turn to 
contractors, who (as will be discussed below) are regulated more loosely than American intelligence 
officials, to bypass public attention and, often, congressional scrutiny and carry out policy endeavors 
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Today’s contractors, for their part, have taken considerable steps to 
upgrade the image of what has historically been an unsavory profession, 
thus helping to make the outsourcing of combat responsibilities more 
palatable. Indeed, contemporary American outfits are not dyed-in-the-
wool bands of ruthless warriors, but rather they are incorporated 
businesses often headed by retired generals and colonels who have traded 
in their fatigues for pinstripes and left the barracks for the Beltway. Their 
employees, in turn, are not a rag-tag lot pulled from the ranks of society’s 
denizens like the French Foreign Legion of yesteryear,49 but are likewise 
often recruited from among the most decorated echelons of the American 
military establishment.50  
For example, one notable contractor, MPRI, a major participant in the 
Balkans during the war-ridden 1990s as well as in the Latin American 
drug wars, boasts of having “more generals per square foot than the 
Pentagon.”51 Indeed, MPRI’s veritable “dream team” includes General 
Carl Vuono, former Army chief of staff during the invasion of Panama and 
the first Gulf War, Lt. General Harry Soyster, a onetime director of the 
Defense Intelligence Agency,52 and General Crosbie E. Saint, the former 
commander of the U.S. Army in Europe.53 MPRI advertises a breadth of 
competency that includes airborne operations, the provision of air support 
for ground troops and convoys, counterinsurgency work, force integration, 
tactical and strategic intelligence, reconnaissance, security assistance, and 
weapons control.54 Another contractor, SAIC, a corporate giant with 
annual revenues topping $1 billion, boasts of a blue-ribbon directorate that 
that would not be achievable if carried out through conventional or previously used “unconventional” 
(i.e., covert operations and proxy wars) routes. See SINGER, supra note 20; Marshall Silverberg, The 
Separation of Powers and Control of the CIA’s Covert Operations, 68 TEX. L. REV. 575 (1990).  
 49. See ANTHONY CLAYTON, FRANCE, SOLDIERS AND AFRICA (1988); TONY GERAGHTY, 
MARCH OR DIE: A NEW HISTORY OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION (1986); DOUGLAS PORCH, THE 
FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION: A COMPLETE HISTORY OF THE LEGENDARY FIGHTING FORCE (1991). 
 50. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 76–78; PETER TICKLER, THE MODERN MERCENARY 71 (1987); 
Milliard, supra note 23, at 14; Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global 
Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (1999); Bianco & Forest, supra note 30, 
at 74 (noting that many contemporary outfits of hired guns are “ragtag units”); Fred Coleman, 
Colonial Grunts No Longer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 1, 1993, at 74 (describing history of 
rogue volunteers who joined the French Foreign Legion); David Shearer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN 
POL’Y, Fall 1998, at 68, 71. 
 51. von Hoffman, supra note 20, at 79; see also Esther Schrader, U.S. Companies Hired to Train 
Foreign Armies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, at A1. 
 52. See Graham, Croatia, supra note 13. 
 53. See Wayne, supra note 2; see also Matthew J. Gaul, Note, Regulating the New Privateers: 
Private Military Service Contracting and the Modern Marque and Reprisal Clause, 31 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1489 (1998); Stan Crock, Trouble Is Our Business, BUS. WK., Nov. 20, 1995, at 52.  
 54. Milliard, supra note 23, at 11–12.  
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includes two former defense secretaries (William Perry and Melvin Laird) 
and two former CIA directors (John Deutch and Robert Gates).55 Other 
notable—and influential—firms such as Blackwater USA, DynCorp, 
Ronco, CACI, and Titan, are also led by former high-ranking military 
officers.56 The presence of distinguished leaders and reputable ex-soldiers 
impresses upon government decisionmakers that these businesses will be 
responsible, professional partners. 
In addition to their all-star rosters, these firms have gained credibility 
and legitimacy because of their corporate ties. Many of the major 
contracting firms have close connections not only to the Pentagon but also 
to Wall Street, and are actually divisions or subsidiaries of such prominent 
businesses as Northrop-Grumman, Booz Allen Hamilton, the Carlyle 
Group, and Bechtel. Hence, corporate oversight and shareholder pressure 
may provide external sources of discipline and conformity.57  
 55. See Silverstein, supra note 13. 
 56. For detailed discussions of these firms, see, for example SINGER, supra note 20; Gaul, supra 
note 53, at 1493–99. See also Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contract Workers Implicated in February 
Army Report on Prison Abuse Remain on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at A6 (describing CACI 
as a 41-year-old public company that does extensive information technology contract work for the 
U.S. government and that has only just, in the 1990s, expanded to offer military intelligence and field 
work services); Shorrock, supra note 28; Barry Yeoman, Editorial, Need an Army? Just Pick Up the 
Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004, at A19 (noting that Blackwater provides services in Iraq such as 
soldier training and convoy protection, and that it employs ex-Green Berets, Army Rangers, and Navy 
SEALs). 
 57. See Wayne, supra note 2; Jack M. Beermann, Administrative-Law-Like Obligations on 
Private[ized] Entities, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1717, 1721–22 (2002); see also Sean Creehan, Soldiers of 
Fortune 500: International Mercenaries, HARV. INT’L REV., Winter 2002, at 6–7. Creehan writes: 
“The organization of mercenaries into corporations that function like consulting firms has put distance 
between them and their activities. Mercenary corporations’ increasing efficiency and self-regulation is 
influencing the way legitimate governments view mercenaries as instruments of state policy.” Id. at 6; 
see also Pape & Meyer, supra note 2, at 22. Notably, Lockheed Martin, poised to acquire Titan in 
Spring of 2004, quickly backed off once it was made public that Titan was intimately involved in the 
prisoner-abuse scandals in Iraq. See Greg Jaffe et al., Titan Worker Is Cited in Iraqi Scandal, WALL 
ST. J., May 21, 2004, at A3; Renae Merle, Prisoner-Abuse Report Adds to Titan’s Troubles; Lockheed 
Plan To Buy Firm Already Stalled, WASH. POST, May 7, 2004, at E3. But see Deborah Hastings, Use 
of Civilian Contractors in War Zones Is at Record Levels, AP, Oct. 19, 2004, available at 
http://nunnews.net/nucnews/2004nn/0410nn/041019nn.htm#329 (last visited Dec. 27, 2004) (noting 
CACI’s considerable profits in 2004, notwithstanding its troubles related to Abu Ghraib and indicating 
that Titan, which also was involved in Abu Ghraib, received up to $400 million from the U.S. 
government for additional translators in the wake of the Iraq prison abuse scandals); McCarthy, supra 
note 29 (characterizing the lack of effective corporate control over defense firms, especially 
subsidiaries, in the post-September 11 contracting frenzy); Ellen McCarthy, Demand Helps CACI 
Profit Increase 56%, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 2004, at E5 [hereinafter McCarthy, Demand] (describing 
CACI’s ability to continue to reap massive profits notwithstanding the political and legal fallout from 
its involvement in the Abu Ghraib scandal). 
 There are other paths that these outfits, which work closely with the U.S. government, could have 
taken. They could perhaps get more business if they were to operate off-shore and sell their services to 
the highest world bidder. Military firms headquartered elsewhere have engaged in outright, unabashed 
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3. A Survey of Recent Combat-Related Private Contracts  
As mentioned above, in recent years, private military firms have 
protected the Karzai administration in still-unstable Afghanistan, secured 
American civil and military installations and served as interrogators in 
Iraq, bolstered and then counterbalanced the military capabilities of both 
the Bosnians and Croats in the Balkans, engaged in surveillance, 
reconnaissance, and coca-crop destroying as well as in counter-insurgency 
missions in Latin America, staffed security details for American officials 
in, among other areas, the Middle East, and attempted to bring some 
stability to war-ravaged Rwanda. This policy of federal contracting with 
private forces to serve in an array of critical zones of conflict to support 
American national security and foreign policy interests involves the 
delegation of not simply commercial responsibilities and accordingly 
represents a startling departure from previous partnerships with the private 
sector. In an effort to provide more specific details, I discuss six case 
studies. 
a. Latin America 
The United States’s lukewarm commitment to fighting the War on 
Drugs at its sources has set the stage for the introduction of military 
contractors. With stringent limitations imposed by Congress regarding the 
number of U.S. Armed Forces personnel and the scope of their activities in 
Colombia,58 and therefore only a relatively modest contingent of U.S. 
warfare, especially in Africa, with fewer reservations. See infra Part V.C. The fact that the U.S.-based 
groups discussed in this Article have tied their fortunes to U.S interests does not necessarily make 
them morally better, but it does make them more reliable and accountable, even if the American 
contractors’ motivations are entirely self-interested. 
 58. See Catan et al., supra note 20; see also John Otis, U.S. Invasion of Colombia Urged, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 24, 2002, at A28 (describing long-standing restrictions against U.S. troops in 
counter-insurgency efforts); Yeoman, supra note 4, at 43 (“Federal law bans U.S. soldiers from 
participating in Colombia’s war against left-wing rebels [who traffic in drugs to finance their 
insurgency] and from training army units with ties to right-wing paramilitaries infamous for torture 
and political killings.”). Accordingly, there usually is never more than a small group of American 
military and diplomatic personnel on the ground, coordinating efforts with the local governments. See 
GEN. ACCT’G. OFFICE, NO. GAO-01-1021, DRUG CONTROL: STATE DEPARTMENT PROVIDES 
REQUIRED AVIATION PROGRAM OVERSIGHT, BUT SAFETY AND SECURITY SHOULD BE ENHANCED 17–
18 (2001) [hereinafter GAO, AVIATION REPORT]; SINGER, supra note 20, at 206–09 (noting 
congressional unease about allowing U.S. troops to work with Colombian military units with egregious 
human rights records and who fight rebels rather than narcotraffickers); Kurlantzick, supra note 20. 
But see Editorial, Sliding into Colombia’s Morass, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 2004, at C18 (noting 
Congress’s recent decision to authorize an increase in the number of troops to be deployed in 
Colombia); ERIC GREEN, U.S. STATE DEP’T, STATE DEPT. EXPLAINS NEED FOR MORE U.S. 
PERSONNEL IN COLOMBIA (2004), at http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Oct/14-50113.html (last 
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troops and officials present on the ground, the Clinton administration 
turned to contractors, awarding them over $1.2 billion in contract work to 
slow down the production and exportation of narcotics.59 In this capacity, 
private agents, notably from DynCorp and MPRI, have helped train local 
enforcement agents in counter narcotics work; but they have been more 
than just advisors: these contractors have flown sensitive reconnaissance 
missions, patrolled the skies to turn back (under the threat of force) 
smugglers, and piloted crop-dusters to destroy coca fields.60 Their efforts 
have not gone unchallenged and, as a result, military contractors have at 
times been drawn into firefights with narco-traffickers and even leftist 
rebels,61 some of whom had no direct connection to the drug trade.62
In the course of their dangerous work, a number of American 
contractors have been killed;63 these casualties have largely escaped public 
notice, media attention, and congressional scrutiny.64 Indeed, relatively 
little is known about the extent of America’s involvement in Colombia, let 
alone details regarding the delegation of specific activities to private firms. 
And, although the GAO rated DynCorp’s performance in Latin America as 
visited Nov. 20, 2004). 
 59. See Yeoman, supra note 4, at 43 (noting that “since the late 1990s, the United States has paid 
private military companies an estimated $1.2 billion . . . to eradicate coca crops and to help the 
Colombian army put down rebels who use the drug trade to finance their insurgency”); see also 
Kurlantzick, supra note 20; Pape & Meyer, supra note 2; Tepperman, supra note 13, at 10; Wayne, 
supra note 2.  
 60. SINGER, supra note 20, at 206–08; Guillory, supra note 47, at 127; Juan Forero, 3 Americans 
on Search Mission Killed in Colombian Plane Crash, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2003, at A7 (describing 
the civilian contractors’ assignment to rescue American citizens held in hostile regions of Colombia); 
Tepperman, supra note 13, at 10–11; Wayne, supra note 2 (noting the dangers associated with the 
flight assignments of private military employees). 
 61. See Guillory, supra note 47, at 127 (noting DynCorp’s involvement in firefights with FARC 
leftist guerillas); Rosky, supra note 6, at 911 n.141; see also GAO, AVIATION REPORT, supra note 58 
(estimating that between 1998 and 2000 alone, military contractors for the U.S. government in Latin 
America came under fire nearly seventy times). 
 62. See Victoria Burnett et al., From Building Camps to Gathering Intelligence, Dozens of Tasks 
Once in the Hands of Soldiers Are Now Carried Out by Contractors, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2003, at 13; 
Catan et al., supra note 20; Forero, supra note 20; Gary Marx, U.S. Civilians Wage Drug War from 
Colombia’s Skies, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 2002, at A4; see also Wayne, supra note 2 (reporting that on 
one occasion, contractors shot down a plane over Peru carrying American missionaries, who were 
mistaken for drug traffickers).  
 63. Catan et al., supra note 20; Kurlantzick, supra note 20 (noting the deaths of at least eight 
American contractors). 
 64. See, e.g., Catan et al., supra note 20 (suggesting that the lack of media attention 
notwithstanding the contractors’ deaths is a main reason why the project in Colombia is still in 
existence and quoting a Colombian general as saying “Imagine if 20 American troops got killed here. 
Plan Colombia would be over”); Forero, supra note 20 (“My complaint about use of private 
contractors is their ability to fly under the radar and avoid any accountability.”) (quoting 
Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky); Tepperman, supra note 13, at 12; Wayne, supra note 2. 
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“unsatisfactory” over several years, the State Department repeatedly 
renewed the firm’s contract.65
b. The Balkans  
In the Balkans during the mid-1990s, the bloody contests between and 
among Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims produced unspeakable 
carnage and threatened to destabilize the entire region. The Clinton 
administration, hamstrung by U.N. arms embargos,66 hesitant allies,67 wary 
adversaries68—not to mention internal White House indecision and 
congressional opposition69 and, also, its desire to retain the appearance of 
an honest, neutral broker in the region70—was militarily limited in its 
ability to help quell the violence. Nevertheless, the Administration actively 
wanted to resolve the conflicts and chose, in part, to augment the relative 
military strength and self-sufficiency of the Croats and, later, the Bosnian 
Muslims to counter Serb aggression.71  
Unable, for the reasons mentioned above, to provide direct assistance 
through much of the years of fighting (but also unwilling to remain fully 
on the sidelines), the United States turned to private solutions. First, it 
 65. See GAO, AVIATION REPORT, supra note 58, at 7–8; see also infra notes 83 and 333 (noting 
that the U.S. government continues to use DynCorp elsewhere in the world despite the fact that 
DynCorp has been a problematic contractor in the Balkans and Afghanistan too). 
 66. In September, 1991, the Security Council imposed a mandatory arms embargo on all of 
Yugoslavia. See U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3009th mtg. at 43, U.N. Doc. S/RES/713 (1991); see also 
WARREN CHRISTOPHER, IN THE STREAM OF HISTORY: SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY FOR A NEW ERA 
(1998); Michael R. Fowler & Jessica Fryrear, Collective Security and the Fighting in the Balkans, 30 
N. KY. L. REV. 299, 325–26 (2003); Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of 
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 569, 583 (1992). 
 67. See BOB WOODWARD, THE CHOICE 255–56 (1996) (describing the indecision and hesitancy 
among European allies regarding more forceful intervention); Fowler & Fryrear, supra note 66, at 334 
(noting Europe’s fear that lifting the embargo would create greater instability and threaten to fracture 
the NATO alliance).  
 68. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 69. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 67, at 255–56; Steven L. Burg, Coercive Diplomacy in the 
Balkans: The U.S. Use of Force in Bosnia and Kosovo, in THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE 
DIPLOMACY 57, 64 (Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin eds., 2003) (describing how foreign policy in 
the Balkans became a critical issue in the 1996 presidential election); Roger Cohen, Why the Yanks Are 
Going. Yet Again., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1995, at D1 (citing “fears . . . of involvement in a Vietnam-
like quagmire”); Elaine Sciolino, Clinton on Serbs: Pacing Shaky Ground, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1993, 
at A6 (noting the general reluctance on the part of the Administration to enter the fray in the former 
Yugoslavia). 
 70. WOODWARD, supra note 67, at 257–60 (emphasizing how diplomatically important it was for 
the United States to appear neutral); John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen Van Evera, When Peace Means 
War, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 1995, at 16 (indicating that the United States could not arm the 
underdog Bosnian Muslims without sacrificing its status as a neutral peace broker).  
 71. See infra note 76 and accompanying text. 
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sought to bolster the fledgling Croatian state and arranged for the 
American firm, MPRI, to provide strategic and tactical military training as 
well as instruction in modern weaponry.72 In working “under the guise of a 
private commercial enterprise, MPRI could achieve what would otherwise 
be impermissible military objectives.”73 Since directly supplying training 
and materiel to the Croats would have violated the U.N. arms embargo, 
and perhaps prompted Russia, in turn, to fortify its traditional ally, the 
Serbs,74 the United States’s use of MPRI effectively permitted it to remain 
neutral yet still pursue its unilateral humanitarian and geostrategic interests 
in the region.75  
Then, later, to entice the Bosnian Muslims to accept the Dayton Peace 
Accords, the need arose to strengthen their position, too, vis-à-vis the 
Serbs.76 Again, the United States—intent on remaining ostensibly 
neutral—played matchmaker and, interestingly, recommended MPRI’s 
services.77 As a matter of fact, the Bosnians ultimately conditioned their 
 72. See Sapone, supra note 50, at 24–25; Schrader, supra note 51 (explaining how the U.N. 
embargo compelled the United States to rely on private agents to help support its political aims in the 
Balkans); Mark Thompson, Generals for Hire, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 34–36 (noting the extensive 
work MPRI has performed for Croatia during the years of strife in the Balkans).  
 73. Wayne, supra note 2; see also Schrader, supra note 51.  
 74. See WOODWARD, supra note 67, at 256 (noting that the Russians would quickly arm the 
Serbs if the United States were seen as violating the U.N. arms embargo by supplying the besieged 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats); Tony Barber, Yeltsin Proposes Lifting Sanctions on Belgrade, 
INDEPENDENT (London), July 28, 1995, at 8; Daniel Williams, Administration May Ask U.N. to Lift 
Arms Embargo on Bosnian Muslims, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 1994, at A14. 
 75. See Wayne, supra note 2; see also Gaul, supra note 53, at 1490 (“[W]ithout the involvement 
of a single American soldier . . . the MPRI project strengthened Croatia’s military and bolstered the 
nation’s strategic position in the region.”); Mearsheimer & Van Evera, supra note 70, at 16 (noting 
that the United States tacitly supported the flow of arms and military expertise to the Croatians in 
exchange for their support at the negotiating table).  
 76. See Gaul, supra note 53; Howe, supra note 44; Roger Cohen, Bosnia Asks U.S. Arms Aid as 
Part of Any Peace Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1995, at A10 (noting that the Bosnian Muslims 
conditioned their acceptance of the peace agreement on the assurances of greater military parity in the 
Balkans); William Safire, Editorial, Balance the Power, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at A17 (advocating 
the bolstering of the Bosnian Muslims’ military capacity to counterbalance that enjoyed by the 
Bosnian Serbs); Eric Schmitt, The Bosnian Playing Field, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at A8 (noting 
the American and European desire to enhance the military strength of the Bosnian Muslims vis-à-vis 
the Bosnian Serbs); see also Douglas Jehl, U.S. Looks Away as Iran Arms Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
15, 1995, at A3 (noting America’s willingness to permit Iran to violate the arms embargo and bolster 
Bosnian capabilities even before the Dayton agreement). See generally Warren Bass, The Triage at 
Dayton, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 1998, at 95. 
 77. Sapone, supra note 50, at 25 (noting how the United States encouraged Bosnia to procure 
private military support well-before the lifting of the arms embargo); Bianco & Forest, supra note 30; 
Roger Cohen, U.S. Cooling Ties to Croatia After Winking at its Buildup, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1995, at 
A1; Eric Schmitt, Retired American Troops to Aid Bosnian Army in Combat Skills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
15, 1996, at A1 (noting that the contracts for MPRI will be paid by Muslim nations, including Saudi 
Arabia); Thompson, supra note 72; Wayne, supra note 2.  
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signing of the Dayton Accords on the State Department’s promise to 
secure for them “the same guys who helped the Croatians.”78 So, while the 
United States committed thousands of troops to the region as neutral 
peacekeepers (to enforce the Dayton agreement), it also helped the 
Bosnian Muslims acquire additional support:79 Privatized intervention thus 
allowed Washington to have its cake and eat it too. 
In both Croatia and Bosnia, the training allegedly exceeded what one 
might expect a purely advisory engagement to entail. In fact, some reports 
of the contractors’ involvement invited comparisons to what had 
transpired in the early years of America’s “advisory” involvement in 
Vietnam.80 The training in the Balkans included practical instruction such 
as strategic planning and targeting enemy locations, skills that were soon 
utilized in actual offensives. In one particularly bloody campaign, in 
which the Croatian leaders in command were ultimately charged with 
international war crimes for their brutality,81 it has been alleged that MPRI 
was intimately involved in all stages of planning.82
 78. Wayne, supra note 2.  
 79. The troops committed to the Balkans as part of the Dayton agreement would serve as neutral 
peacekeepers, not advocates or aides to any one side. See, e.g., Bosnia’s Lingering Peace, ECONOMIST, 
Nov. 9, 1996, at 57 (noting the effective role of peacekeepers in Bosnia after the Dayton Accords); 
Mearsheimer & Van Evera, supra note 70, at 16 (arguing that the United States could not openly 
support the Bosnian Muslims without destroying their reputation as neutral peacekeepers and regional 
brokers); Norman Podhoretz, Why We Are in Bosnia, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 11, 1995, at 9 (arguing 
that peacekeepers should not be neutral but should bolster the position of the Muslims); Thompson, 
supra note 72, at 34 (describing the Clinton administration’s “pledge[] that U.S. troops will not play an 
active role in rearming the Bosnians”); Jonathan Turley, Editorial, Soldiers of Fortune—At What 
Price?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, at B11 (noting how contractors were used in the Balkans to 
exceed the congressional cap on the number of soldiers authorized to be deployed in the Balkans).  
 80. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST (1969) (describing how America’s 
involvement in Vietnam began with limited participation of U.S. military advisors in what was then 
mainly a Vietnamese civil war and how the United States’s role expanded over the years through 
incremental increases in commitment levels); STANLEY KARNOW, VIETNAM: A HISTORY 267–70 (2d 
rev. ed. 1997); Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam War: The Limits of Legal 
Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 72 (1998) (noting how President Kennedy “deepened the American 
commitment [to the Vietnam conflict] by dispatching . . . hundreds of military advisors”). See 
generally Jules Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority: Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1088–89 (1986) (describing “the dispatch of American military advisors” 
into a zone of conflict as having “a strong tendency to escalate into a larger American role involving 
United States troops”). 
 81. See Raymond Bonner, War Crimes Panel Finds Croat Troops “Cleansed” the Serbs, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1999, at A1 (describing a brutal Croatian offensive as having been carried out with 
the “tacit blessing” of the United States); Wayne, supra note 2. 
 82. See Graham, Croatia, supra note 13; Schrader, supra note 51 (describing the advisory and 
support role played by MPRI in the 1995 Croatian offensive that prompted allegations of war crimes 
and ethnic cleansing).  
 Retired Lt. Col. Roger Charles, now a military analyst, suspected that MPRI had a good deal to do 
with this gruesome assault on Serb villages. “No country moves from having a ragtag militia to 
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Fortunately, while the participation of such advisors did not lead to an 
escalation of America’s entanglement, as was the case in Vietnam, the 
story of private soldiers in the Balkans nevertheless gets worse. DynCorp, 
the same company employed to protect President Karzai, the same 
company that received unfavorable performance ratings in Latin America, 
and the same company that is now spearheading a good deal of security-
oriented contracting work in Iraq, was (along with MPRI) also providing 
security services in Bosnia. While there, DynCorp personnel were 
accused, by colleagues and by the British government, of operating a full-
fledged sex-slave operation involving young female war refugees.83 Given 
the vagaries of the contractors’ legal status and the jurisdictional 
limitations of American criminal law,84 there was little the United States 
could do, that is, short of refusing to contract for DynCorp’s services in 
the future. As explained above and below, however, the United States has 
not even taken that modest step.85 
c. Afghanistan 
As referenced in the Introduction, in the Fall of 2002, the United States 
withdrew its elite Special Forces team assigned to protect President Karzai 
and, in its stead, contracted (yet again) with DynCorp to provide 
security.86 Ensuring the stability and safety of the pro-Western Karzai 
regime, I need not add, is widely considered absolutely critical not only to 
rebuilding a free Afghanistan, but also to waging a successful war on 
global terrorism.87 Nevertheless, though the decision to privatize came at a 
carrying out a professional military offensive without some help. . . . That’s not something you learn 
while being instructed about democratic values.” Silverstein, supra note 13, at 14. 
 83. See P.W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and 
International Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 524–25 (2004) (noting also that a DynCorp 
supervisor was found to have videotaped himself raping two young women); John Crewdson, 
Contractor Tries to Avert Repeat of Bosnia Wars: Sex Scandal Still Haunts DynCorp, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 
19, 2003, at A3; Tepperman, supra note 13, at 11; Wayne, supra note 2.  
 84. See infra Parts III.C.1 and IV.A. 
 85. See also Hastings, supra note 57; McCarthy, Demand, supra note 57; T. Christian Miller, 
Army Gives Contract to Company in Jail Scandal, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2004, at A9. 
 86. See Dao, supra note 2; Tepperman, supra note 13, at 10. 
 87. See, e.g., Bradley Graham, Officers: Iraq Could Drain Terror War; Diversion of Afghan 
Forces to Gulf Raises Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2002, at A1; Carl Hulse, In Senate, a Call for 
Answers and a Warning on the Future; Focus on Iraq Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at A5; 
Glenn Kessler, Clarke’s Critique Reopens Debate on Iraq War, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2004, at A22; 
Jim VandeHei, Clark Urges New Focus on Terrorist; Democratic Candidate Would Shift Forces to 
Hunt Bin Laden, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2003, at A7; see also Vincent M. Cannistraro, Editorial, Keep 
the Focus on Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A19 (warning against diverting military attention 
away from fighting terrorism and cautioning against devoting too many resources to fighting Saddam 
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time when Kabul remained incredibly unstable and threats on the new 
president and his cabinet were tangible and ever-present,88 Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld insisted that privatization was a necessity: He simply 
could not spare the handful of troops any longer.89  
This justification may not seem totally satisfying. The military detail 
originally assigned to Karzai numbered approximately forty Special 
Forces soldiers. To put that number in perspective, conservative estimates 
suggest that, at the time, the total number of active U.S. Special Forces 
personnel was between 40,000 and 50,000 strong.90 And, moreover, there 
were tens of thousands of additional regular American soldiers stationed 
throughout Afghanistan carrying out all sorts of duties, from protecting the 
construction workers building roads to rooting out Taliban and al-Qaeda 
operatives in the caves along the Pakistani border.91 Finally, as mentioned 
above, DynCorp has received abysmal performance evaluations ranging 
from poor service in Latin America to horrible human rights violations in 
Bosnia. More recent reports, from Fall 2004, have described DynCorp 
employees as alienating and intimidating locals in Kabul.92 Nevertheless, 
despite the obvious significance and importance of protecting Karzai and 
Hussein in Iraq); William Safire, Editorial, The View from Purgatory, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2004, at 
A21 (noting that promoting and protecting President Karzai’s administration is essential to 
establishing an Islamic model of democracy); Thom Shanker, Pentagon Weighs Transferring 4,000 
G.I.’s in Korea to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2004, at A11 (noting the potential need to move U.S. 
troops from the volatile Korean Peninsula to Iraq).  
 88. See James Brooke, The Tangled History of Karzai’s Would-Be Killer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 
2002, at A20; John F. Burns, Afghan President Escapes Bullets; 25 Killed by Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
6, 2002, at A1; Dexter Filkins, Afghan Official Is Assassinated; Blow to Karzai, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 
2002, at A1; Carlotta Gall, Another Assassination Attempt Is Stopped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002, at 
A22. 
 89. See Tepperman, supra note 13, at 12 (citing Rumsfeld as having suggested that “he can’t 
spare the manpower to protect Afghanistan’s president”). 
 90. See id.; see also PRIEST, supra note 47, at 129 (estimating 46,000 Special Forces troops in the 
current U.S. military’s arsenal and noting that the Special Forces units were not part of the downsizing 
efforts that occurred throughout the military in the 1990s); Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Special 
Warriors Have Growing Ranks and Growing Pains in Taking Key Antiterror Role, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
2, 2004, at A1. 
 91. See James Dao, U.S. Shifts Emphasis in Afghanistan to Security and Road Building, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2002, at A14 (noting the influx of Special Forces personnel to help train Afghan 
security forces and help build civil infrastructure projects); Baron Gellman & Thomas E. Ricks, U.S. 
Concludes Bin Laden Escaped at Tora Bora Fight; Failure To Send Troops in Pursuit Termed Major 
Error, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2002, at A1; Amy Waldman, Link Between Afghanistan’s North and 
South Is Restored, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2003, at A10 (describing how the United States provided 
military protection to construction workers who were building a major highway in Afghanistan); see 
also Transcript of the Candidates’ First Debate in the Presidential Campaign, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2004, at A20 (quoting Senator Kerry as criticizing President Bush for pulling too many U.S. troops out 
of Afghanistan and “outsourc[ing]” the job of hunting Osama Bin Laden to local Afghan warlords). 
 92. See infra notes 333 and 399 and accompanying text. 
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the apparent option of diverting a handful of regular U.S. soldiers to 
relieve the outgoing Special Forces team, the Bush administration 
preferred this private alternative.  
As an additional note regarding contractors in Afghanistan, it has also 
recently come to light that private contractors working as interrogators in 
American military prisons in Afghanistan have been deemed responsible 
for brutal beatings (and even deaths) of al-Qaeda and Taliban inmates.93 
There is even evidence of Americans running “private” detention centers, 
possibly—but not definitively—in some loose affiliation with the CIA, 
purportedly to acquire information regarding terrorism.94
d. Iraq 
With hundreds of thousands of contractors involved in the liberation 
and occupation in Iraq, in jobs ranging from cooking and construction to 
armed security and intelligence, no combat venue has witnessed a greater 
influx of American private agents. Among them, many perform traditional 
commercial services. But a sizeable number, estimated between 20,000–
30,000 contractors, carry out many of the core security functions typically 
understood to be inherently governmental—and inherently soldierly.95 The 
difficulties of the occupation,96 coupled with the relative shortages of U.S. 
troops,97 an unwillingness to contemplate a military draft,98 and only 
 93. See, e.g., John Hendren & Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Charges Contractor over Beating of Afghan 
Detainee, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A6; Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Ariel Hart, Contractor Indicted 
in Afghan Detainee’s Beating, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A1; Susan Schmidt & Dana Priest, 
Civilian Charged in Beating of Afghan Detainee, WASH. POST, June 18, 2004, at A1. 
 94. See, e.g., Hamida Ghafour, Afghans Are Fed Up with Security Firm, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 
2004, at A3 (describing allegedly “freelance” work by Jonathan Idema, an American accused of 
detaining suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban members); Turley, supra note 79 (describing Idema’s 
private prison as full of beaten and tortured detainees and commenting on Idema’s claims that he had 
been working with the CIA). 
 95. See Priest & Flaherty, supra note 4, at A1.  
 96. See, e.g., Neela Banerjee & Ariel Hart, Inquiry Opens After Reservists Balk in Baghdad, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A1; Jeffrey Gettleman & Douglas Jehl, Up to 12 Marines Die in Raid on 
Their Base As Fierce Fighting Spreads to 6 Iraqi Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2004, at A1; Douglas 
Jehl & David E. Sanger, Iraqis’ Bitterness Is Called Bigger Threat than Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 
2003, at A12; Thomas E. Ricks, Probe of Reservists Underway, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2004, at A14 
[hereinafter Ricks, Probe]; Thomas E. Ricks, Strains Felt by Guard Unit on Eve of War Duty, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 19, 2004, at A1 [hereinafter Ricks, Strains]; Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Armor Scarce 
for Heavy Trucks Transporting U.S. Cargo in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at A1; Steven R. 
Weisman, Rocky Path for Bush: Effort To Remake Iraq Hits Roadblocks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, 
at A12; Edward Wong, Iraq Chief Gives a Sobering View About Security, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at 
A1. 
 97. See Editorial, Costly Troop Deficit in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at A26; Shanker & 
Knowlton, supra note 22; Spiegel, supra note 22. 
 98. See Dao, supra note 22; Carl Hulse, Military Draft? Official Denials Leave Skeptics, N.Y. 
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minimal assistance from foreign allies99 have made contractors close to 
indispensable.100 Along the way, of course, many contractors have been 
killed. Casualties among contractors, to date, are not insubstantial, but of 
course they are not as high as the number of reported casualties among 
members of the U.S. military.101 Yet comparatively speaking, rarely are 
those contractor-casualty numbers tallied with such care, publicity, and 
despondency as soldier-casualties are.102  
In the interests of providing some descriptions of the type of private 
military-security work undertaken in Iraq, I offer three representative 
illustrations.  
First, both the Coalition Provisional Authority (“CPA”) and the U.S. 
government have contracted with private military firms to provide security 
for key American and CPA positions, important Iraqi locations (such as 
banks, museums, and oil fields) as well as for American and CPA 
officials, including Ambassadors Paul Bremer and John Negroponte.103 
These contractors often carry automatic weaponry and, at times, have been 
provoked into exchanging fire with insurgents. For example, in early April 
2004, Shiite militia forces attacked the CPA’s headquarters in Najaf. Eight 
employees of Blackwater, unaided by members of the U.S. military—or 
by any other national army participating in the liberation and occupation—
had to fend off the siege until they were ultimately supported by 
reinforcements. The cavalry, so to speak, came by way of a helicopter 
crew, comprised of additional Blackwater agents, not American military 
TIMES, July 3, 2004, at A1; Krugman, supra note 22; Thom Shanker, Need for Draft Is Dismissed by 
Officials at Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at A22. 
 99. See Gordan, supra note 22; Nicholas D. Kristof, Editorial, Brother, Can You Spare A 
Brigade?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at A19; Elain Sciolino, Spanish Premier Says Troops Will Not 
Return to Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A3; see also infra note 417 and accompanying text. 
 100. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 22. 
 101. See id.; Mary Ann Fergus, Iraq’s Other Toll, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 24, 2004, at A1; von 
Hoffman, supra note 20. 
 102. See infra notes 145–61 and accompanying text. 
 103. See The Baghdad Boom, ECONOMIST, Mar. 27, 2004, at 56; Cooper, supra note 22; Dao, 
supra note 4; Priest & Flaherty, supra note 4; see also Barstow et al., supra note 4. Barstow and his 
colleagues write: 
Far more than in any other conflict in United States history, the Pentagon is relying on private 
security companies to perform crucial jobs once entrusted to the military. In addition to 
guarding innumerable reconstruction projects, private companies are being asked to provide 
security for the chief of the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer III, and other 
senior officials; to escort supply convoys through hostile territory; and to defend key 
locations, including 15 regional authority headquarters and even the Green Zone in downtown 
Baghdad, the center of American power in Iraq.  
Id. 
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personnel.104 Similar battles, waged principally by armed contractors (with 
more or less success), have been fought in such places as Mosul, Kut, and 
Fallujah since the occupation began.105
Second, private contractors have assumed now infamous roles as 
intelligence agents, translators, and supervisors in Iraq’s most notorious 
prison, Abu Ghraib. In the weeks following formal investigations by 
General Taguba,106 General Fay,107 and former Defense Secretary 
Schlesinger,108 it became apparent that employees of Titan and CACI, who 
devised interrogation techniques and supervised the military police, were 
central participants in the horrific prisoner-abuse scandal.109  
Third, contractors working for DynCorp helped stage and raid Ahmed 
Chalabi’s personal compound as well as his offices at the Iraqi National 
Congress in Baghdad. This raid—which occurred soon after the Pentagon 
suspected that Chalabi had passed along U.S. national security secrets to 
Iran—is indicative of the fact that military contractors in Iraq have 
 104. See Priest, supra note 4.  
 105. For example, in March 2004, four employees were similarly pinned down by insurgents in 
Fallujah and were killed. Id.; see also Barstow et al., supra note 4; Sewell Chan, U.S. Civilians 
Mutilated in Iraq Attack, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2004, at A1; Dana Priest & Mary Pat Flaherty, Slain 
Contractors Were in Iraq Working Security Detail, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2004, at A16.  
 106. See Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade (“Taguba Report”), at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/abughraib/taguba_report.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2004). 
 107. See Article 15-6, Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military 
Intelligence Brigade (“Fay Report”), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2004). 
 108. See Final Report of the Independent Panel To Review DoD Detention Operations 
(“Schlesinger Report”), at http://www.c-span.org/pdf/prisonerfinalreport.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 
2005). 
 109. See supra notes 106–08; see also Editorial, Abuse by Outsourcing, WASH. POST, May 26, 
2004, at A26; Deborah Avant, What Are Those Contractors Doing in Iraq?, WASH. POST, May 9, 
2004, at B1; Joel Brinkley, Army Policy Bars Interrogations by Private Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, June 
12, 2004, at A5; Joel Brinkley, U.S. Civilian Working at Abu Ghraib Disputes Army’s Version of His 
Role in Abuses, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A5; Brinkley & Glanz, supra note 8, at A15; Ariana 
Eunjung Cha & Renae Merle, Line Increasingly Blurred Between Soldiers and Civilian Contractors, 
WASH. POST, May 13, 2004, at A1 (noting that contractors in Abu Ghraib were known to exert 
considerable influence over the Army’s rank and file); Joshua Chaffin, Contract Interrogators Hired 
To Avoid Supervision, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at 9; Sewell Chan, U.S. Official: Abuse Allegations 
Are “a Big Deal”: Charges Involving Army-Run Prison in Iraq Seen as Setback, WASH. POST, May 3, 
2004, at A16; Hersh, supra note 4; Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 
10, 2004, at 42; David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Examines Role of C.I.A. and Employees in Iraq 
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A16; Renae Merle, CACI and Titan Sued Over Iraq Operation; 
Legal Center Representing Prisoners, WASH. POST, June 10, 2004, at E3; Renae Merle, Contractor 
Investigated by Justice, WASH. POST, May 22, 2004, at A17 (describing allegations that CACI 
employees instructed the military police in interrogation tactics that the contractors “knew . . . equated 
to physical abuse”); James Risen, Command Errors Aided Iraq Abuse, Army Has Found, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 2004, at A1. 
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undertaken offensive missions.110 Within the industry, which vociferously 
contends that it only accepts “defensive” assignments, this example 
signals a major evolution in contractor responsibilities and protocols.111
With extreme stress on the active U.S. Armed Forces,112 the withdrawal 
of troops by Coalition partners,113 a lack of faith in Iraqi security teams,114 
and no end in sight to the insurgents’ hostilities, one would have to assume 
that the demand for (and utility of) military contractors, in spite of the 
notoriety they received at Abu Ghraib, will only increase.115
e. Rwanda  
Another interesting but not widely reported case of military 
privatization involved the United States supporting the very limited use of 
private agents in Rwanda. In the midst of that horribly brutal genocide 
campaign,116 an extremely small (and admittedly insignificant) group of 
private agents under the employ of the Ronco firm were dispatched to 
protect some villages, to provide some humanitarian relief, and to offer 
training to the fledgling Rwandan Patriotic Army.117 Contrasting the 
magnitude of the travesties against the modest deployment of private 
agents, it is safe to conclude that Ronco did not make much of a dent in 
stopping intertribal violence.118 It is even safer to say, that the United 
 110. Merle, supra note 4, at A17; Scott Shane, Chalabi Raid Adds Scrutiny to Use of U.S. 
Contractors, BALT. SUN, May 30, 2004, at 1A. 
 111. See SINGER, supra note 20; Tepperman, supra note 13, at 10–12; Wayne, supra note 2; see 
also Rosky, supra note 6, at 908 (characterizing the private military industry as insisting that its 
contractors largely confine themselves to defensive and logistical tasks). 
 112. Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, The Struggle for Iraq: Contingencies; Pentagon Drafts 
Iraq Troop Plan To Meet Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, at A1 (noting that estimates in the 
Spring of 2004 indicated that American forces in Iraq were short by about 20,000 the number of troops 
requested by General Abizaid, head of the U.S. Central Command).  
 113. See Carlos H. Conde, The Reach of War; Manila Starts Withdrawing Troops from Iraq; U.S. 
Criticizes Step, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at A7; Shanker & Sanger, supra note 112 (noting the 
withdrawal of troops in Iraq by Spain, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic). 
 114. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Scott Wilson, Marines Begin to Cede Control of Restive 
Fallujah, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at A1. 
 115. See supra note 57; see also supra note 85. 
 116. Within a matter of one hundred days, over 800,000 Tutsis were slaughtered. See MICHAEL 
BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 1 (2002); SAMANTHA 
POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 362, 381–82 (2002). 
 117. See DEP’T OF DEFENSE, SUMMARY—REPORT TO CONGRESS ON U.S. MILITARY ACTIVITIES 
IN RWANDA, 1994 – AUGUST 1997, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rwanda/ 
summary.html (last visited May 4, 2004) (noting Ronco’s participation in dog de-mining program as 
part of humanitarian relief); see also Victoria Brittain, Absolute Minefield, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 
27, 1994, at T20 (describing Ronco’s contractual responsibilities in Rwanda, including detecting mine 
fields); Pentagon Provides Dogs To Detect Landmines in Rwanda, AFRICA NEWS, Mar. 1996 (same).  
 118. See Milliard, supra note 23, at 18–19 (noting that while it is “unlikely that any modern 
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States, like most other nations, did almost nothing else to stop the 
genocidal massacre.119 Indeed, General Dallaire, a Canadian commander 
of U.N. peacekeepers in Rwanda who condemned his own leadership as 
well as that of the entire Western world, said:  
I haven’t even started my real mourning of the apathy and the 
absolute detachment of the international community, and 
particularly the Western world, from the plight of Rwandans. 
Because fundamentally, to be very candid and soldierly, who the 
hell cared about Rwanda? . . . Who is grieving for Rwanda and 
really living it and living with the consequences?120
Nevertheless, despite its extremely limited scope and even more limited 
success, the Rwanda-Ronco project provides a powerful if incomplete 
model of possibilities. Irrespective of any U.N. hesitancy,121 it is doubtful 
that the American public would have countenanced U.S. servicemen and 
women being sent to Central Africa to stop internecine tribal violence—
especially on the heels of the recent debacle in Somalia.122 On the other 
[private military company, or “PMC”] could have diffused the Rwandan crisis in mid-1994 . . . [a] 
capable and willing PMC could have seized, disabled, or simply jammed Hutu-controlled Radio Mille 
Collines early on to prevent further anti-Tutsi propaganda . . . [and] intervened to prevent or at least 
discourage those responsible for the organized but small-scale assaults, rapes, and murders that began 
in 1990”); Pape & Meyer, supra note 2 (describing Executive Outcome’s early and unsuccessful pitch 
to the Clinton administration to provide services to stabilize Rwanda). 
 119. See DAVID HALBERSTAM, WAR IN A TIME OF PEACE 276 (2001) (“The genocide succeeded 
. . . because it took place in a moral and political vacuum.”); POWER, supra note 116 (noting the 
complete lack of urgency from the West to intervene); Alison L. Des Forges, Shame: Rationalizing 
Western Apathy on Rwanda: Alas, We Knew, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2000, at 141 (describing how 
western leaders refused to intervene at a sufficiently early junction to prevent the mass slaying of the 
Tutsis); Chaim Kaufmann, See No Evil: Why America Doesn’t Stop Genocide, FOREIGN AFF., 
July/Aug. 2002, at 142–43 (“[T]he United States not only did not halt the killing but actively 
prevented other [more] willing powers from taking effective action.”). 
 120. HALBERSTAM, supra note 119, at 277. 
 121. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda, United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (1999). In fact, the 
United Nations withdrew a sizable percentage of its on-the-ground troops that had already been in 
Rwanda (enforcing a pre-existing truce between the Hutus and Tutsis) when the deadly tribal violence 
began. BARNETT, supra note 116, at 62–64, 105–07 (2002); see also Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of 
States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 390 (1999) (describing how 
the United Nations withdrew most of its troops as soon as violence commenced and some Westerners 
were killed); Who Will Save Rwanda?, ECONOMIST, June 25, 1994, at 13 (describing the United 
Nations’s belated efforts to commit peacekeeping troops).  
 122. See BARNETT, supra note 116, at 123–24, 174 (describing how the international community 
was reluctant to undertake another difficult peacekeeping mission so soon after what had transpired in 
Somalia); United Nations Peacekeeping; Trotting to the Rescue, ECONOMIST, June. 25, 1994, at 19 
(noting that the Somalia disaster shaped America’s apathy in Rwanda and also characterizing the 
United States’s position on relief in Rwanda as “[n]ot a soldier, not a cent”); Who Will Save Rwanda?, 
supra note 121 (noting America’s reluctance to engage in humanitarian intervention in the aftermath 
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hand, the public might be more comfortable with—or less aware of—
dispatching contractors, who specifically agreed to sign up for such a 
dangerous mission, than with sending over regular U.S. soldiers whose 
defense of American sovereignty and interests does not (as the public 
might believe) legitimately extend to humanitarian police actions.123 
Dangerous humanitarian work such as what may be warranted today in the 
Darfur region of Sudan124 may, accordingly, prove to be a new growth 
industry of assignments for contractors who consent to enter dangerous 
situations well outside of the scope of what is conventionally understood 
as core American national security interests.125  
f. Gaza Strip 
A final, recent illustration of military privatization on a very small 
scale involved the terrorist attacks on U.S. consular attachés in Gaza.126 In 
October 2003, a caravan of U.S. diplomats was shepherded through a 
virtually lawless area of Palestinian-controlled Gaza by DynCorp security 
forces, not State Department Diplomatic Service agents or U.S. Marines, 
who otherwise often guard embassies and overseas diplomats.127 The 
of Somalia). 
 123. See PRIEST, supra note 47, at 52 (characterizing Colin Powell’s belief that national security 
commitments should not extend to humanitarian relief missions); see also James Mann, Not Your 
Father’s Foreign Policy, AM. PROSPECT, Apr. 9, 2001, at 28 (emphasizing the current Bush 
administration’s embrace of the Powell Doctrine’s prescription—at least before September 11—to use 
military force only when “vital U.S. interests [are] at stake”); Michael O’Hanlon, Come Partly Home, 
America: How To Downsize U.S. Deployments Abroad, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 2 
(describing efforts to conserve military resources and use them only to further national security 
interests).  
 124. See Romeo Dallaire, Editorial, Looking at Darfur, Seeing Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2004, 
at A25 (noting the need for intervention and doubting whether help will be forthcoming); JIM FISHER-
THOMPSON, STATE DEP’T, IMPORTANT ROLE SEEN FOR PRIVATE FIRMS IN AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING 
(2004), at http://usinfo.state.gov/af/Archive/2004/Oct/19-30116.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2004) 
(quoting Congressman Royce as seeing “a role for private military contractors . . . in attempting to 
bring stability to Africa” and noting the nascent presence in the Darfur region of Sudan of at least two 
private firms hired by the African Union). 
 125. See infra notes 159 and 397 and accompanying text. 
 126. See John F. Burns, 3 Americans Slain in Blast in Gaza Strip, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2003, at 
A1; Mark Matthews, Bomb Strikes Diplomatic Convoy, Killing 3 Americans in Gaza Strip: Marks 
First Fatal Attacks Against U.S. Personnel, BALT. SUN, Oct. 16, 2003, at 1A; Molly Moore & John 
Ward Anderson, Bomb Kills 3 Americans in Gaza Strip: Guards Were Escorting U.S. Diplomatic 
Convoy, WASH. POST, Oct. 16, 2003, at A1; Rebecca Santana, Americans Killed in Gaza: Embassy 
Convoy Bombing Crosses a New, Deadly Line, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 16, 2003, at 1A. 
 127. See, e.g., After Iran, Millions To Make Embassies Safer, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 2, 
1981 at 52 (indicating efforts to bolster Marine Corps security forces); Arthur J. Goldberg, Editorial, 
Security of American Embassies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 1984, at 12 (describing large 
security role played by U.S. Marines in American embassies); Smith Hempstone, Embassies at Risk, 
NAT’L INTEREST, Fall 1998, 53, 53–55 (describing the Marine Corps guards’ role in the U.S. Embassy 
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killing of three American contractors on the security detail did make the 
news for a day or so,128 but it did not become a serious media or 
diplomatic story, and little was ultimately made of the attack in terms of 
creating an impetus for a counter-strike, or even a rethinking of U.S. 
Middle East policy. Perhaps, for better or worse, if it were American 
soldiers killed, a different response would have been forthcoming.129  
C. Conceptualizing Tactical Privatization 
Without having looked at these specific case studies, one might readily 
assume that economic efficiency, the sine qua non of privatization, 
explains the evolution and expansion of military outsourcing.130 But these 
examples, which paint a vivid though still inchoate and fragmentary 
picture of military privatization, actually suggest that there might be 
alternative (or at least additional) reasons why policymakers employ 
contractors. Examining the six examples above, we begin to realize that 
not only must we grapple with the implications of the dynamic 
transformations from outsourcing strictly commercial functions to ones 
involving the exercise of considerable discretion of the sort normally 
considered “inherently governmental;” we must also come to terms with 
the possibility that conventional, economic justifications do not explain 
the full breadth of normative reasons for soliciting private soldiers.  
Traditionally, the lens of privatization scholarship has focused on 
economic efficiency, how competitive market forces and profit incentives 
can inject cost-savings and quality-enhancing measures into the provision 
of government services and functions.131 Scholars have also examined 
ways in which contracting out may generate additional cost-savings 
benefits. For example, contractors are not subject to the costly and time-
consuming notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative 
Procedure Act or to the disclosure mandates of the Freedom of 
in Somalia in the early 1990s); Jim Hoagland, Miscasting the Marines, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1987, at 
A2 (characterizing U.S. Marines’s expansive security responsibilities when they are assigned to an 
overseas embassy).  
 128. See supra note 109. 
 129. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. 
 130. See, e.g., von Hoffman, supra note 20, at 79 (“The rationale for privatizing American war 
making is that corporate warriors can do the job for less.”). 
 131. See, e.g., SAVAS, supra note 3, at 118–20; Stuart Butler, Privatization for Public Purposes, in 
PRIVATIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 17 (William T. Gormly, Jr. ed., 1991); Freeman, supra note 
6, at 170; Metzger, supra note 39, at 1377, 1433; Minow, supra note 20, at 1230, 1242–46; Rosky, 
supra note 6, at 929; Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 8, at 1424–30, 1436; Michael D. Wright, A 
Critique of the Public Choice Theory Case for Privatization: Rhetoric and Reality, 25 OTTAWA L. 
REV. 1 (1993). 
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Information Act.132 Nor are they necessarily deemed “state actors” for 
purposes of Bivens or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability.133 Finally, employees of 
contracting firms are less likely to have union protection, and thus they 
can be made more responsive to market incentives (and more easily fired) 
than can civil servants.134 Accordingly, the lower costs associated with 
contracting out are thus a function not only of competition and innovative 
business planning, but also of public-private status differentials. Even 
though they provide cost-savings too, these incidents of privatization, 
which permit contractors to bypass channels of accountability and to use 
more “casualized” labor, are, especially since the government is 
outsourcing increasingly sensitive functions, a growing source of 
concern.135
In the military context, non-economic status differentials can emerge as 
all-important in (rather than incident to) decisions to privatize. Private 
actors qua private actors may be sought—not because they are situated in 
a more efficient market or even because they command lower market 
wages, but because legally, politically, and symbolically they are not 
soldiers. Military privatization can allow the government to achieve 
national security and even humanitarian ends that would be more difficult, 
if not impossible, to accomplish using American soldiers.136 Perhaps, at 
 132. See Freeman, supra note 3, at 1302, 1305 (describing how private actors, even those 
responsible for providing services under government contracts, are largely exempt from APA and 
FOIA requirements); Guttman, supra note 3, at 895, 898 n.137, 901–05 (noting how FOIA does not 
apply to contractors); see also Public Citizen Health Research Group v. HEW, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (noting that holding private contractors to the same disclosure standards as are applied to 
government agents would not be in keeping with the aims of using private contractors in the first 
place). 
 133. See Metzger, supra note 39, at 1410–37 (characterizing the legal gap between government 
providers disciplined by threat of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions and private contractors who are not 
considered state actors for such suits). 
 134. See Beermann, supra note 33, at 1523–24 (describing cost-savings associated with hiring 
private employees who lack the job security and civil service status that government employees 
enjoy); Gilman, supra note 6, at 602–03 (characterizing some percentage of the presumed savings 
associated with privatization as resulting from the replacement of unionized labor with non-union 
labor). 
 135. See, e.g., DiIulio, supra note 34; Diller, Revolution, supra note 6; Freeman, supra note 3; 
Kennedy, supra note 6; Minow, supra note 20, at 1232–34, 1241. 
 136. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 133 (noting that private firms are able to go where the United 
States could not officially go and explaining that “[d]irect participation could thus be denied and there 
[would be] no limiting public oversight or debate”); Lobel, supra note 80, at 1079 (suggesting that 
decisions to use private troops rather than American soldiers often are aimed at circumventing 
democratic decisionmaking); Eugene B. Smith, The New Condottieri and U.S. Policy: The 
Privatization of Conflict and Its Implications, PARAMETERS, Winter 2002, at 104, 111 (noting that 
some observers believe that the use of private firms is “simply a convenient way for the executive 
branch to avoid congressional oversight”); Tim Spicer, Why We Can Help Where Governments Fear to 
Tread, TIMES (London), May 24, 1998, at Features Section (“It’s not so much that we can do things 
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various times, a desire, however latent, to avoid instituting a draft, to 
lessen public awareness, to dilute casualty counts, to bypass congressional 
troop limitations, and/or to evade international arms embargoes, entice 
policymakers to outsource because private actors are not regulated, 
controlled, or even mourned to the same extent that public soldiers are. 
But, if a decision to outsource does reflect “tactical” aims to circumvent 
political and legal obstacles associated with the conventional deployment 
of regular, U.S. troops, an entire set of problems for constitutional 
principles and democratic virtues—independent of any actual, tangible 
misdeeds that privateers may perpetrate in a zone of conflict—must be 
anticipated. It is these structural problems, deeper than just accountability 
concerns, which command my attention.137 Indeed, these structural 
problems are so great in the context of military privatization that even 
absent any express intent by the Executive to leverage or exploit status 
differentials between contractors and soldiers, many of the chief 
constitutional and democratic harms would still arise.  
Economic privatization is, ostensibly speaking, ideologically agnostic. 
Its advocates may have particular agendas, but efficiency-driven 
privatization per se mainly creates an alternative process for carrying out 
government contracts that strive to replicate government provision—only 
at a fraction of the cost (and perhaps with less government red-tape). On 
the other hand, “tactical” privatization, which may seek to exploit status 
differentials, is predicated on substantive rather than administrative or 
bureaucratic reform. Privatization, in this latter case, could be used to 
achieve objectives materially different than those that could be—for a 
number of reasons—achieved within the public sector. For example, a 
conflict may prompt an outsourced response if it would otherwise be 
difficult for the president to secure congressional and/or international 
support to deploy members of the U.S. Armed Forces. In such scenarios, it 
is not the cheaper price tag, but rather the status of the private actors (as 
distinct from U.S. military personnel) vis-à-vis congressional oversight, 
better than sovereign governments . . . it’s that we can do it without any of the spin-offs that make 
military intervention unpalatable to governments; casualties among [private military companies] do 
not have the same emotive impact as those from national forces.”); Yeoman, supra note 4 (indicating 
that privatization is a way of bypassing Congress and the American people).  
 137. By structural problems, I am referring to the ways in which military privatization can bypass 
congressional war powers, dampen public awareness, and destabilize the delicate balance between 
civilian and military governance. These problems are deeper and, I will argue, more intractable than 
those associated simply with subpar contract performance. For instance, the danger with a contractor 
possibly circumventing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 state-actor liability or evading FOIA disclosures runs 
principally to concerns of effective provision of services—not to the structural dynamics of 
constitutional and democratic governance. See supra notes 131–35.  
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public attention, and international law that may motivate policy planners 
to hire contractors. 
In this Section then, I focus on the structural challenges posed by forms 
of military privatization that leverage status differentials, purposefully or 
even inadvertently. This is not to say that there are not instances where 
“tactical” aims may influence outsourcing patterns in domestic policy 
contexts.138 Nor is it the case that the lessons and insights we can glean 
from the already rich, nuanced, and comprehensive scholarship on 
economic privatization would not be immeasurably helpful here. I 
nevertheless leave much of that conventional, scholarly analysis to the side 
for now in order to explore some of the deeper concerns that are triggered 
when privatization can be undertaken for purposes of limiting political and 
legal oversight. Thus, for instance, I do not consider the potential 
economic gains and efficiencies associated with military privatization, 
though such an exploration would, no doubt, prove quite interesting.  
Instead, I briefly discuss how the “optics” of privatization as well as 
how the legal and political differences between using private troops and 
American soldiers could create opportunities for national security 
policymaking that would not be possible were the Executive limited to 
deploying only members of the U.S. Armed Forces. This short discussion, 
in turn, helps lay a framework for examining in Parts III, IV, and V, how 
status differentials not only threaten effective service provisions, but also 
may disrupt the democratic and constitutional workings of the federal 
government. 
1. Using Private Troops To Minimize Political and Legal Contests 
As will be explored at length in the course of the discussions in 
subsequent parts of this Article, privatization expands the horizon of 
executive policymaking discretion in the context of military affairs. Using 
privateers, whose legal status differentiates them from regular, U.S. 
soldiers, could help enable the president to bypass congressional oversight 
and even international collective security arrangements. Indeed, 
outsourcing may be undertaken to exploit this legal gap between what is 
the official state policy (say, non-intervention, limited involvement, or 
limited troop deployment) and what military goals can actually be 
accomplished through private channels. If contractors operate within these 
interstices, the president can presumably satisfy national security aims 
 138. See, e.g., Diller, Form, supra note 6; Diller, Revolution, supra note 6, at 1166–72; Michaels, 
supra note 6.  
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without expending the time and political capital to secure formal approval 
at home or internationally. 
First, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, customary practice, and 
statutory framework laws such as the War Powers Resolution, the 
president shares many warmaking powers with Congress. While retaining 
exclusive jurisdiction over command decisionmaking, the president must 
nevertheless seek, inter alia, authorization and funding from Congress to 
deploy U.S. troops into zones of hostility. But, many of Congress’s powers 
over military affairs are keyed to its Article I authority over the Armed 
Forces per se. Congress can, for instance, regulate the use and number of 
servicemen and women abroad, curtail funding for operations, and 
withhold support for a military engagement. Hence, as it stands, the 
president must often seek congressional approval in some form or another.  
If the Executive were, however, to deploy private troops in lieu of U.S. 
soldiers, it might be able to evade much of Congress’s oversight 
jurisdiction—at least temporarily. Without having to seek authorization 
and funds from the national legislature, the president can more easily 
engage in unilateral policymaking and dispatch private contractors who 
are not part of the regular U.S. military. In so doing, objectives can 
perhaps be achieved more swiftly and with less political wrangling and 
opposition. This privatization agenda is discussed further in Part III.  
Second, an additional—and this time constitutionally exogenous—
check on presidential discretion comes by way of the United Nations 
Security Council. In the post-Cold War era, the Security Council has 
reemerged as a, if not the, legitimate source for the authorization of 
military intervention in the name of collective security. Without the 
endorsement of the Security Council, any one nation’s decision to 
intervene in the affairs of another sovereign state is subject to criticism and 
charges of illegality and illegitimacy. But although the Security Council 
attempts to regulate the behavior of nation-states and their national 
militaries, it (like international law more generally) has comparatively less 
influence over the activities of private agents.139
If a country were to utilize the services of private contractors, it could 
bypass a Security Council vote—or possibly evade an already passed 
resolution prohibiting intervention by member states. Thus, the use of 
private troops in lieu of the U.S. military may free the Executive from 
having to depend on the support of the Security Council in order to initiate 
 139. See, e.g., Zarate, supra note 20, at 116–44 (describing some of the successes and limitations 
of regulating private military actors through the United Nations and other international bodies). 
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a foreign deployment. This privatization agenda is explored at greater 
length in Part V.  
2. The Optics of Military Privatization 
Beyond leveraging the legal status differentials between U.S. soldiers 
and private actors to evade oversight by Congress (and maybe even the 
U.N.), the Executive might further, or alternatively, resort to privateers 
precisely because they may have a different social or symbolic status in 
the American consciousness. Privateers do not, so it appears, occupy the 
same special place in the hearts and minds of the American public as do its 
citizen-soldiers.140 By contrast, it is that special regard for soldiers, well-
understood by military and political leaders alike, that often constrains the 
government from readily sending public troops into harm’s way.141  
Conversely, it is doubtful also that privateers go overseas with the 
symbolic “baggage” that U.S. soldiers tend to carry—as exemplars (at 
least in the minds of many) of hegemony and coercion.  
Hence in either or both scenarios, the use of private agents may prove 
more palatable (or at least more discreet) than sending in the Marines. 
Dispatching private contractors may not trouble and worry the American 
people as profoundly as if their boys and girls in uniform were sent into 
battle. And, likewise, dispatching private troops—who do not even wear 
the uniforms of the U.S. military and are not as likely to hoist an American 
flag in celebration on foreign soil142—may accomplish goals more readily 
and with less resistance than if U.S. soldiers were actually deployed. 
Below I posit that differences between soldiers and contractors, based 
on (a) normative value judgments and traditional affinities for U.S. 
servicemen and women, and (b) sensitivities of foreign hosts, may lead 
policymakers to prefer private contractors in certain situations. The harms 
 140. See infra Part IV.B; see also notes 152–57 and accompanying text. 
 141. See Lawrence F. Kaplan, Willpower, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 8, 2003, at 19, 20; Wayne, supra 
note 2 (describing the difference in symbolic importance between U.S. soldiers and government 
contractors). For further discussion, see infra Part IV.B. 
 142. See, e.g., Jim Dwyer, Troops Told To Carry Freedom, Not the Flag, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
2003, at A6 (noting that the U.S. military leadership instructed American soldiers not to raise the 
American flag in Iraq in order to avoid appearing as conquerors); Emily Wax & Alia Ibrahim, TV 
Images Stir Anger, Shock and Warnings of Backlash, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2003, at A41 (describing 
how poorly received the image of the American flag draped over a statue of Saddam was on the “Arab 
street”); Bernard Weinraub, Display of U.S. Flag Barred After Unfurling on Statue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
11, 2003, at B13 (highlighting the appearance problem associated with hanging the American flag in 
Iraq).  
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associated with exploiting these sets of status differentials will be 
addressed more fully in Part IV. 
a. Public Opposition Grounded in an Expectation of Zero-
Casualties: A Focus on Soldiers’ Deaths 
Americans’ general distaste for war is a significant factor 
circumscribing the government’s ability to deploy and use force abroad. 
But that aversion is not necessarily grounded in pacifist or even 
isolationist sentiments; another significant factor is a low tolerance for 
casualties: the squeamishness associated with watching soldiers arrive 
home in body bags and with tallying the rising casualty counts in the 
morning newspapers. Indeed, though the United States has not necessarily 
been shy about military interventions in principle, it has often been hyper-
vigilant about minimizing soldiers’ casualties in any way possible. 
Billions of dollars expended for stealth fighters, cruise missiles, unmanned 
drones, and smart bombs aim to ensure that harm to American soldiers is 
kept to an absolute minimum.143 In fact, key military decisions are at times 
made with the public’s concerns in mind even at the expense of sound 
national security policymaking. For instance, in his efforts to galvanize 
domestic support for intervening in Kosovo, President Clinton publicly 
and repeatedly promised not to engage in a ground war.144 His pledge not 
to put troops in harm’s way may have secured the public support at home 
necessary to liberate Kosovo, but it also reduced the strategic discretion 
the Pentagon would have otherwise possessed were no such promise 
made.145  
An attitude of risk-aversion and faith in what is the now-popularized 
“zero-casualty,” force-protection military paradigm146 constrains the 
 143. See, e.g., Brzezinski, supra note 47 (noting that the development of unmanned flight and 
marine vehicles could reduce the need for Air Force pilots, thus taking many combatants out of the 
direct theater of combat); Kaplan, supra note 141.  
 144. The combination of a nation’s interventionist bent and its low tolerance for casualties reveals 
its preference for air campaigns over (“messy”) ground wars. See PRIEST, supra note 47, at 53; Peter J. 
Boyer, A Different War, NEW YORKER, July 1, 2002, at 54; Brzezinski, supra note 47; Philip Everts, 
When the Going Gets Rough: Does the Public Support the Use of Military Force, WORLD AFF., Jan. 1, 
2000, at 91 (identifying the strong zero-casualty sentiment felt among the American public).  
 145. See PRIEST, supra note 47, at 53–54; Boyer, supra note 144 (describing the military’s 
frustration with Clinton’s promise and characterizing the strategic difficulties this pledge created for 
the military). 
 146. See Michael P. Scharf, Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millenium, 49 
DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 958 (2000); Ivo H. Daalder & Michael E. O’Hanlon, Unlearning the Lessons of 
Kosovo, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept. 22, 1999, at 128; see also Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Kosovo, Casualty 
Aversion, and the American Military Ethos: A Perspective, 10 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 95, 101–03 
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effective exercise of military power—but not as much as if the overriding 
concern among Americans were purely pacifist in nature. This distinction 
between a zero-casualty and pacifist mentality may be less meaningful in 
the context of sending American troops into a conflict zone: either way, 
the public would be reticent to support a combat-related engagement. But, 
in the context of employing private troops who may not have the 
preternatural connection to the American people that U.S. soldiers 
enjoy,147 this distinction might make all the difference in how a president 
conducts foreign policy.  
Enter the contractor. Tim Spicer, founder of Sandline, a prominent 
British military firm, believes military contractors can “fill the gap” left in 
the wake of the debacle in Somalia more than a decade ago.148 Recall that 
America’s low tolerance for casualties, perhaps a by-product of 
Vietnam,149 was tragically tested in Somalia, where the sight of American 
soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu was televised stateside 
for all to see.150 Indeed, “the live footage on CNN of United States troops 
being killed in Somalia has had staggering effects on the willingness of 
governments to commit to foreign conflicts.”151  
Private firms can undertake dangerous missions on behalf of the U.S. 
government without the attention, media coverage, or official sponsorship; 
(1999) (noting how pervasive the concerns over casualty avoidance and force protection have become 
within the military establishment). 
 147. See infra Part V.B.  
 148. See Andrew Gilligan, Inside Lt. Col. Spicer’s New Model Army, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 
22, 1998, at A1; see also Howe, supra note 44, at 5 (“Private security [forces] can enter situations 
where Western governments presently fear to tread, especially after the world’s intervention into 
Somalia.”). 
 149. See, e.g., John Kerry & Vietnam Veterans Against the War, The New Soldier 14–18 (David 
Thorne & George Butler eds., 1971) (describing as senseless the mounting casualties in Vietnam and 
noting how the tallying of the body counts became a national obsession); Robert N. Strassfeld, How 
Can the Law Regulate Loyalty Without Imperiling It?: “Lose in Vietnam, Bring the Boys Home,” 82 
N.C. L. REV. 1891, 1892 (2004) (calling Vietnam “almost certainly America’s most unpopular war”); 
James Dao, How Many Deaths Are Too Many?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2004, at D1 (comparing the 
angst about body counts in the Iraqi conflict with that which existed during the Vietnam War). 
 150. See, e.g., Brzezinski, supra note 47 (noting that “[e]ver since Vietnam, the American public’s 
threshold for casualties has been thought to be very low”); Nancy Gibbs, Can the Pro-War Consensus 
Survive?, TIME, Feb. 18, 1991, at 32 (speculating that public support for military operations can 
rapidly dissipate once the death toll mounts, as it did in Vietnam). 
 151. See Gilligan, supra note 148 (quoting Tim Spicer); see also Jonathan Alter, Does Bloody 
Footage Lose Wars?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 1991, at 38 (describing the public’s low tolerance level for 
American casualties); Brzezinski, supra note 47; Kenneth L. Cain, Editorial, The Legacy of Black 
Hawk Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at A27 (describing the anguish felt by the soldiers who were 
pinned down in the streets of Mogadishu); Clark, supra note 45 (noting America’s impulse to be risk-
averse after Vietnam and how that aversion was strengthened in wake of Somalia); Andrew Kohut & 
Robert C. Toth, Arms and People, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1994, at 47 (describing television’s 
impact on Americans’ aversion to casualties).  
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if things go wrong, the line of blame to the government is more attenuated 
and the casualties would not be patriotic American soldiers serving under 
(and being carried home under) the American flag, but rather defense 
contractors whose deaths are not officially reported.152 As former U.S. 
Ambassador to Colombia Myles Frechetter noted: “If the narcotraffickers 
shot American soldiers down, you could see the headlines: ‘U.S. Troops 
Killed in Colombia.’” But when three DynCorp employees were shot 
down during an anti-drug mission in Peru, their deaths “merited exactly 
113 words in the New York Times.”153 And, as Doug Brooks, a private 
military industry spokesperson explains, if an American soldier is killed 
overseas, it is front-page news. If he is not a soldier, and instead is a 
private contractor who “is shot wearing blue jeans, it’s page fifty-three of 
their hometown newspaper.”154 Journalist Kevin Myers has come to a 
similar conclusion: If a private military contractor is “killed in action, the 
tabloid sob-industry cannot then move into tearful action, wondering about 
our brave boys perishing on a foreign field.”155 In the hearts and minds of 
the people, private actors “are excluded from such hand-wringing.”156 
Indeed, although ABC’s Nightline recently devoted an entire episode to a 
solemn reading of the names of the slain American servicemen and 
women in Iraq, it is highly doubtful that it or a similar show would allot 
comparable time to fallen contractors.157
Thus in conflict zones, or areas of potential conflict, such as Colombia, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Rwanda, the use of private agents rather than 
 152. See Shapiro, supra note 24; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text; infra notes 153–
56 and accompanying text. 
 153. Yeoman, supra note 4, at 43. 
 154. Tepperman, supra note 13, at 12; see Marego Athans, To Make a Living, Driver Risked It All, 
BALT. SUN, Feb. 8, 2004, at 1A (“Americans are accustomed to hearing the military death toll in Iraq 
. . . . But largely absent from the public consciousness are the thousands of civilians putting their lives 
on the line as contractors in Iraq . . . .”); Bredemeier, supra note 13 (describing the media’s relative 
indifference to the two private military agents killed in Kuwait by terrorists). 
 155. Kevin Myers, Mercenaries Are Much Misunderstood Men, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 17, 
2002, at 26. 
 156. Id.; see also PRIEST, supra note 47, at 140 (indicating that the “world’s terrorists and 
despots” believe that “killing a few American soldiers . . . is enough to spook Uncle Sam” into 
inaction) (quoting MARK BOWDEN, BLACK HAWK DOWN: THE STORY OF MODERN WAR 355 (1999)); 
Shapiro, supra note 24; Editorial, Soldiers Honored, Soldiers Dishonored, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, 
at A14 (describing America’s “yearning to give military casualties the honor of an individual 
remembrance [that] is ingrained in the modern national fabric”).  
 157. Bill Carter, Debate Over “Nightline” Tribute to War Dead Grows, as McCain Weighs In, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at A5 (noting the prominent reporting of slain American soldiers on 
television and in the print media); Bill Carter, “Nightline” To Read Off Iraq War Dead, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2004, at A9; Mark Steyn, Editorial, “Nightline” Demoralizes America, JERUSALEM POST, 
May 5, 2004, at 15 (quoting Ted Koppel as saying “[t]he most important thing a journalist can do is 
remind people of the cost of war”). 
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American soldiers does not lower the likelihood of death. But their acting 
in lieu of soldiers does perhaps lower the likelihood of the unacceptable 
imagery of American soldiers coming off cargo planes in bodybags draped 
with the flag.158 It is possible that, at least in terms of small-scale 
operations (such as in Rwanda or Sudan), this gives the president greater 
discretion to place troops on the ground for humanitarian peacekeeping or 
even hostage-rescue assignments that the public would deem too remote 
an interest to justify jeopardizing American soldiers.159 And, in high-
profile interventions, such as in Iraq or Afghanistan, the use of contractors 
can lower the number of soldiers who have to be called into or kept in 
service, dilute the tally of official casualties, and lessen the need to 
cultivate a broader international coalition. The U.S. government may, in 
turn, exploit this gap in how contractors are valued vis-à-vis soldiers and 
place privateers in harm’s way at a lower political cost. 
Perhaps these observations overstate the difference, especially in light 
of the Bush administration’s ongoing War on Terror and the war in Iraq. 
After September 11, the force-protection theory of warmaking may seem 
more of a naïve luxury than a sustainable national defense strategy.160 
Casualties to American troops struck down in the caves of Afghanistan or 
 158. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Backs Ban on Photos of G.I. Coffins, N.Y. TIMES, June 
22, 2004, at A17 (noting the Senate’s support of the Bush administration’s ban on photographing the 
flag-covered coffins of service members killed overseas and quoting Senator McCain as opposing the 
ban and saying “I think we ought to know the casualties of war”); Alan Wirzbicki, Show Room, NEW 
REPUBLIC ONLINE, Apr. 29, 2004, at http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?I=express&s=wirzbicki042904 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2004) (citing accusations that President Bush is not releasing photographs of 
America’s war casualties in an effort “to sanitize the human cost of war” and suggesting that “it’s hard 
to avoid the suspicion that something other than concern for privacy drives [the] photoban”); see also 
Cooper, supra note 22. 
 159. DAVID CALLAHAN, UNWINNABLE WARS 187–88 (1997) (“Since the United States will rarely 
have vital interests at stake in an ethnic conflict, it will almost always be inclined to use military force 
on a limited scale, if at all . . . . It will seek to keep causalities low.”); see also Jane E. Stromseth, 
Collective Force and Constitutional Responsibility: War Powers in the Post-Cold War Era, 50 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 145, 164 (1995) (noting that when “operations do not implicate core U.S. security 
interests, the American public will have a very low tolerance for casualties”); Pape & Meyer, supra 
note 2, at 22 (suggesting that it might be tempting to American leaders to hire a private security force 
to oust Liberia’s Charles Taylor without having the “risk of dead American . . . soldiers”); The 
O’Reilly Factor (Fox News television broadcast, Oct. 6, 2004) (suggesting that the United States 
should use contractors to do America’s dirty work in order to let soldiers, reservists, and members of 
the National Guard go home and to spare them from “getting grinded up”). 
 160. See Michael Hirsh, America Adrift; Writing the History of the Post Cold Wars, FOREIGN 
AFF., Nov./Dec. 2001, at 158 (noting how the Bush administration was forced after September 11 to 
abandon its isolationist campaign promises and engage in multilateralism in order to jump-start the 
War on Terror); see also PRIEST, supra note 47, at 38–40 (noting the new imperative to expand 
military operations). But see Jeffrey Bell, Rumsfeld’s Vietnam Syndrome, WKLY. STANDARD, May 24, 
2004, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/content/public/articles/000/000/004/097jzsnm.asp 
(last visited Dec. 24, 2004) (noting the enduring vitality of the zero-casualty doctrine). 
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the streets of Iraq may be considered acceptable in ways they might not 
have been in Kosovo or Colombia. And, in Iraq, as contractors become 
more commonplace on the battlefield and more closely associated with the 
American commitment there, the symbolic differences between them and 
soldiers may lose some currency.161 Accordingly, to the extent the 
differences lose meaning, however, so does the policymakers’ perceived 
flexibility to employ privateers as less politically costly stand-ins (and 
hence contractors may become less useful).162  
Nevertheless, the public’s sense of the differences may endure—and 
may even become more acute in instances where national security interests 
are not implicated. In other words, the loss of military lives in a 
humanitarian intervention—conducted contemporaneously as “real” wars 
are being fought on the frontlines of American security interests—may 
become even less acceptable. But, as often is the case with trying to glean 
meaning from dynamic trends, this discussion is speculative, of course, 
and any statements proffered here would benefit from further empirical 
analysis and/or a longer period of time to gauge cultural changes brought 
about in the post-September 11 climate.  
b. Lowering the American Profile Abroad 
Moreover, at times U.S. expertise and strength may be warranted—and 
even solicited by foreign leaders—but the symbolism of inviting American 
troops may prove too problematic for the host country, and the decision to 
dispatch them may do more harm than good. One need only consider the 
level of hostility shown toward U.S. GIs in countries with complicated 
histories of an American military presence, such as Japan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the Philippines,163 to appreciate that in some circumstances private 
 161. See, e.g., Cha & Merle, supra note 109 (noting that the Pentagon awarded—though 
mistakenly—honors such as Purple Hearts and Silver Stars to contractors); Richard Lezin Jones, A 
Family Tries To Remember a Son Killed in Iraq and His Style, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2004, at A11 
(reporting on the death of civilian—but non-military—contractor, Nicholas Berg); Jay Price, The 
Bridge, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh), July 25, 2004, at A1 (describing the killing in Fallujah of four 
American contractors whose bodies were defiled and whose deaths were very widely reported in the 
United States); Edward Wong, Islamist Website Reports Beheading of Second American, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 22, 2004, at A11 (reporting on the death of a captured American contractor).  
 162. See infra Part VI. 
 163. See Gwyn Kirk & Carolyn Bowen France, Redefining Security: Women Challenge U.S. 
Military Policy and Practice in East Asia, 15 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 229, 237–41 (2000) 
(describing local hostility toward American military presence in Japan and the Philippines); Rafael A. 
Porrata-Doria, Jr., The Philippine Bases and Status of Forces Agreement: Lessons for the Future, 137 
MIL. L. REV. 67, 68, 85–91 (1992) (characterizing the resentment among Filipinos over the long-term 
presence of the U.S. military in the Philippines); Toni M. Bugni, Note, The Continued Invasion: 
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contractors not wearing uniforms and not waving American flags may be 
much more effective agents of foreign policy than would soldiers, whose 
presence often invites anti-American sentiments.164  
Contractors, even if they are all Americans, may not exhibit any telltale 
signs of nationality. Hence, they may be especially valuable in places 
where the willingness of foreign leaders to help the United States fight the 
War on Terror exists but is offset by strong domestic opposition to U.S. 
forces on the ground. After all, one of Osama bin Laden’s principal 
reasons for threatening Saudi Arabia remains the Kingdom’s willingness 
to host American military bases in the “Holy Land.”165 And, on the flip 
side, the deaths of American contractors overseas (as opposed to U.S. 
soldiers) may be less likely to lead to a public outcry at home, which then 
might require the United States to respond with even greater force in 
defending its interests.  
III. THREATENING THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 
While the immediate benefits of cost-savings, economic efficiency, and 
greater political maneuverability provide strong incentives for 
policymakers to consider employing private contractors, a full accounting 
of the concomitant harms is also in order. In the parts that follow, I focus 
on structural harms and catalogue the depth and breadth of the potential 
dangers brought about when core governmental responsibility over 
military engagement is delegated to privateers. Indeed, whether explicitly 
seeking to evade political and legal constraints—or even inadvertently 
doing so in the course of trying to save money—the enhanced discretion 
associated with military privatization may: (1) subvert the constitutional 
imperatives of limited and democratic government, (2) diminish the 
effectiveness of the U.S. Armed Forces, and (3) undermine the already 
weak diplomatic and moral standing of the United States abroad.  
Assessing the United States Military Presence on Okinawa Through 1996, 21 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L 
L. REV. 85, 93–94 (1997) (indicating the tensions between the U.S. military and the Japanese 
government due to the high rate of criminal and violent behavior among American servicemen); 
Michael R. Gordon & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Will Move Air Operations To Qatar Base, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 2003, at A1 (alluding to the uncomfortable coexistence between American military personnel and 
Saudi citizens on Saudi soil). 
 164. But see infra note 405. 
 165. See, e.g., PRIEST, supra note 47, at 84 (“The presence of Americans on Islamic holy land in 
Saudi Arabia was highly controversial among Islamic states (and one reason Osama Bin Laden called 
for a jihad against the Saudi monarchy and the United States).”).  
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In this Part, I focus on how private contractors may enable the 
Executive to conduct military policy with relatively few constraints. To 
the extent that Congress’s authority over warmaking is principally tied to 
its Article I powers over the U.S. Armed Forces, a president seeking more 
unilateral control might deploy private troops instead of U.S. soldiers. By 
bypassing congressional authority, the president violates the two chief 
constitutional imperatives: limited government—by circumventing 
Congress and limiting its ability to rein in the power of the president—and 
democratic government—by acting covertly without the national 
legislature’s and, by extension, the People’s consent. Problematically, 
even if the Executive had no such insidious aim—and was instead seeking 
primarily to maximize efficiency gains—simply and even inadvertently 
operating outside of the constitutional framework of shared military 
policymaking has the effect of limiting Congress’s and, again, the 
People’s formal and informal involvement in national security affairs, a 
limitation that, of course, is harmful to the proper functioning of 
government. For the most part, over time, Congress should be able to 
recover and reassert much of its authority by actively legislating to impede 
or, perhaps just counterbalance, the president’s unilateral activity. 
Therefore, presidential discretion by way of outsourcing may not create an 
insurmountable constitutional crisis, but can, at the very least, create a 
critical imbalance that has yet to be satisfactorily anticipated. 
And, in the subsequent two Parts, I discuss, first in Part IV, how 
military privatization damages the institutional integrity and effectiveness 
of the U.S. Armed Forces and, also, how it may threaten the normative 
standing of the American soldier as an embodiment of the patriot-citizen; 
and then in Part V, I characterize how military privatization, by 
undermining the legitimacy and vitality of collective security agreements, 
provides additional fodder for those already suspicious of American 
foreign policy. 
Some of these harms identified in this Part as well as Parts IV and V, 
lend themselves to amelioration through more procedural transparency, 
through legislation mandating greater coordination with Congress, and 
through more candor with the American people. Other harms, however, 
are more intractable and, for constitutional and cultural reasons, not as 
easily remedied. A discussion of an agenda for reform—and the 
limitations of reform—will be reserved for this Article’s conclusion.  
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A. Military Privatization’s Threat to Limited and Democratic Governance  
Although, we might think of the call to Philadelphia in the Summer of 
1787 as a concerted effort to redistribute power away from the national 
legislature and toward a strong Executive,166 the Founders nevertheless 
retained for Congress a sizable bulk of the Republic’s warmaking 
powers.167 Scholars have suggested that the motivation for the Convention 
lied principally in addressing the Articles of Confederation’s defects in 
domestic governance (as well as in its misallocation of powers between 
the states and the Union), rather than any shortcomings in the nascent 
country’s perceived abilities to take up arms in defense of its 
sovereignty.168 Indeed, perhaps centuries of Old World tyranny and scores 
of bloody wars instigated by petulant European kings sensitized the 
Founders to the dangers of entrusting the sword and the decision to wield 
that sword in the same set of hands.169  
Vesting warmaking decisions—to authorize war, fund war, and supply 
and regulate the personnel involved in war—in Congress advanced, as I 
have intimated above, the two chief aims of the American experiment in 
constitutional democracy. The United States would be a limited 
government: its Commander-in-Chief would be constrained by sets of 
laws, deliberative processes, and by other, equally ambitious leaders in 
 166. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 2–3 (4th 
ed. 2000); MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1913) 
(characterizing the non-existence of an executive capable of enforcing the laws of the new union as a 
key weakness inherent in the Articles of Confederation).  
 167. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of 1787, at 292 (Max Farrand ed., rev. 
ed. 1937) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION]; Lobel, supra note 80, at 1098–99; Charles A. Lofgren, 
War-making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672, 679–82 (1971) 
(describing the Constitution’s vesting of key war powers in Congress). 
 168. See, e.g., BREST ET AL., supra note 166, at 2 (cataloguing the deficiencies of government 
under the Articles and emphasizing the weakness of that national government in managing the 
economy, taxing, and printing money); Mark E. Brandon, War and American Constitutional Order, 56 
VAND. L. REV. 1815, 1860 (2003) (characterizing the chief aims of the Constitutional Convention as 
directed at reallocating powers from the states to the federal government); Lofgren, supra note 167, at 
675, 697 (noting that although criticism of the Articles of Confederation regime prompted the call for a 
strong executive, that criticism did not extend to concerns that the legislature was unable or ill-suited 
to commit the nation to war); see also 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 318–19 
(documenting the rather limited discussion at the Convention regarding the placement and reallocation 
of war powers); William Michael Treanor, Fame, The Founding, and the Power To Declare War, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 698 (1997) (indicating that the entire debate on warmaking powers occupied 
only a “page of the published record”).  
 169. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 1–6 (1995); Brandon, supra note 168, at 1845; 
Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2000); Treanor, supra 
note 168, at 699–702; see also Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1109 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360) 
(holding that the Constitution allowed no citizen, not even the president, to lift up the sword of the 
United States without congressional authorization). 
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coordinate branches.170 And the United States would also be a great 
democracy: its decisions would reflect the will of the citizenry.171 Hence, 
Congress as the most direct representatives of the People, would 
necessarily be involved in military policy, simultaneously promoting the 
virtues of limited government by checking the perceived natural 
inclinations of the strong Executive172 and upholding the ideals of 
democracy by remaining the true servants of the People. Moreover, 
decisions by the president to wage war could not be undertaken without 
first benefiting from the deliberative insights of a legislative assembly and 
 170. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). The dominant theme of separation of powers 
served as one of the American republic’s leitmotifs, even in the area of warmaking responsibilities. 
See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 83 (1990) (suggesting that 
the Framers intended the constitutional system of checks and balances to apply equally in the domain 
of foreign affairs); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and 
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 212 (1988) (describing separation of powers as an “almost 
sacred article of faith in the deliberations of the constitutional assemblies of the United States”); 
Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy, 43 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 463, 488–89 (1976) [hereinafter Casper, Constitutional Constraints] (emphasizing how 
separation of powers remained a central constitutional tenet for the Founders even in the allocation of 
war powers); Treanor, supra note 168, at 700 (describing the Founders’ recognition that a strong 
executive would need to be kept in check by the Congress in matters of war powers); see also Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that the separation-of-powers 
doctrine’s purpose was “not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the 
distribution of the governmental powers among three departments, to save the people from 
autocracy”). 
 171. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 
(1969). 
 172. Madison confided in Jefferson: “The constitution supposes, what the History of all 
Governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most 
prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legislature.” Letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Apr. 2, 1798), in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 311, 
312 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1906); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 629–
34 (1952) (Douglas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that the intent of a government organized around 
separation of powers is to deter arbitrary exercises of power); FISHER, supra note 169, at 1650 (noting 
that the cluster of war powers vested in Congress represented a marked break “with prevailing theories 
that placed war powers, foreign affairs, and judgments on the law of nations with the Executive”); 
FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 179 (1989) (“The 
legislative branch was purposely given the war power as a check upon the impulsive use of military 
force by the executive.”).  
 Hamilton, for his part, acknowledged the vast war-making power of the legislature, which alone 
could not only declare war, but could “actually transfer the nation from a state of peace to a state of 
hostility. . . . The Legislature alone can interrupt the [blessing of peace] by placing the nation in a state 
of war.” Letters of Pacificus No.1, in 4 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 432, 443 (Henry 
Cabot Lodge ed., 1904). As Professor Ramsey notes, since Hamilton was such a “vigorous advocate 
for presidential powers in general . . . his concession that the war-initiation power lay with Congress 
must be counted as substantial.” Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1543, 1607 (2002). 
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without concomitantly securing the tacit blessings and consent of the 
citizenry.173  
Military privatization threatens this framework of coordinate 
decisionmaking. The potential to outsource combat roles necessarily 
carries with it opportunities for the Executive to wield powers 
unimaginable were it limited to the use of regular, U.S. troops. By shifting 
responsibilities away from America’s armed forces and delegating them to 
private contractors, the president can circumvent constitutional obligations 
to share warmaking authority with Congress. Privatization, therefore, may 
destabilize the delicate balance of powersharing built into what Dean 
Harold Koh calls the National Security Constitution,174 by weakening a 
critical check on presidential power—a failure of constitutional 
governance—and also by engendering a level of distrust and sense of 
disenfranchisement among the population writ large—a failure of 
 173. Montesquieu, who is so intimately associated with the theory and architecture of separation 
of powers, was not unaware of the democratic reasons—and not just the limited-government reasons—
why legislatures should be entrusted with considerable warmaking powers. He articulated the need for 
popular consent in such weighty policy decisions: “To prevent the executive power from being able to 
oppress, it is requisite that the armies with which it is intrusted should consist of the people, and have 
the same spirit as the people. . . . To obtain this end . . . if there be a standing army . . . the legislative 
power should have a right to disband them as soon as it pleased.” C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF 
THE LAWS (C.T. Nugent trans., 1949). Moreover, Blackstone noted that “[o]ne of the principal 
bulwarks of civil liberty . . . was the limitation of the king’s prerogative by bounds so certain and 
notorious, that is impossible he should ever exceed them, without the consent of the people . . . or 
without . . . a violation of that original contract.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND, ch. 7 (1st ed. 1765); see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ch. 
14, para. 160 (P. Laslett rev. ed., New American Library 1963) (3d ed. 1698) (characterizing the term 
“prerogative” as one including executive authority over military affairs). Madison took exception with 
the longstanding Lockean theory of executive prerogative in making martial decisions and recognized 
that “the power to declare war . . . is not an execution of laws. . . . It is, on the contrary, one of the most 
deliberative acts that can be performed.” James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, No. I, Aug–Sept 1793, 
reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 172, at 138. 
 174. KOH, supra note 170. Dean Koh has asserted: 
The National Security Constitution grows out of the . . . principle that the system of checks 
and balances is not suspended simply because foreign affairs are at issue. . . . [T]he 
Constitution requires that we be governed by separate institutions sharing foreign policy 
powers. . . . As it has evolved, the National Security Constitution assigns to the president the 
predominant role in the process, but affords him only a limited realm of exclusive powers, 
with regard to diplomatic relations and negotiations and to the recognition of nations and 
governments. Outside of that realm, government decisions regarding foreign affairs must 
transpire within a sphere of concurrent authority, under presidential management, but 
bounded by the checks provided by congressional consultation. . . . 
Id. at 69 (emphasis added); see also Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141, 1148 (D.D.C. 1990) (noting 
that the deployed forces were construed to be of such a magnitude and significance as to present no 
serious claim that a war would not ensue if they became engaged in combat.); Harold Hongju Koh, 
The Coase Theorem and the War Power: A Response, 41 DUKE L.J. 122, 123 (1991) (“[T]he 
Constitution d[oes] not permit the President to order U.S. armed forces to make war without 
meaningful consultation with Congress and receiving its affirmative authorization . . . .”). 
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democratic legitimacy. In the process, the People lose effective control 
over the helm of national security policy; and, institutionally speaking, 
once lost, such control will take time and considerable effort for Congress 
to regain. 
B. The Fallacy of Imperial Warmaking and the Reality of Coordinate 
Powersharing  
Were Congress unquestionably subordinated by an Executive 
authorized to assert exclusive powers to engage troops in combat 
unilaterally, then any separation-of-powers concern stemming from 
military privatization would fall to the wayside: Regarding the deployment 
of U.S. soldiers in zones of hostility, without any obligation to consult 
with Congress, let alone seek its approval, it would make no difference at 
least from this perspective if the Executive outsourced military 
responsibilities to private contractors. Although other constitutional and 
prudential harms would still ensue, the structure of powersharing between 
the elected branches would not be destabilized as a result of privatization. 
But despite actions and rhetoric suggesting that the Executive possesses 
unrivaled warmaking authority, the Constitution does not grant the 
president those exclusive powers,175 and hence in order to grasp the very 
real threat privatization poses to the equitable and prudent allocation of 
war powers, we must appreciate Congress’s important role in military 
affairs. 
The exact contours of congressional-presidential powersharing need 
not be explored here; nor need we debate which branch, if either, has a 
preponderant say in decisions to commit troops. Those critically important 
questions are beyond this inquiry’s ken. The more modest aim is simply to 
establish the existence and persistence of a strong congressional role in 
military affairs both as a vital check on the Executive and as a necessary 
conduit to ensure the continued informed consent of the American people. 
In what follows directly below, I describe the principal ways in which 
Congress typically plays a prominent role in shaping military policy and, 
concomitantly, in constraining presidential unilateralism. Then, in Section 
C, I will discuss how privatization allows the Executive greater leave to 
 175. See, e.g., Brandon, supra note 168, at 1843 (recognizing the shared authority over military 
affairs that the Constitution vests in its two elected branches); H. Jefferson Powell, The President’s 
Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 550 
(1999) (recognizing the important role Congress plays in warmaking decisions even while the author 
advocates expansive presidential authority).  
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bypass congressional oversight and authorization in those key domains. I 
do note at the outset, however, that congressional authority over the affairs 
of the U.S. Armed Forces is not perfect; nor is Congress entirely unable to 
oversee the activities of military contractors. Accordingly, though I do 
want to highlight the important differences between Congress’s influence 
over the Armed Forces and its influence over military contractors (both in 
theory and in practice), I recognize that at times these differences are ones 
of degree, rather than of kind. 
Congress tends to exercise its authority over military policy along three 
key axes: its power to regulate military personnel, to appropriate funds to 
the military, and to authorize the deployment of U.S. combat troops in 
conflict zones. First, through its authority to regulate military personnel, 
Congress can constrain presidential warmaking by limiting the size of the 
U.S. military,176 by imposing restrictions and regulations on how and 
where soldiers can be deployed,177 and by structuring the chains of 
command to limit an Executive’s ability to politicize the military 
leadership.178  
Indeed, by possessing power over the conscription of American 
civilians179 and by regulating the standards of reserve activations,180 
Congress can potentially limit the size of a conflict and its relative 
 176. See Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893) (“Congress may increase the Army, 
or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether . . . . ”); Powell, supra note 175, at 569 (noting that 
Congress can limit the exercise of the president’s deployment power by refusing to provide the 
Executive with the force necessary to conduct military affairs). For a recent example involving 
congressional deliberation as to the size of the American military, see Thom Shanker, Officials Debate 
Whether To Seek a Bigger Military, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at A6.  
 177. See Powell, supra note 175, at 569. 
 178. See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 179. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 
U.S. 366 (1918); Harrup A. Freeman, The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA. L. 
REV. 40, 56–59 (1944); Leon Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original 
Understanding, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493, 1494–1500 (1969); David I. Lewittes, Constitutional 
Separation of War Powers: Protecting Public and Private Liberty, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1083, 1138–47 
(1992) (describing Congress’s exclusive powers over drafting and maintaining an army); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (raise and support clause); id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 15–16 (providing for 
Congress’s exclusive authority to call forth the states’ militias). Congress also can terminate, or refuse 
to call for a draft. See, e.g., Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No 80-759, 62 Stat. 604 (1948).  
 180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (raise and support clause); see Perpich v. Department of 
Defense, 496 U.S. 334 (1990) (upholding Congress’s power to activate reservists); Selective Draft Law 
Cases, 245 U.S. at 369 (affirming that Congress could call up state militia personnel to fight foreign 
enemies); Johnson v. Powell, 414 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1969) (acknowledging Congress’s power to 
activate national guard units for combat duty); Dukakis v. Department of Defense, 686 F. Supp. 30 (D. 
Mass. 1988) (same); see also Presidential Reserve Call-Up Act, 10 U.S.C. § 12304 (2000) (prescribing 
the scope and procedures for the president to call up reservists); Capt. Kenneth M. Theurer, Low-Level 
Conflicts and the Reserves: Presidential Authority Under 10 U.S.C. 673(b), 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1135, 
1141–43 (1994) (describing the process by which reservists are activated).  
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duration. Without the prospects of an unlimited, fresh supply of troops as 
replacements and reinforcements, the president may feel constrained in 
initiating and continuing unilateral engagements.181 Also, Congress can 
impose rules regarding the internal governance of the military, set terms 
for the conduct of war, and establish restrictive guidelines for 
engagement.182 In the absence of this set of Article I powers, the 
president—as Commander-in-Chief—presumably would possess the 
exclusive authority to determine the acceptable contours of soldierly 
conduct.183 And finally, still within this first set of powers, Congress can 
limit the politicization of the military by legislating hierarchical 
promotional guidelines184 and by organizing units around civilian and 
 181. Though, of late, Congress has at times preferred a larger military than the president, this 
disagreement is one often shaped by local politics and an unwillingness among members of Congress 
to allow base closings in their respective districts. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker, Senate Rejects 
Pentagon’s Request to Close More Bases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1999, at A22; Andrew Rosenthal, 
Lawmakers Scurrying To Protect Home Bases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1990, at A13. Such 
considerations reveal how any one congressional power may not be a sufficient or effective check on 
the president since external considerations (such as preserving local jobs and securing re-election) may 
be prioritized by the People’s representatives.  
 182. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (“[W]e give Congress the highest 
deference in ordering military affairs.”); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“The . . . decisions 
as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional 
military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”); see 
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14; Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2000). 
 183. As Commander-in-Chief, the president’s powers are undisputed. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 74, at 447 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he direction of war most 
peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”); 
WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 128–29 (1916) (“In carrying on 
the war as Commander-in-Chief, it is he who is to determine the movements of the army and navy. 
Congress could not . . . themselves . . . carry on campaigns.”); William Howard Taft, The Boundaries 
Between the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judicial Branches of the Government, 25 YALE L.J. 
599, 610–12 (1916).  
 However, while Congress cannot deprive the president of the command of the Army and Navy, it 
alone can provide him with an army or navy to command. And, since Congress is empowered to make 
rules for the “Government and Regulation of land and naval Forces,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14, it 
may, to some extent, also impinge on command functions. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1952); see also id. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“No penance would 
ever expiate the sin against free government of holding that a President can escape control of executive 
powers by law through assuming his military role.”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942) (noting 
that the president has the power to “carry into effect all laws passed by Congress for the conduct of 
war and for the government and regulation of the Armed Forces. . . .”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 337 n.11 (2d ed. 1996); ABRAHAM SOFAER, WAR, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 3 (1976) (asserting that it is most accurate to 
understand the president as Commander-in-Chief as an “agent of the legislature”). 
 184. Congress has control of the administration and structuring of the military, which can be 
exercised in ways to thwart presidential aims. See, e.g., WORMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 172, at 91 
(noting how Congress’s seniority rules as applied to the promotion of military officers limited 
Lincoln’s flexibility in appointing certain generals); Richard Hartzman, Congressional Control of the 
Military in a Multilateral Context, 162 MIL. L. REV. 50, 99–100 (1999) (describing Congress’s efforts 
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military leaders whose positions require Senate confirmation pursuant to 
the Appointments Clause.185 In all, this first category of checks constrains 
the exercise of unbridled presidential warmaking and adds layers of 
transparency vis-à-vis fixed rules of military conduct and decisionmaking 
that ensure greater public awareness of military policymaking.  
Second, another critically effective axis-of-constraints check on 
executive-driven military policy is Congress’s power of the purse, perhaps 
its ultimate trump card.186 Appropriations decisions, which belong to 
Congress and within the context of U.S. military spending must be 
constitutionally revisited at least every two years,187 are often “conceived 
of as lump-sum grants with ‘strings’ attached . . . binding the operating 
arm of government.”188 This power was notably employed in the Vietnam 
era, when Congress cut off all funds for use in operations in Cambodia;189 
then, a decade later, Congress again tightened the purse strings to limit the 
to reform military command structures both within the armed forces and vis-à-vis civilian department 
heads); see also 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. 
No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986); Act of Feb. 14, 1903, ch. 553, 32 Stat. 830 (1903); Youngstown, 343 
U.S. at 644; PRIEST, supra note 47, at 95–96 (characterizing the 1986 reorganization by Congress as 
altering the chain of command at the higher levels of military and civilian leadership within the 
Department of Defense); Col. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian 
Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 375–76 (same).  
 185. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; infra notes 231–46 and accompanying text; see also Yeoman, 
supra note 4.  
 186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Appropriations power can effectively limit a president’s 
ability to command troops and sustain efforts abroad. See, e.g., WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-
HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE, 119, 137–57 (1994); Michael J. 
Glennon, Strengthening the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 
MINN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1267 (1988) (describing that between 1973 and 
1974 alone, “Congress enacted seven separate provisions declaring that no funds authorized or 
appropriated . . . could be expended to support United States military . . . forces in Vietnam, 
Cambodia, or Laos”); Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the 
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833 (1994); Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE 
L.J. 1343, 1353 (1988); see also FISHER supra note 169, at 199–206 (advocating the importance of 
congressional power over appropriations to serve as an effective check against an overzealous 
executive branch); John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The Unconstitutionality of 
the War They Didn’t Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1105 (1990) (“Even the staunchest 
supporters of presidential power in this area grant—indeed adopt as a critical premise of their 
argument—that if Congress does not like the way a war is being conducted it can pull the financial 
plug on it . . . .”).  
 187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (“[B]ut no Appropriation of Money to that [military] Use shall 
be for a longer Term than two Years”). 
 188. Stith, supra note 186, at 1353. 
 189. Id. at 1361. In a 1973 appropriations bill, Congress told the President to stop bombing 
Cambodia by August 15, and he did. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Working Balance of the American 
Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13, 15–16 (1974). Professor Black added that “[i]f 
the will had existed, [Congress] could have done much the same thing four, or six or eight tragic years 
ago—at any time they really had wanted.” Id.; see also Koh, supra note 186, at 1267. 
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president’s efforts in Nicaragua;190 and, in the present, post-Cold War era, 
Congress has used its appropriations power with some regularity to limit 
presidential power and narrow the scope of military engagements in Haiti, 
Somalia, the Balkans, and Rwanda.191 As will be discussed below, for a 
number of reasons it is much more administratively difficult to regulate 
the funding that ultimately flows to privateers, because contractors are 
often paid through more discreet, even convoluted bureaucratic channels 
(if they are even paid through the U.S. Treasury at all). Of course, it could 
be the case that Congress, in making its appropriations, begins with the 
foundational assumption that executive agencies—even ones not directly 
involved in national security192—employ military contractors. But while 
this may very well become a commonplace assumption among future 
congresses, it is doubtful that previous and even the contemporary 
congresses, which appropriated war spending in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
contemplated the scope (and complexities) of private military funding.  
Third, there is Congress’s most direct (but also most contested) power: 
to authorize military deployments even short of a formal declaration of 
war.193 Today, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution,194 a statutory 
 190. Koh, supra note 186, at 1265 n.41 (describing the Boland Amendment that prohibited “the 
expenditure of funds . . . to any entity of the United States . . . for assistance to the Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance to support . . . operations in Nicaragua”); see also Andrew W. Hayes, The 
Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1565–69 (1988) 
(describing the congressional appropriations bill that cut off the Executive’s ability to fund the Contras 
in 1984); Frank G. Colella, Note, Beyond Institutional Competence: Congressional Efforts To 
Legislate United States Foreign Policy Toward Nicaragua—The Boland Amendments, 54 BROOK. L. 
REV. 131 (1988). 
 191. For examples of Congress restricting funds to curtail—or register disapproval of—military 
engagements, see Act of Nov. 11, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8151(b), 107 Stat. 1418 (1993) 
(restricting funds to the efforts in Somalia); Act of Sept. 30, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-335, § 8135, 108 
Stat. 2599 (1994) (same); and, Act of Sept. 30, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-335, tit. IX, 108 Stat. 2599 
(1994) (restricting funds to finance any military efforts in Rwanda). Moreover, in September 1995, the 
House passed an appropriations limitation that prohibited funds for new operations in Bosnia, and the 
Senate passed 94–2 an amendment against funds for new combat deployments in Bosnia. See Charles 
Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1990s by Partial Congressional Declaration, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1, 11–12 (1999). Professor Jane Stromseth notes that with respect to Bosnia, in September 1995, the 
Senate “passed an amendment to the State, Commerce, and Justice Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 
1996, which expressed the sense of the Senate that funds provided by the bill should not be used to 
deploy U.S. combat troops to Bosnia unless Congress first approved the deployment in advance.” Jane 
E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 
YALE L.J. 845, 903 n.304 (1996). But see LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
109 (1st ed. 1972) (“In fact, Congress has rarely refused to adopt the laws or appropriate the funds 
required to implement an international undertaking, though Congress might differ with the president as 
to how much money or what laws were required.”). 
 192. See infra notes 223–27. 
 193. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. Definitionally, at the time of the Founding, there was little legal 
difference between formal and undeclared, or limited wars—and it was thought that both types of wars 
would require congressional authorization. See, e.g., EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
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399 (J. Chitty ed. 1863) (1758); Ely, supra note 186, at 1104 (“[T]he framers and ratifiers of the 
Constitution provided that all acts of war performed on behalf of the United States—even when they 
fell short of full-fledged war and even when undertaken by private parties . . . had to be authorized by 
Congress.”) (emphasis added); Ramsey, supra note 172, at 1546 (noting that because war can be 
declared by simply commencing hostilities—as well as by formal announcement—it is clear that 
Congress was given power over both sorts of declarations); id. at 1545 (indicating that “declaring war 
meant initiating a state of war by public act, and it was understood [at the time of the Founding] that 
this could be done either by formal declaration or by commencing armed hostilities”); see also JOHN 
HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1993) (describing how all wars, large or minor, declared 
officially or not, had to be legislatively authorized).  
 As Judge Sofaer has pointed out, none of the first five presidents ever claimed inherent 
constitutional powers that would permit him to deploy troops in combat zones, even in instances well 
short of formal declarations of war, without congressional approval. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The 
Presidency, War and Foreign Affairs: Practice Under the Framers, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 12, 
36–37 (1976); see also KOH, supra note 170, at 80. Specifically, in the early years of the Republic, the 
president sought congressional authorization for a series of what would have to be construed as limited 
wars. These conflicts included the Neutrality crisis of 1793, the 1798 Naval War with France, the 
Nootka Sound incident, as well as skirmishes with Native American tribes and Algierian pirates. See 
SOFAER, supra note 183, at 100–27; Ramsey, supra note 172, at 1551, 1608. For instance, in a conflict 
against some Native American tribes, President Washington confined his troops to defensive postures 
until he received congressional authorization. See SOFAER, supra note 183, at 116–27 (describing this 
restraint in the context of Native American incursions against America’s western border); Saikrishna 
B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 
346–50 (2001) (describing similar restraint under later presidents with respect to the Barbary pirates).  
 This practical deference by the Executive to Congress had judicial support in the early 1800s. 
When John Adams initiated an undeclared war with France, the Supreme Court, in Bas v. Tingy, 4 
U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 43–46 (1800), upheld this exercise not because the president had plenary power in 
military affairs, but because it believed that Congress had authorized limited hostilities by means other 
than a formal war declaration. See id. at 43; see also ALEXANDER DECONDE, THE QUASI WAR: THE 
POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF THE UNDECLARED WAR WITH FRANCE, 1797–1801, at 89–98 (1966). 
Accordingly, though none of the Justices explicitly stated that only Congress might authorize even a 
limited, or “imperfect” war, that conclusion was clearly conveyed by the fact that even this modest 
engagement with the French required some form of congressional authorization. See, e.g., Lofgren, 
supra note 167, at 701. And, in Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801), the Court again located 
the authority for a naval capture of a neutral ship as stemming from Congress. Chief Justice Marshall 
held that “[t]he whole powers of war being, by the constitution of the United States, vested in 
congress, the acts of that body can alone be resorted to as our guides in this enquiry.” Id. at 28. The 
Chief Justice further noted that the authorization for even limited wars was squarely within the 
purview of Congress. Id. at 32; see also Mark T. Uyeda, Note, Presidential Prerogative Under the 
Constitution to Deploy U.S. Military Forces in Low-Intensity Conflict, 44 DUKE L.J. 777, 794–95 
(1995) (suggesting that the consensus surrounding the fact that, in the early years of the Republic, even 
limited wars required congressional approval served to lay the “primary legal foundation for the 
assertion of congressional supremacy in the context of [low-intensity conflicts]”). 
 194. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2000). The War Powers Resolution has three highly pertinent 
sections. Section 3 of the Resolution requires:  
The President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing 
United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after every such introduction shall 
consult regularly with the Congress until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged 
in hostilities or have been removed from such situations.  
50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000).  
 Section 4 of the Resolution requires the President to send a report within forty-eight hours when, 
absent a declaration of war, he introduces American forces:  
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rule195 ensuring that the collective judgment of both elected branches will 
apply to military intervention in a manner consistent with “the intent of the 
framers,”196 the president must consult with Congress and ultimately seek 
its approval to deploy and retain U.S. military forces in zones of 
combat.197 Despite opposition to this statutory framework and a refusal to 
concede that Congress has any role to play in military engagements short 
of formal war,198 recent administrations have nevertheless consulted with 
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly 
indicated by the circumstances;  
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except 
for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; 
or  
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat 
already located in a foreign nation.  
50 U.S.C § 1543 (2000). 
 Finally, § 5(b) of the Resolution states that the president may not commit troops to combat for 
longer than sixty days. If the president wants to commit American forces for a longer period, he may 
seek the joint resolution provided for in the War Powers Resolution, or he may request separate 
enabling legislation. 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (2000). 
 195. Gerhard Casper has called the Resolution a “framework statute.” Framework statutes 
describe major legislative achievements that do not merely “formulate specific policies for the 
resolution of specific problems, but rather . . . implement constitutional policies.” Casper, 
Constitutional Constraints, supra note 170, at 482; see also KOH, supra note 170, at 69–70 (describing 
framework statutes as specifying the “legal authorities and constraints for particular institutional acts,” 
providing “procedures to evaluate and control particular exercises of delegated powers,” and fostering 
“institutional expectation as to how those powers will be exercised in the future”); Gerhard Casper, 
The Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 187 (1985) 
(listing other framework statutes). 
 196. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2000); see also Treanor, supra note 168, at 705. 
 197. See Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The War Power at a Constitutional 
Impasse: A “Joint Decision” Solution, 77 GEO. L.J. 367, 385–90 (1988); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Youngstown Goes To War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 222 (2002). As Professor Lori Damrosch 
argues:  
The War Powers Resolution . . . reclaimed Congress’s powers both with respect to “war” and 
with respect to lesser degrees of “hostilities.” . . . Congress has surely not abandoned—and 
indeed has expressed its insistence on asserting—its constitutional prerogatives with respect 
to introduction of U.S. Forces into hostilities, whether or not those hostilities are denominated 
“war.” 
Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements, 89 
AM. J. INT’L L. 58, 66–67 (1995). 
 198. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 198–201 
(1957); ELY, supra note 193, at 10–11 (highlighting Truman’s strong executive assumption of powers 
in initiating the Korean War); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 460 (2d ed. 1995) (noting how infrequently presidents have sought to comply with 
the War Powers Resolution); QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 
306–10 (1922); Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on John Hart Ely's War and Responsibility: 
Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and its Aftermath, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1364, 1370–88 (1994); 
Casper, Constitutional Constraints, supra note 170, at 463 (“The manner in which recent Presidents 
have conducted United States foreign and defense policy suggests the absence in practice of 
constitutional constraints and the presence of surprisingly few political constraints.”); Robert J. 
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Congress—and sought formal authorization—before deploying troops for 
combat duty abroad. For example, both President George H.W. Bush in 
the Gulf War and President Clinton in the Balkans and Iraq aligned  
themselves with, rather than against, the powerful argument that 
Congress should take responsibility [in war decisions]. Each 
President submitted his defining military action to Congress along 
with a request for congressional approval in advance. Thus . . . 
highly publicized congressional debates characterize the present 
arena for resolving questions about putting the military in harm’s 
way.199
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military Operations 
Against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 487, 503–04, 509 (2002) (noting that 125 deployments abroad came about by unilateral action 
by the President without prior express authorization by Congress); Michael D. Ramsey, Presidential 
Declarations of War, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 321 (2003); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad 
Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV. 833, 864–66 (1972); Eugene V. Rostow, “Once More 
unto the Breach:” The War Powers Resolution Revisited, 21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986); Glen E. 
Thurow, Presidential Discretion in Foreign Affairs, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 71, 86 (1973) (“[T]he 
thrust of the Federalist Papers. . . . is that the great discretion required in foreign affairs can be made 
compatible with republican government not by dispersing the power to the greatest extent possible, but 
by concentrating it in the hands of the President.”); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by 
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Power, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996); see also 
Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173, 175–76 (1994) 
(recommending to the President that Congress had given him considerable discretion as Commander-
in-Chief in deciding how to deploy troops); Authority To Use U.S. Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel 6 (1992) (authorizing the President to “commit troops overseas [to Somalia] 
without specific prior Congressional approval ‘on missions of good will or rescue, or for the purpose 
of protecting American lives or property or American interests.’”); Presidential Power to Use the 
Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 185, 185–86 
(1980) (advising the President that he had independent constitutional authority to order a unilateral 
deployment abroad at some risk of engagement, to rescue hostages and retaliate against Iran, and to 
repel any assault against American interests in the Persian Gulf); Training of British Flying Students in 
the U.S., 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 58, 61–62 (1941) (authorizing the President to “dispose of troops and 
equipment in such manner and on such duties as best to promote the safety of the country”); Address 
to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, 2 PUB. PAPERS 
1460 (Aug. 20, 1998) (noting President Clinton’s unilateral order for American forces to strike at 
terrorist facilities in Sudan and Afghanistan because of the threat they posed to national security); 
Leonard Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet-Nam, 54 DEP’T ST. 
BULL. 474 (1966), reprinted in PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW 
771 (1996).  
 199. See Tiefer, supra note 191, at 4; see also Damrosch, supra note 197, at 68 (describing 
George H.W. Bush’s “military strategy [as] deriv[ing] much-needed legitimacy from the fact that he 
was able to persuade Congress to support him; that congressional articulation of national interest has 
provided authority and credibility . . . for the 1991 war.”). As Peter Spiro has stated:  
With the end of the Cold War, Congress has become increasingly assertive on the foreign 
policy stage. The legislative branch may never have reflexively done the President's bidding 
on national security matters, but today the White House can no longer even indisputably 
claim to set the general course of the nation's foreign dealings. On defense and security 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/6
p1001 Michaels book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY 1061 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And notwithstanding otherwise embracing the pretensions of vast 
executive prerogative,200 President George W. Bush has followed his 
predecessors’ deferential lead by seeking congressional votes of support 
and authorization before taking up arms in both Afghanistan and Iraq.201  
policy, Congress may now call the shots. 
Peter J. Spiro, Old Wars/New Wars, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 723–24 (1996). Consistent with 
the dictates of the War Powers Resolution, President Clinton also duly reported the bombing of Serb 
forces in Kosovo. See Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F. Supp. 2d 34, 37–38 (D.D.C. 1999); Note, D.C. 
Circuit Holds that Members of Congress May Not Challenge the President’s Use of Troops in Kosovo, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 2134 (2000).  
 200. See, e.g., T.J. Halstead, The Law: Walker v. Cheney: Legal Insulation of the Vice President 
from GAO Investigations, 33 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 635 (2003); Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism 
and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767 (2002); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived? 
Secrecy and Conflict During the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403 (2002); James Carey, 7 Clues To 
Understanding Dick Cheney, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at 98; Harold Hongju Koh, Rights to Remember, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003, at 24; John Podesta, Taking Liberty, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 2003, at 44; 
Benjamin Wittes, Enemy Americans, ATL. MONTHLY, July 1, 2004, at 127; see also Rumsfeld v. 
Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 
2633 (2004); In re Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003).  
 201. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002); Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 
224 (2001); Alison Mitchell & Carl Hulse, Congress Authorizes Bush To Use Force Against Iraq, 
Creating a Broad Mandate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2002, at A1. And, as Professor Michael Paulsen 
reminds us, just because Congress’s Authorization for Use of Military Force on September 18, 2001, 
gave the President nearly plenary power to conduct the war on terrorism, without apparent limitation 
as to duration, scope, and tactics, it does not mean that congressional authorization was not an 
important prerequisite to military action. Paulsen, supra note 197, at 251–52; see also Hamdi, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2635, 2640–42 (plurality opinion) (characterizing Congress’s 2001 authorization of military 
force to fight terrorism as quite broad). 
 Indeed, none of these authorizations should be viewed merely as a rubber stamping. See, e.g., 
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Fires Next Time, NEW REPUBLIC, June 28, 2004, at 14 (describing congressional 
efforts to narrow the scope of the president’s “mandate” in Iraq); Donna Cassata & Pat Towell, Doubts 
About Clinton’s Strategy Stall Iraq Resolution, 56 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 397 (1998) (describing 
Congress as refusing either to approve or disapprove of military action in 1997–98 in Iraq); Damrosch, 
supra note 197, at 68 (noting that Somalia lacked the popular support that might have been obtainable 
had George H.W. Bush first sought to involve Congress in a meaningful way); Tiefer, supra note 191, 
at 8–9 (noting that the House had drafted funding cutoffs and was prepared to vote on them if the 
President had expanded U.S. military involvement in Bosnia); id. at 13–14 (describing Senator Dole’s 
proposal that would guarantee congressional decision making over what type of military work U.S. 
soldiers would handle); Tracy Wilkinson, U.S. To Provide Bosnia 116 Heavy Cannons, WASH. POST, 
May 10, 1997, at A22 (noting that pure military work, not nation building, was what Congress 
specified under Dole’s plan); see also Hartzman, supra note 184, at 95 (describing congressional 
efforts in the 1990s to limit the number of U.S. troops dispatched for U.N. peacekeeping to 1000 at 
any one time and to limit their function to guarding, observing, and other non-combatant roles); id. at 
95–96 (characterizing other bills limiting the president’s ability to dispatch military officials to foreign 
countries or to have them participate in joint military actions); Tiefer, supra note 191, at 25 n.109 
(describing Congress’s refusal to support Eisenhower’s request for combat involvement in Vietnam in 
1954). But see Treanor, supra note 168, at 702–05 (suggesting modern presidents have not deferred to 
congressional authority in matters of engaging troops in hostile environs).  
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C. Bypassing Congress Through Privatization: An Attack on 
Constitutional, Limited Government 
Privatization, accordingly, creates unprecedented opportunities for the 
Executive to circumvent Congress and act unilaterally in military affairs. 
By opting to employ private contractors—rather than members of the U.S. 
Armed Forces—the president can avoid triggering many of Congress’s 
commonly exercised war powers, which are by-and-large specifically 
linked to constitutional authority over America’s military branches.202 
Hence, the utilization of private agents has led scholars such as Professor 
Jules Lobel to suggest engagement without U.S. troops could be a shortcut 
around “democratic decisionmaking that distorts the democratic process 
and is fundamentally incompatible with the demands of our constitutional 
system.”203 Whether bypassing Congress is an intentional aim of 
privatization or an inadvertent byproduct (perhaps, the Executive sought to 
reap cost-efficiencies), this damage to the tenets of separation of powers, 
even if temporary—until Congress can revise its background assumptions 
and seek to establish formal authority over privateers—could compromise 
the strategic and physical security of the nation, the well-being of 
individuals inappropriately endangered, and the confidence of the People 
in the democratic practices and institutions of this nation. Below, I 
describe how privatization enables the Executive to bypass many of the 
avenues through which Congress typically exercises its constitutional 
authority over military affairs.  
1. Denial of Congress’s Regulatory Role 
a. Size of Military  
As mentioned above, Congress can preemptively constrain the excesses 
of a hawkish president by limiting the number of available troops.204 With 
a finite-sized public military, the president must deploy troops judiciously, 
or otherwise be forced to ask Congress to authorize a draft, liberalize 
 202. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 203. Lobel, supra note 80, at 1079; Juan O. Tamayo, Private Firms Take on Jobs, Risks for U.S. 
Military in Andes Drug War, MIAMI HERALD, May 22, 2001, at 1A (“Privatization is a way of going 
around Congress and not telling the public. Foreign policy is made by default to private military 
consultants motivated by bottom-line profits.”) (quoting U.S. Army Col. Bruce Grant). 
 204. Lewittes, supra note 179, at 1132–33 (contrasting the American president’s limitations on 
calling up a standing army with the broad powers to conscript enjoyed by monarchs and tyrants of 
centuries ago). 
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reservist activation policies, or slowly expand through recruitment and 
retention programs.205 Any such request by the president to Congress 
would invite questions and criticisms of current strategies and priorities.206 
The president’s expectation of political opposition provides crucial ex ante 
checks on executive adventurism and thus has the effect of counseling 
caution in how soldiers are deployed around the world. The other option 
for a president constrained by the size of the military is also disastrous 
politically: The overextended president (unwilling to request a draft) might 
be forced to withdraw troops from a conflict zone prematurely, and face 
the inevitable criticism for starting a war that could not be successfully 
completed. 
If on the other hand, there were some external, elastic source of troops, 
who could complement and supplement the U.S. Armed Forces, provide 
needed reinforcements, and help the president avoid having to activate 
reservists and/or reinstituting a military draft, the costs of not acting 
conservatively and judiciously are lowered. Privatization, at least at the 
margins, therefore presents a great alternative to lobbying Capitol Hill and 
the American people for permission to increase the size of the military 
quickly.207 While contractors could not “discreetly” command an entire 
theater in a major conflict, smaller outfits can be selectively positioned to 
provide the president with much greater flexibility—to continue, for 
instance, an unpopular or unexpectedly demanding war (that neither the 
president nor Congress would want to bolster with fresh newly conscripted 
 205. See, e.g., Joseph C. Anselmo, Pentagon Plans for Bigger, Better Army with ‘Spike,’ 62 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 270 (2004) (noting the Army’s need to add more troops to satisfy the nation’s 
international commitments); Eric Schmitt, Army Extending Service for G.I.s Due in War Zones, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2004, at A1; Eric Schmitt, General Says He May Ask for More Troops, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2004, at A10. 
 206. Joseph C. Anselmo, Rangel Legislation Stirs Draft Debate, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 273 
(2004); Dao, supra note 22; Monica Davey, Eight Soldiers Plan To Sue over Army Tours of Duty, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at A15; Helen Dewar, Hagel Seeking Broad Debate on Draft Issue, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 22, 2004, at A25; Lee Hockstader, Army Stops Many Soldiers from Quitting; Orders 
Extend Enlistments To Curtail Troop Shortages, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2003, at A1; Krugman, supra 
note 22; Vernon Loeb, Army Reserve Chief Fears Retention Crisis, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2004, at A4; 
Manuel Roig-Franzia, Weekend Warriors Go Full Time, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2004, at A1; see also 
SINGER, supra note 20, at 211 (noting that using privatization to circumvent congressional troop caps 
can help avoid the domestic uproar associated with calling up the National Guard or Reservists); 
Bianco & Forest, supra note 30, at 78 (“Why take the heat of calling up reservists when you can 
summon civilians-for-hire?”); Catan et al., supra note 20; Thomas E. Ricks, Wars Put Strain on 
National Guard, WASH. POST, June 6, 2004, at A1; Wayne, supra note 2 (noting that private military 
firms can be used not simply to elude public scrutiny but also, more affirmatively, to evade existing 
congressional limits on troop strength). 
 207. See Cooper, supra note 22 (noting the much higher political and economic costs associated 
with increasing troop levels or reintroducing the draft relative to those related to relying on private 
contractors). 
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soldiers). Hence with lower political opportunity costs for waging war, the 
president may be more apt to overcommit American capital—human, 
monetary, and diplomatic—in ways that would be less likely to occur were 
Congress and the American people (through their legislators) given a more 
direct say.  
One need not ponder hypotheticals to appreciate this potential for 
dangerous presidential unilateralism. If it were not for the tens of 
thousands of private troops supporting and serving alongside of U.S. 
soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps the President would not have 
been so eager to invade Iraq;208 or, perhaps, the limited number of 
American troops available would have compelled him to seek a broader 
coalition of countries willing to commit their own personnel to these 
endeavors at the outset.209 By relying on external, private sources for 
troops, the President has, perhaps, overextended American obligations 
abroad, turned his back on collective security measures, and in the process 
drawn the ire of a great many. (Hence, these “structural” harms are 
independent of any accountability-related transgressions that privateers 
might themselves perpetrate once deployed.)210  
Accordingly, tapping into an external, elastic supply of contract 
personnel could breach a tacit—and, no doubt, often hard fought—
agreement between the Executive and Congress on the size of the military. 
This harm is, immediately, a fiscal one: it might be the case that Congress 
and the president agreed to keep the military comparatively small to 
reduce expenditures and reap peace dividends after, for example, the 
thawing of the very costly Cold War.211 But, the harm is also a political 
 208. See Elizabeth Bumiller & Jodi Wilgoren, Ex-Administrator’s Remark Puts Bush on the 
Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at A22 (noting Ambassador Bremer’s claim that the United 
States never deployed enough troops in Iraq to support the occupation and transition). 
 209. See Hastings, supra note 57 (noting that the United States has relied on military contractors 
in Iraq to a greater extent than on any foreign ally, including Britain). 
 210. See, e.g., Editorial, The Coalition of the Willing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, at A24 
(characterizing the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq as lacking in the coercive legitimacy that would exist 
were the United Nations Security Council included); Michael Dobbs, Concern Grows Over U.S. Need 
for Allies, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2003, at A1 (describing the United States’s willingness to invade Iraq 
by itself while taking note of the benefits that could be achieved were a broader coalition included); 
Michael R. Gordon, Serving Notice of a New U.S., Poised to Hit First and Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 
2003, at A1 (describing President Bush’s willingness to disarm Iraq without the assistance or support 
of the international community); Elizabeth Kolbert, Solo Act, NEW YORKER, Oct. 6, 2003, at 43; 
Patrick E. Tyler, Annan Presses Bush To Avoid a Rush To War, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A1; 
Patrick E. Tyler & Felicity Barringer, Annan Says U.S. Will Violate Charter If It Acts Without 
Approval, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A10; Very Well, Alone—Dealing with Iraq, ECONOMIST, 
Mar. 15, 2003, at 3 (noting how the Anglo-American initiative in Iraq lacked widespread international 
support).  
 211. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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and legal one: Perhaps Congress kept the military small to dissuade an 
overly interventionist president from participating in far-flung 
engagements. Moreover, Congress might have agreed to authorize specific 
war powers requests only with the knowledge that the engagement would 
be of a limited scope commensurate with the manpower resources it 
assumed were available.212 Again, to the extent that the president could 
extend the duration and expand the magnitude of war by employing 
private contractors and to the extent that Congress had not been 
anticipating the wholesale reliance on military privateers, privatization 
provides opportunities to subvert these carefully arrived at arrangements.  
b. Reporting and Oversight 
Another key constraint on the president’s conduct of war takes the 
form of Congress’s reporting and oversight functions.213 Consultation 
with, written reports to, and oversight hearings before Congress represent 
important ways in which military policy is subject to considerable scrutiny 
and accountability.214 Typically, Congress has opportunities to debate and 
hold hearings on matters of national security—shedding light and 
imposing accountability on the Executive Branch. If any given 
deployment of forces would be received critically, say, as overly 
dangerous, destructive, or antithetical to American principles of 
 212. After Hamdi, of course, it may be the case that Congress will be more careful and precise 
with respect to what it actually authorizes in terms of presidential warmaking. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 
2641–42 (plurality opinion) (holding that the 2001 congressional authorization of military force 
provided the Executive with sufficient legal grounding to detain enemy combatants); id. at 2656–57 
(Souter, J., concurring) (construing the force authorization statute more narrowly so as not to grant the 
Executive blanket detention powers over individuals within the United States); see also infra notes 
256–63 and accompanying text. 
 213. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; War Powers Resolution, supra note 194; Nunn, supra note 27, at 18–
19. 
 214. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 108–09 
(1974) (“In the entire armory of war powers only one has been exclusively conferred upon the 
President, the power as ‘first General’ to direct the conduct of war once it has been commenced. Even 
in this area, the military and naval command were not immune from parliamentary inquiry into the 
conduct of the war.”); see also BARRY M. BLECHMAN, THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL SECURITY 3–22 
(1990); ALLAN R. MILLETT, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE 
MILITARY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 47–48 (1979); Dunlap, supra note 184, at 379 (“Since the 
Vietnam War . . . Congress has sought to become much more active in the management and oversight 
of military affairs . . . . [S]ince 1974, Congress annually makes 750,000 inquiries of the Pentagon and 
demands 750 yearly reports. Furthermore, the Congress created potent support agencies like the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) a huge 5,000 person investigatory organization that frequently 
targets the military.”); Carl Hulse, Byrd Questions Use of Money for Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2004, 
at A11 (noting the senator’s dismay that the Administration “might have broken the law by failing to 
inform Congressional leaders in mid-2002 of its use of emergency antiterror dollars to begin 
preparations for an invasion of Iraq”).  
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democracy,215 an administration might be deterred from pursuing such 
ends in the first place.216 And, even if the Executive, wanting to avoid the 
use of actual soldiers (because of the reporting requirements under the 
War Powers Resolution) used CIA operatives,217 a framework of reporting 
and oversight statutes are in place to ensure a modicum of accountability 
and transparency over those individuals too.218 But when neither members 
of the U.S. Armed Forces nor other government officials are intimately 
involved in a particular engagement, it is quite possible that members of 
Congress would not be as fully informed about the activities being 
undertaken by private contractors.219  
 215. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 20, at 210. Singer notes: 
Military consulting firms also offer the possibility of providing military assistance to allies 
with negative images, which would otherwise be unable to garner Congressional approval. 
For example, both Angola and Equatorial Guinea are nondemocratic states with poor human 
rights records, that by law are ineligible for U.S. military assistance. However, with the 
emergence of [private military firms], the United States has been able to offer to arrange the 
privatized equivalent for both. Similar discreet moves were made to aid the Nigerian military 
in Liberia . . . in 1996–97, again against the law (in this case sanctions against the Abacha 
dictatorship) . . . .  
Id at 210–11; see also infra notes 217–18 and accompanying text (noting no disclosure to Congress is 
required if a military contract with a foreign nation is valued at less than $50 million).  
 216. This is the case even if it could secure authorization ex post. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The 
Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1048 (2004) (noting how built-in separation-of-powers 
checks to limit executive authority in times of emergency “will lead [the president] to use his powers 
cautiously”); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crimes Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1123–24 (2003) (characterizing the ex post evaluation of an 
Executive’s actions during times of crisis as a means of constraining ex ante decisions to engage in 
potentially unlawful or overzealous behaviors).  
 217. Koh, supra note 186, at 1273 (indicating that War Powers impediments have not eliminated 
executive warmaking attempts, but has driven them “underground . . . to substitute covert for overt 
operations”) (emphasis added); Lobel, supra note 80, at 1038 (noting that modern presidential 
administrations have argued that authority over covert operations is an inherent presidential power); 
Silverberg, supra note 48; Uyeda, supra note 193, at 784, 792. 
 218. See KOH, supra note 170; Koh, supra note 186; see also Lobel, supra note 80, at 1093–97. 
As Professor Lobel notes, although this act appears to allow the Executive to conduct covert 
operations without congressional approval, it should not be read as broadly delegating all power to the 
president. Instead, it “should be understood as a supplement to preexisting statutory and constitutional 
limits on the executive use of covert operations. The purpose of the statute was to provide procedural 
limitations on the exercise of executive power in order to augment the substantive restraints that 
already existed.” Id. at 1094; see also Act of Dec. 21, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1830 
(“None of the funds provided by this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence Agency or the 
Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training or advice, or other support for 
military activities, to any group or individual, not part of a country’s armed forces, for the purpose of 
overthrowing the government of Nicaragua . . . .”). 
 219. See, e.g., Avant, supra note 109 (noting how Congress is not adequately informed of 
deployments and operations involving private soldiers); Day, supra note 13 (indicating that executive 
agencies do not always have a complete, comprehensive record of all the outsourcing initiatives 
undertaken by their various sub-divisions); Forero, supra note 20 (noting that very few members of 
Congress have any familiarity with the details of the contracts authorizing counternarcotics work in 
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Private firms thus permit the president to conduct military operations 
(especially small-scale ones not involving many, or any, U.S. troops) 
without having the same obligations to notify and involve Congress as 
would exist were American soldiers used.220 Privateers can, moreover, be 
contracted into service through third-party nations, host countries, or 
quasi-independent agencies, as has been the case with some American-
based firms operating in the Balkans and even in Iraq. In these instances, 
Congress has comparatively little oversight authority. Indeed, the principal 
federal law, the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”),221 which, inter alia, 
sets the terms by which information about American contractors working 
for foreign nations must be disclosed to Congress, currently requires the 
State Department to notify Congress only when a contract it authorizes 
exceeds $50 million.222  
And, even if the privateers were operating directly for the federal 
government, their contracts might (purposefully or unintentionally) have 
been indirectly routed through the Commerce, Interior, or the State 
Department,223 rather than the Defense Department. The congressional 
committees that principally oversee Commerce and Interior, for example, 
may not be sufficiently informed or interested, and may not have 
developed the requisite expertise to be effective monitors of such 
Latin America); see also Ely, supra note 186, at 1100 (noting that wars may not need to be authorized 
by Congress if they are not fought by regular members of the U.S. Armed Forces). 
 As Congresswoman Schakowsky has noted, contracting “masks just what the U.S. commitment is 
in places like Iraq and allows many of these activities to literally fly under the radar of the Congress 
and the consciousness of the American people.” Cooper, supra note 22 
 220. SINGER, supra note 20, at 214.  
 221. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751–2799(d) (2000); see 22 U.S.C. §§ 2776–2778 (2000).  
 222. Only if a contract between an American military firm and a foreign state exceeds $50 million 
does the State Department even have to notify the Speaker of the House and the Chair of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee prior to effectuating it. At the time of notification, a notice of the 
contract is also published in the Federal Register. Congress has between 15 and 30 days to react by 
passing a joint resolution; otherwise the contract will automatically take effect. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776 
(2000). Anything short of $50 million—and many sizable contracts, of course, can be broken down 
into several, smaller contracts under $50 million—does not require any active involvement by 
Congress, though the president must update the Speaker and the Senate Foreign Relations Chair on a 
quarterly basis. Id.; see also Gaul, supra note 53 (noting that “[t]he AECA provides little public 
accountability for non-classified contracts that commit the entire nation to acts of war.”); Kurlantzick, 
supra note 20; Kevin P. Sheehan, Note, Executive and Legislative Relations and the U.S. Armed 
Export Control Regime in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 179, 186–88 (1995). 
 223. SINGER, supra note 20, at 208 (describing Colombian contracts that are routed through the 
State Department’s anti-narcotics section); Guillory, supra note 47, at 127 (noting that DynCorp’s 
contracts in Colombia have been routed through the State Department); Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Ellen 
McCarthy, Private Sector Has Firm Role in the Pentagon, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at E1 (noting 
that the contracts for interrogators at Abu Ghraib were overseen by the Interior Department, which had 
little expertise in knowing how to monitor or define the role of such intelligence work); see also infra 
notes 226, 227, and 251 and accompanying text. 
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contracts.224 Finally, even if the contracts were issued through the 
Pentagon, matters of military privatization may not arise per se—short of a 
massive fiasco such as the Iraq prison-abuse scandal—that would warrant 
congressional interest from the Armed Services committees.225 This is, 
again, not to say Congress is unfailingly vigilant with respect to oversight 
of “public” military affairs, and entirely enfeebled with respect to 
overseeing military contractors. But while recognizing that the differences 
in congressional oversight are quantitative rather than qualitative, they are 
nevertheless important. 
Indeed, speaking about contracting in Iraq, Professor Deborah Avant 
notes:  
We are not even sure for whom these contractors work or worked. 
Nor do we know how many other contract employees were—and 
may still be—working at . . . [Abu Ghraib] . . . . We do not know 
precisely what roles these contract employees had at the prison or to 
which group or agency they were accountable. To trace that, we 
would need to know the contracting agent—someone representing a 
group within the Army, probably, but which one?226  
 224. SINGER, supra note 20, at 209–10 (noting how the many layers of contracts and subcontracts 
make congressional oversight very difficult and indicating that “Congress tends to focus its attention 
on official aid programs”); id. at 214 (noting that many military contracts are paid through off-budget 
funds); id. at 240 (suggesting that oversight committees with jurisdiction over Commerce and State 
need to become learned in military affairs); Guttman, supra note 3, at 894 (indicating that even little 
things such as contractors not being required to publish personnel directories and phone books, 
organization charts, and pay grades complicates and frustrates congressional oversight). 
 225. Even in a highly publicized, nationally televised committee hearing in the immediate wake of 
the Abu Ghraib scandal, the Senate Armed Services Committee members could not get any answers 
from top Pentagon officials about what contractors and what contracting firms were involved in the 
brutal activities. See Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, Testimony as Prepared 
by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld Before the Senate and House Armed Services 
Committees, U.S. Department of Defense Speech (May 7, 2004), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040507-secdef1042.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2004) 
(indicating that the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff could not respond 
to Senator McCain’s request for the names of the military firms under contract to work at Abu 
Ghraib); see also Avant, supra note 109; Joel Brinkley, Army Policy Bars Interrogations by Private 
Contractors, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2004, at A1. 
 226. Avant, supra note 109; see Editorial, Contractors in Iraq Need Strict Oversight, DENVER 
POST, June 20, 2004, at E6 (noting that CACI’s contract governing its interrogation work in Abu 
Ghraib was embedded in a computer services contract with the Department of the Interior); see also 
Cooper, supra note 22 (describing loopholes that contractors and the executive branch use to help 
evade congressional oversight). As Cooper notes: 
[A] new “blanket-purchase agreement” allows a government department to avoid bidding out 
contracts by piggybacking onto another department’s existing contract with a company for 
unrelated services. In this way, the Defense Department contracted with CACI to provide 
interrogators for Iraq using an existing agreement the firm had for unrelated services with the 
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And, as Washington Post journalists have recently observed: 
The bureaucracy of the contracting process also complicates how 
contractor operations are run because it’s unclear who the client is. 
For example, the request for contract interrogation support . . . came 
from . . . the military group that oversees coalition forces in Iraq. It 
was then sent to the Interior Department and processed at a federal 
business center . . . .227
These oversight difficulties cannot be reduced to mere accountability 
lapses. Rather these oversight difficulties also sound in terms of structural 
concerns about the architecture of American government. Even if 
Congress insisted on more centralization in the contracting process, 
because of the nature and design of military contracts and because of 
issues of private-sector proprietary information more generally, it is still 
questionable whether adequate information would readily be disclosed to 
an oversight committee were either a private military firm or a government 
official subpoenaed and asked to testify about critical details of an 
agreement.228 This proprietary information concern has already become a 
major source of executive-congressional tension in the commercial 
military contracting realm. One notable example involves the Air Force 
invoking the principle of proprietary information to fend off repeated 
Interior Department. 
Id. 
 227. Cha & Merle, supra note 109; see also GREEN, supra note 58 (noting how private military 
contracts for work in Latin America are routed through at least five U.S. executive agencies). 
 228. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 214 (noting that the firms “claim that they cannot provide 
information, without government approval” and that the government does not provide information 
about the private contracts in accordance with proprietary information protections); id. at 208–09 
(citing both contractual imperatives not to discuss the details of plans related to missions and 
discussing the fact that neither contracting firms nor the federal government is required to release 
names of slain contractors).  
 For similar patterns of proprietary information being withheld from oversight committees and/or 
the public in other contexts, see Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and 
Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1559, 1570–71 (2001); Diller, Revolution, supra note 6, at 1199; Freeman, supra note 3, at 
1303–06; Merrill Goozner, Welfare’s Gold Rush: Private Sector Mining Hard for Reform Effort’s 
Contracts, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1997, at C1; David A. Super, Policy Considerations Relating to 
Privatization in the Food Stamp Program, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Oct. 28, 2004, 
available at http://www.cbpp.org/10-28-04fa.pdf (last visited Dec. 14, 2004); cf. Forsham v. Califano 
587 F.2d 1128, 1136 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (“Where records are created by a private entity, we believe 
the applicability of FOIA will turn on whether the government is involved in the core planning or 
execution of the program or whether, by contrast, the entity retains its private character in bona fide 
fashion during the course of the endeavor that results in the records.”). 
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requests by Congress to disclose certain information regarding its Tanker 
contract with Boeing.229
Therefore, with limited congressional oversight and reporting, there are 
comparatively fewer political and legal checks constraining how the 
president conducts military affairs. The Executive’s policies may not be in 
line with the priorities and principles of Congress and the American 
people, such as when, for instance, the State Department, under the AECA 
framework, approved requests from MPRI to perform military consulting 
services for the repressive regime running Equitorial Guinea as well as for 
the Abacha dictatorship in Nigeria.230 It is at least debatable whether such 
permission would have been as readily granted were congressional consent 
a bona fide prerequisite. And, strategic interests and prudential 
policymaking aside, the lack of effective oversight deprives Congress and 
the People of an opportunity to debate normative concerns about 
delegating governmental policymaking decisions to privateers in the first 
place. 
Accordingly, circumventing congressional oversight lengthens the 
leash the Executive has in conducting national security policy and, 
concomitantly, limits the effective transmission of information to the 
American public.  
c. The Appointments Clause: Senate Confirmation of Military 
Officers 
Since military officers are “appointed in the manner of principal 
officers [of the United States],”231 every individual, holding at least the 
rank of second lieutenant or ensign must be nominated by the president 
 229. Senator McCain, a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, has repeatedly 
requested that the Pentagon turn over its communications with Boeing regarding negotiations over a 
new fleet of Air Force Tankers. The Pentagon has resolutely refused, citing the need to preserve its 
contractors’ proprietary information. McCain, in turn, blocked the confirmation of all civilian 
nominees to the Defense Department and promised to continue to do so until those documents were 
disclosed. Philip Dine, Probe Continues on Boeing Lease/Pentagon Official Says Investigation Could 
Hold Up Tanker Deal, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 2004, at B3 (noting Senator McCain’s 
frustration with the Defense Department for its refusal to disclose communications between the 
Pentagon and its contractors); Renae Merle, Pentagon Refuses To Give Panel Documents on Tanker 
Contracts, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at E6 (describing the Pentagon’s refusal to share contract 
documents with the Senate Armed Services Committee because of Boeing’s need to protect its 
proprietary information); see also supra notes 132 and 137 and accompanying text. 
 230. SINGER, supra note 20, at 131–34; see also infra note 431 and accompanying text. 
 231. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 182 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring); see also 10 U.S.C. 
§ 531 (2000); United States v. Corson, 114 U.S. 619, 622 (1885) (characterizing military officials as 
officers of the United States who require presidential appointment and Senate confirmation). 
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and confirmed by the Senate.232 The Senate must also confirm the 
commissions of all reservists above the level of major.233 And, each time 
an officer is promoted to a higher rank, another round of Senate 
confirmations is required.234  
Though it is rare and administratively difficult for either the president 
or members of the Senate to be intimately involved in, say, the promotion 
of any particular Army captain,235 at the higher levels of military 
commissions, individual evaluations and considerations become more 
commonplace.236 In those cases, where appointments are important in 
shaping the policy direction as well as the public image of the American 
military, both presidential and Senate scrutiny is evident.237 Importantly, 
however, as Justice Souter noted in Weiss v. United States, many of the 
military officers subject to Senate confirmation are, constitutionally 
speaking, “inferior officers” that do not require the advice and consent of 
the upper house.238 But Congress has not chosen to vest the appointment of 
those (inferior) officers in the president and, instead, continues to subject 
those officers to the “rigors” of Senate confirmation; Congress’s decision 
not to abdicate this responsibility suggests that the Senate values and takes 
seriously its oversight role in this capacity.239  
If contractors carrying out American policy are not vetted through the 
process of presidential appointment and Senate confirmation, it is 
questionable whether, given the Senate’s oversight of military officers’ 
 232. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of 
the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States. . . .”); 10 U.S.C. § 531 (2000); Weiss, 
510 U.S. at 170 (confirming that the Appointments Clause applies at least to some military officers); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (noting that any individual “exercising significant authority” 
under the laws of the United States is an “Officer of the United States” and must therefore be 
appointed pursuant to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause); see also Weiss, 510 U.S. at 182 
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that even though many military officers may be deemed “inferior 
officers” for constitutional purposes, Congress has not chosen to designate them as such for purposes 
of dispensing with Senate confirmation proceedings).  
 233. 10 U.S.C. § 531 (2000). 
 234. 10 U.S.C. § 624 (2000); Weiss, 510 U.S. at 170 n.5. 
 235. JOSEPH HARRIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 331 (1953) (noting that the 
“Senate confirmation of military and naval officers has become for all practical purposes an empty 
formality” because of the sheer number of appointments annually under consideration).  
 236. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 152, 154 (2000) (prescribing the appointments process for the chair 
and vice-chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).  
 237. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 184, at 364–65 (noting the significant public opposition for the 
appointment of General Hoar to the chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of Staff); id. at 376–77 
(describing the desire among some to replace General Powell with a more docile chairman who would 
not publicly oppose presidential policy aims).  
 238. Weiss, 510 U.S. at 182. 
 239. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673 (1988). 
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nominations down to the level of ensigns and lieutenants, they possess the 
legal authority or legitimacy to exercise the lethal discretion bestowed on 
them. As discussed, at Abu Ghraib, private contractors with little oversight 
were allegedly given broad (officer-like) discretion in helping set and 
implement interrogation policies and, in turn, were themselves issuing to 
U.S. enlisted soldiers orders that included the directives—ostensibly 
speaking—to brutalize or humiliate detainees.240 Whether bypassing the 
appointments process is a deliberate aspect of the decision to privatize or, 
more likely, an unintended consequence of the outsourcing objective, the 
fact remains that contracting out the responsibilities of active military 
engagement to ersatz “officers” deprives the Senate of one of its core 
duties—as applied both as a check on an injudicious Executive241 and as a 
safeguard for continued civilian control over the military.242  
Presumably even if the confirmation process is not treated with the 
individualized attention given, for example, to Supreme Court nominees, 
the Senate could still insist that all prospective nominees to command 
positions must satisfy certain blanket requirements. Those might include 
an absence of any type of criminal or domestic-abuse citation to ensure 
that the military advances only those individuals with impeccable 
professional and ethical credentials.243 Without such review processes,244 
privatization (as in Abu Ghraib) may continue to permit the advancement 
of a range of less desirable candidates who lack the moral virtues and 
skills necessary to lead by deed and example.245  
Of course, since many military officers also were intimately involved 
in the prison-abuse scandal, clearly the appointments process alone is not a 
dispositive factor. So while I do not want to overstate the importance of 
 240. See supra notes 106–09 and accompanying text. 
 241. See, e.g., Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (acknowledging that the 
Appointments Clause was at least in part a reflection of the Founders’ attempt to thwart the unilateral 
manipulation of official appointments by the Executive); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 374–77 (1833) (noting that the “consciousness of this [Senate 
confirmation] check will make the president more circumspect and deliberate in his nominations for 
office”); see also 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 167; THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander 
Hamilton).  
 242. See infra notes 290–303 and accompanying text. 
 243. Cf. James Dao, A Man of Violence, or Just “110 Percent” Gung-Ho?, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 
2004, at A6 (noting the inadequate screening by the CIA of contractor David Passaro accused of 
perpetrating brutalities against Afghan detainees). 
 244. Beermann, supra note 33, at 1511 (“The best candidate for a federal constitutional constraint 
on privatization of federal government activity may be the Appointments Clause.”).  
 245. See Jeffrey Addicott & William A. Hudson, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of My Lai: A 
Time To Inculcate The Lessons, 139 MIL. L. REV. 153, 184–85 (1993) (emphasizing how important it 
is for America’s junior officers to be well-trained in the laws and ethics of military engagement to 
insure against battlefield transgressions). 
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the Appointments Clause,246 I do note that it would be significantly easier 
to conduct more searching review processes for military officers than it 
would for both the House and Senate to pass—and the president to sign—
comprehensive legislation regulating and, perhaps, licensing the types of 
employees that military contractors can hire. 
d. Governance and Discipline of the Military 
Finally, the Constitution authorizes Congress to establish codes of 
governance for members of the U.S. Armed Forces.247 Congress sets 
disciplinary guidelines for soldiers and authorizes the imposition of 
penalties in the event that they violate their oaths of duty or engage in any 
other form of proscribed behavior. Civilian contractors are not (and 
perhaps cannot be) effectively regulated to the same extent—and thus this 
status differential between contractors and soldiers may provide the 
Pentagon with opportunities to permit practices and behaviors (such as 
physical abuse for the purpose of extracting information) that are 
otherwise off-limits to U.S. troops.248 Leaving that insidious possibility 
aside, this issue of discipline via Congress is important because the 
 246. Again, we have an issue where the difference between Congress’s relationship to soldiers and 
to contractors is one of degree rather than kind. As evidence of perhaps the need for Congress to 
exercise greater control over the enlisted ranks, it should be noted that the Army in 1998—and well 
before the current state of the United States’s overcommitted military—approved 68% of all waiver 
requests for applicants with felony convictions. Editorial, Keep the Bad Apples Out of Military Units, 
NEWS & RECORD (Greensboro), July 6, 2004, at A10; see also Ken Silverstein, Pentagon Alerted to 
Trouble in Ranks, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at A1 (noting that in 1998 nearly one-third of military 
recruits had arrest records). 
 247. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 16.  
 248. See Chaffin, supra note 109; see also Neil A. Lewis, Documents Build a Case for Working 
Outside the Laws on Interrogating Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2004, at A8 (citing memoranda by 
the Bush administration’s lawyers on how to evade the legal restrictions on “torturing” detainees); Neil 
A. Lewis, Justice Memos Explained How To Skip Prisoner Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A10 
(describing steps taken by the Administration to justify the legality of “torture”); Neil A. Lewis, U.S. 
Court Asserts Authority over American in Saudi Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2004, at A17 (noting how 
the American federal judiciary is asserting jurisdiction over Americans detained abroad and how the 
courts’ actions are seen as an attempt to “rebuff[] the Bush administration in its efforts to keep 
detention policies and actions connected to fighting terrorism beyond the reach of the [courts]”); Dana 
Priest & Charles Babington, Plan Would Let U.S. Deport Suspects to Nations that Might Torture 
Them, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2004, at A1 (describing the Bush administration’s support for a proposal 
in the House leadership’s Intelligence Reform bill “that would allow U.S. authorities to deport certain 
foreigners to countries where they are likely to be tortured or abused, an action prohibited by the 
international laws against torture the United States signed 20 years ago” and noting that this support 
“contradicts pledges President Bush made after the Abu Ghraib prisoner-abuse scandal erupted [last] 
Spring that the United States would stand behind the U.N. Convention Against Torture”); Eric Schmitt 
& Thom Shanker, Rumsfeld Issued an Order To Hide Detainee in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2004, at 
A1 (noting that prisoners called “ghost detainees” had not been listed on officials rolls and were 
hidden from Red Cross monitors). 
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Constitution separates the command of the military from the governance 
of the military, presumably to prevent an aggrandizement of war powers. 
But military discipline is broader than a separation-of-powers matter 
because the president, even as Commander-in-Chief, also may not be able 
to control contractors to a satisfactory extent. Part of this difficulty in 
disciplining contractors as if they were soldiers is that the Supreme Court 
has given Congress virtually plenary power to regulate the behavior of 
military personnel, and it is at least an open question whether the Court 
would also permit Congress to impose similarly strict rules backed by 
criminal punishments on top of—or in lieu of—contractual arrangements 
with privateers absent a formal declaration of war.249 Accordingly, because 
of its complexity and because it is not just a separation-of-powers concern, 
this subject will be treated at greater length and with broader sweep in Part 
IV.  
2. Denial of the Appropriations Role 
By using private contractors, the president may also reduce the 
likelihood of Congress easily terminating military funding.250 The sources 
of funds for private guards in Afghanistan, for coca-crop dusters in 
Colombia, and for security forces in Iraq may be outside the formal scope 
of Defense Department appropriations budgets, and hence may be buried 
within longer-term funding sources that are not as readily apparent to 
Congress. As noted above in the context of identifying oversight 
difficulties, when contracts with privateers are scattered throughout or 
among executive agencies, it becomes very difficult for Congress to 
detect, target, and—if need be—attack particular streams of funding in 
order to influence policy via the purse.251 Congress could, of course, 
always strike at the Pentagon’s budget writ large in lieu of trying to track 
down discrete funding sources to privateers, but the political fallout for not 
 249. See infra notes 312–13, 444–46 and accompanying text. 
 250. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, War May Require More Money Soon, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 
2004, at A1 (describing the Administration’s reluctance to ask for more money for the prolonged 
occupation of Iraq and characterizing some members of Congress as accusing the President of 
concealing his true funding needs in an election year for fear of political fallout).  
 251. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 209–10, 214 (describing how contractors may be paid by off-
budget funds); see also O’Harrow, Jr. & McCarthy, supra note 223 (characterizing how disorganized 
and hard-to-access military contracts are and noting that it took the Pentagon a full week to pinpoint 
the contracts that authorized the outsourcing of military prison intelligence at Abu Ghraib). See 
generally supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
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appearing to support America’s troops and war effort may be too great of a 
disincentive.252
And perhaps most troubling from a legal-control vantage point, 
sometimes military operations are funded off-shore, by host countries or 
sympathetic third-parties. This was the case in Bosnia, where for a variety 
of reasons, a coalition of Muslim nations paid the American contractors 
for services rendered.253 Obviously, when engagements are financed from 
sources outside of the U.S. Treasury, Congress’s power of the purse may 
not be an effective constraint.254 This is also somewhat of the case in Iraq, 
where a percentage of the funding for operations (including security 
operations) administered through the CPA supposedly came from Iraqi oil 
sales and thus was disconnected from the federal fisc.255 Hence from an 
appropriations standpoint, there may be occasions where Congress’s 
influence is quite weak. Therefore, without yet another check, Congress 
and the American people not only have fewer means of halting operations 
they deem to be counterproductive, but they also have a more limited 
appreciation of how well-funded select operations in general may actually 
be.  
 252. See Jim Rutenberg, A Bush Commercial Takes Aim at Kerry’s Defense Credentials, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A20 (noting how President Bush heavily criticized John Kerry for allegedly 
not supporting military appropriations); Jim Rutenberg, 90-Day Strategy by Bush’s Aides To Define 
Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2004, at A1 (describing how the Bush campaign highlights “Kerry’s vote 
against the $87 billion package to support military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan”). 
 253. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 128 (noting that the United States arranged for the contractors 
to be paid by, inter alia, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Kuwait, Brunei, and the United Arab Emirates); Eric 
Schmitt, Retired American Troops To Aid Bosnian Army in Combat Skills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1996, 
at A1 (describing the process by which Muslim nations paid for MPRI to provide services to Bosnia).  
 254. See Koh, supra note 186.  
 255. See Jackie Spinner & Ariana Eunjung Cha, U.S. Decisions on Iraq Spending Made in 
Private, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2003, at A1 (describing how some of the CPA’s operational expenses 
are funded through the sale of Iraqi oil and noting that the CPA’s “process for spending Iraq’s money 
has little of the openness, debate, and paper trails that define such groups in democratic nations”); see 
also id. (commenting on how a “mini-Congress” of Americans, Britons, and Australians comprise the 
core group of administrators awarding and overseeing reconstruction contracts); Steven R. Weisman, 
U.S. Seeks Help of Iraq Costs, But Donors Want a Larger Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2003, at A6 
(noting how oil revenues are used to help fund Iraqi reconstruction). The CPA would be even more 
independent of Congress if the occupation and transition to a free Iraq were less problematic—and less 
costly. See, e.g., Christopher Dickey, $1 Billion a Week, NEWSWEEK, July 21, 2003, at 28 (noting how 
unannounced and hidden costs associated with the military occupation in Iraq has required additional 
funding from Congress); cf. ROBERT CARO, THE POWER BROKER 618–20 (1974) (describing how civil 
bureaucrat Robert Moses was able to develop an independent and unaccountable financial power base 
through the creation of public authorities—such as toll roads and bridges—unconnected to legislative 
appropriations).  
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3. Denial of the Authorization Role 
Regulating military personnel and patrolling funding allocations are 
secondary weapons in Congress’s quiver. The degree to which Congress 
can regulate personnel and require testimony and briefings may have a 
modest impact on fundamental presidential decisions to deploy and direct 
forces in zones of conflict. This is not to diminish the importance of these 
congressional powers, but rather to acknowledge their individual 
limitations in terms of influencing and altering executive policymaking. 
When aggregated, however, these powers loom larger: Congress’s 
cumulative ability to limit troop size and to curtail funding and to insist on 
oversight briefings weaves a thick web of checks possibly sufficient to 
constrain unilateral action (and more certainly sufficient to provide 
incentives for the Executive to want to work closely with Congress). 
When we turn to the issue of express authorization, however, 
Congress’s power is immediately evident. While often insisting that 
congressional authorization is unnecessary, presidents—especially over 
the last decade—have routinely if begrudgingly sought congressional 
resolutions in support of military action.256 Hence the authorization power 
does serve as a considerable constraint. As Professor Charles Tiefler notes:  
The presidential request-for-approval interaction with Congress 
cranks up an elaborate machinery for the democratic inclusion of 
the nation in the military commitment decision. Hearings, news 
coverage, briefings, disputes over conditions or demands for 
assurances, and floor debate ventilate and test the propositions as to 
the soundness of the commitment . . . .257  
Without the customary and statutory need for ex ante consultation and 
authorization, the president could deploy private troops in a way that 
otherwise would never have dared been initiated if limited to American 
troops and, correspondingly, beholden to the dictates of the War Powers 
Resolution.258 But since the War Powers Resolution applies only to the 
deployment of U.S. Armed Forces259 and, moreover, since anti-covert 
operations legislation requiring congressional notification and consultation 
 256. See supra notes 199, 201 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Tiefer, supra note 191, at 25. 
 258. See Powell, supra note 175, at 569–70. 
 259. See 50 U.S.C. § 1542 (2000); Biden & Ritch, supra note 197, at 385–90; Damrosch, supra 
note 197, at 66–67; Koh, supra note 186, at 1259–60. 
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applies only to members of the U.S. intelligence community,260 there is 
room to maneuver unilaterally if the president were to use privateers.  
The drug war in Colombia provides an apt example.261 Due to 
frustrations associated with Congress’s stringent limitations on the number 
and responsibilities of American soldiers in Colombia in the 1990s, private 
military firms were utilized probably in no small part to circumvent these 
legislative restrictions.262 According to P.W. Singer, the  
intent of privatized military assistance is to bypass Congressional 
oversight and provide political cover to the White House if 
something goes wrong. . . . [So,] the United States quietly arranged 
the hire of a slew of PMFs, whose operations in Colombia range far 
beyond the narrow restrictions placed on U.S. soldiers fighting the 
drug war. Rather, the firms’ operations are intended to help the 
Colombian military finally end the decades-old [rebel] 
insurgency.263
Again, the structural damage is clear: through bypassing Congress—
and the American people—the Executive can initiate more conflict than 
the public might otherwise have been willing to support. And, extending 
the War Powers Resolution to contractors—though possible (as will be 
discussed in the Conclusion)—would be politically very difficult given the 
troubles Congress faced trying to pass the 1973 legislation over the 
President’s veto (and that was when antiwar sentiment and hostility 
toward presidential warmaking power were both exceedingly high).264
D. Bypassing the People Through Privatization: Harms to Democracy 
Having explored how privatization can short-circuit the effective 
workings of constitutional government as a government of checks and 
 260. See supra note 48. 
 261. See supra notes 58–64 and accompanying text. 
 262. SINGER, supra note 20, at 207.  
 263. Id. 
 264. THOMAS M. FRANCK & EDWARD WEISBAND, FOREIGN POLICY BY CONGRESS 76 (1979) 
(noting the number of attempts by Congress to rein in unilateral presidential warmaking prior to the 
passage of the War Powers Resolution); Michael Ratner & David Cole, The Force of Law: Judicial 
Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 715, 728–36 (1984) (characterizing 
efforts to limit presidential war powers during the Vietnam era); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-287, at 4–5 
(1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346; William Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the 
Power To Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1972); W. Taylor Reveley 
III, Presidential War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1300 
(1969); Patrick D. Robbins, Comment, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A 
Reassessment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 141, 154 n.80–83 (1988). 
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balances, I turn now to the corollary harm: how privatization, by 
bypassing Congress, can damage the proper functioning of democratic 
government as one predicated on informed, popular consent. To the extent 
privatization permits the Executive to carry out military policy 
unilaterally, without consulting Congress and without seeking formal 
authorization, it circumvents primary avenues through which the People 
are informed and blocks off primary channels (namely Congress) through 
which the People can register their approval or voice their misgivings.265  
In short, the legitimacy of military policymaking depends not just on 
broad congressional involvement, but also on democratic input and 
popular consent.266 In a liberal democracy, the consent of the People is 
necessary and  
ought to be more express in entering war than at almost any other 
time [or in any other policy matter] both because of the adversity 
the war will bring (the bodies of the population are subject to the 
risk of great injury) and also because the existence of the nation (the 
elemental social pact) is itself at risk.267
Thus, when, or even if, the public is potentially precluded from taking part 
in such discussions, the democratic integrity of the country is greatly 
compromised.268 As Kant argued:  
 265. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison); Gary Born, Review Essay: The 
President’s War Powers, 23 TEX. INT’L L.J. 153, 161–63 (1988); Lewittes, supra note 179, at 1132–
46; Jules Lobel, “Little Wars” and the Constitution, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 61, 73 (1995); Nunn, supra 
note 27, at 18; see also Peter M. Shane, Learning McNamara’s Lessons: How the War Powers 
Resolution Advances the Rule of Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1997) (noting that the 
approval of Congress often represents the existence of broad political support).  
 266. See, e.g., EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE (1988); WOODROW WILSON, 
CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 303 (1913) (suggesting that the 
duty to inform the public is Congress’s most important function and noting that “[t]he only really self-
governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates an administration”); GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1969); Brandon, supra note 168, at 
1856–57 (characterizing popular sovereignty and self-government as principal features of American 
constitutionalism); Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); see also Bruce A. 
Williams, War Rhetoric’s Toll on Democracy, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 16, 2004, at B15 
(describing the imperative to gain popular support for wars in democratic societies).  
 267. Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution and the Right to 
Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1258 (1991). 
 268. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 25–29, 287–303 (2d ed. 1992); see also 
Freeman, supra note 3, at 1302–03 (noting many public law scholars’ belief that privatization weakens 
the mechanisms “designed to ensure public participation and individual fairness [that] improve the 
rationality of decisionmaking and legitimize the authority of the state”); Mashaw, supra note 3, at 26 
(describing public administrative law as the embodiment of a rational, deliberative government that 
subordinates power to reason-giving); Sapone, supra note 50, at 6–10 (describing the use of force by 
the government as “appropriate violence” and questioning the moral legitimacy of engagement via 
private actors).  
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Every nation must be so organized internally that not the head of the 
nation—for whom, properly speaking, war has no cost (since he 
puts the expense off on others, namely the people)—but rather the 
people who pay for it have the decisive voice as to whether or not 
there should be war.269
Privatization creates opacities that may occlude the ready awareness of 
events. Americans who are unwittingly kept ill-informed of their country’s 
involvement in matters overseas cannot serve their necessary roles in 
keeping the State responsive and responsible.270 Conversely, when they are 
made aware of such engagements, they can express opposition or consent, 
organize parades or protests, enlist in the military as a sign of support or 
burn draft cards as a sign of disapproval.271 However inconvenient it might 
be for the Executive to be constrained by the opinions of the People,272 
public participation is a necessary and valued component of the republican 
system as evidenced in the Constitution, culture, and customs of the 
United States. To use privatization to limit public disclosures and curtail 
 269. Immanuel Kant, On the Proverb: That May Be True in Theory, But Is of No Practical Use, in 
PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS ON POLITICS, HISTORY AND MORALS 61, 88 (T. Humphrey 
trans. 1983); see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 72 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
1980) (6th ed. 1764) (contending that military powers must be distributed pursuant to the social 
contract and warning that individuals in a community are “in a much worse condition . . . [when] 
exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than [those] that [are] 
exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men”). 
 270. See Scarry, supra note 267, at 1302 (describing one of colonists’ chief grievances against the 
Crown in the Declaration of Independence as that the king “has kept among us, in times of peace, 
Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature. He has affected to render the Military 
independent of and superior to the Civil Power”) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 
2 (U.S. 1776)). 
 271. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 102–03 (1975) (“[T]he waging of 
war needs continuous political support [and] it is subject to a continuous round of informal 
referenda.”). Professor Bickel noted that the anti-war movement sentiment in America was so palpable 
in 1968 that it dissuaded Lyndon Johnson from running for a second presidential term. Id. at 102 
(describing how public opinion managed to “toppl[e] a sitting president, in the midst of war, in 1968, 
before a single national vote had been cast”); see also Avant, supra note 219 (emphasizing how the 
media is not well-equipped to report on military privateers in the same way that they are able to 
chronicle the activities of regular outfits of U.S. soldiers).  
 272. See Scarry, supra note 267, at 1259 (describing the burdens of democratic deliberation on 
matters of foreign conflict). Professor Scarry writes:  
Though it is difficult and time-consuming to convert hundreds of representatives from 
uncertainty to the decisiveness required for a declaration of war, this very unwieldiness was 
saluted as a great virtue at the original constitutional convention, and again by later jurists 
who, like Story, argued that a country must be slow to go to war but quick to attain peace.  
Id.; see also Thomas E. Ricks, Rumsfeld Gets Earful from Troops; Complaints Cite Equipment Woes, 
Extended Tours and Pay Delays, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1 (chronicling a candid, public town-
hall discussion between American military personnel and Secretary Rumsfeld); Eric Schmitt, Troops’ 
Queries Leave Rumsfeld On the Defensive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1 (noting the value of a 
public town-hall discussion between Iraq-bound troops and the Defense Secretary). 
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public debates is to diminish popular sovereignty. But even without that 
intent on the part of the Executive, privatization has the effect of 
circumscribing not only Congress’s deliberative role, but also its oversight 
role, and thus, it could end up limiting the information that reaches the 
People.  
Congress’s constitutional role in preserving popular sovereignty is, of 
course, critical—and revealing. Far from simply serving as an institutional 
counterbalance to the president, the architecture of congressional 
responsibility in warmaking bespeaks an express recognition of the 
imperative to keep the public informed and to keep elected officials 
responsive. Just as it is endowed to do in the context of presidential treaty-
making or ministerial appointments,273 the Senate, on its own, could have 
been exclusively entrusted to resist the tendencies of an imperial president 
bent on unilaterally sending troops into zones of hostility. At the 
Founding, however, Senators, like the president, were not directly elected 
by the People—only the House was.274 So if congressional warmaking 
authorities were vested only in the Senate (as Hamilton originally 
proposed),275 one might read the Constitution as saying that although the 
Executive must be kept in check by a competing branch of government, 
there is no corresponding responsibility to ensure that the People (through 
their biannually elected representatives in the House) would be given a 
say. But, because the entire Congress was and is empowered in matters of 
authorizing and funding wars, evidently there is a compelling democratic 
element to the allocation of war powers that complements the limited-
government analysis discussed above in Part III.C.276  
 273. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.  
 274. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2. 
 275. See, e.g., 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 167, at 292; Lofgren, supra note 167, at 680; 
see also JOHN NORTON MOORE ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 821 (1990). 
 276. See, e.g., Scarry, supra note 267, at 1265, 1269 (describing Article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution, which calls for a “deliberate assembling of the representatives of the people for a voiced 
affirmation of war,” as embodying America’s “Social Contract” and suggesting with regard to the 
Second Amendment that “if as a nation-state we are to have injuring power, the authorization over the 
action of injuring (as well as over the risk of receiving injury in return) must be dispersed throughout 
the population in the widest possible way”); see also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 12. Section 8, clause 
12 imposes limits on the general power to tax and spend by ensuring military appropriations must be 
debated and re-authorized at least every two years. Hence, Congress cannot lock in long-term plans 
for, say, a standing army, but must have to reauthorize funds with regularity. See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 259 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (calling the two-year 
limitation provision the “best possible precaution against the danger from standing armies”); Dunlap, 
supra note 184, at 345, 348 (noting that among those debating the virtues of the 1787 Constitution, the 
“danger posed by a permanent military establishment was a preeminent concern”); “Brutus” X, That 
Dangerous Engine of Despotism, A Standing Army, N.Y.J., Jan. 24, 1788, reprinted in THE DEBATE 
ON THE CONSTITUTION, FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/6
p1001 Michaels book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY 1081 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The expectation of popular ratification of war does not only follow 
from the fact that the Constitution gives the lower legislative house a role 
in decisionmaking; the Constitution provides additional support. Many 
believe, for example, that the Second Amendment embodies a popular-
sovereignty right vis-à-vis military matters. As Professor Elaine Scarry 
notes: 
the history of [the Second Amendment’s] formulation and 
invocation makes clear that whatever its relation to the realm of 
individuals and the private uses they have devised for guns, the 
amendment came into being primarily as a way of dispersing 
military power across the entire population. Like voting, like 
reapportionment, like taxation, what is at stake in the right to bear 
arms is a just distribution of political power.277  
Indeed, the Second Amendment gave the People a physical “say” over 
the conduct of war by limiting the capacity of the federal executive to 
aggrandize central military power. In providing for the dispersed 
ownership of weapons by the citizens, the Founders envisioned the 
existence of a people’s army, and thus vested decisions over matters of 
defense in the hands of people, and communities.278 Since, at least in the 
premodern era of warfare, weapons had to “be carried onto the field by 
persons, the leaders [had to] address the population and persuade them to 
carry those guns.”279 This understanding comports with Akhil Amar’s as 
well. Professor Amar understands the Second Amendment as originating 
out of Locke’s recognition that “the people’s right to alter or abolish 
tyrannous government invariably required a popular appeal to arms,”280 
and as reflecting a deep anxiety about a centralized federal military.281  
DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION: PART TWO: JANUARY TO AUGUST 1788, at 86 (1993).  
 277. Scarry, supra note 267, at 1268–69. 
 278. See MORGAN, supra note 266, at 85–87 (describing the linkages between popular sovereignty 
and the right to bear arms); Scarry, supra note 267, at 1301–09; see also H. RICHARD UVILLER & 
WILLIAM G. MERKEL, THE MILITIA AND THE RIGHT TO ARMS, OR, HOW THE SECOND AMENDMENT 
FELL SILENT (2002); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an 
Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 314, 321 (1991); Lawrence Delbert Cress, An 
Armed Community: The Origin and Meaning of the Right To Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22, 31 
(1984); Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law 
Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983). 
 279. Scarry, supra note 267, at 1266. 
 280. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 47 (1998) (citing JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND 
TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 221–43 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952)); Cottrol & Diamond, supra 
note 278, at 327–30; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right To Self-
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 111, 113–15 (1987); see also STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT 
EVERY MAN BE ARMED 76–77 (1984) (noting that it was a chief aim of the Second Amendment to 
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Today, of course, the role of the militia (and the relevance, at least in 
this context, of the Second Amendment) has been diminished by the needs 
of a standing professional army. But that spirit of popular sovereignty has 
endured and surfaced elsewhere, often at the intersection of war and 
voting: “Apparently it takes war to open the eyes of America to the 
injustice she imparts to her young men. For it is surely unjust and 
discriminating to command men to sacrifice their lives for a decision 
which they had no part in making.”282 Hence, as early as the 
Revolutionary War, the franchise has been expanded and enlarged at times 
of combat to accommodate not only the service of soldiers for their 
patriotic labor, but also out of recognition for their desire to have a say 
over the conduct of the war.283 That tradition of expanding and protecting 
the franchise for soldiers has continued throughout the decades and 
centuries. President Lincoln insisted, for example, that the nation hold 
presidential elections in 1864, in the midst of the Civil War, even though 
he knew that his defeat would likely lead to the abandonment of efforts to 
preserve the Union.284 And during World War II, the United States passed  
ensure America’s citizenry had the capacity to oppose federal tyranny). 
 281. See AMAR, supra note 280, at 46–50; MORGAN, supra note 266; UVILLER & MERKEL, supra 
note 278; Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 647–48 
(1989); Lund, supra note 280, at 111–16.  
 282. Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1359 (2003) (quoting Lowering the Voting Age to 18: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 90th Cong. 23 (1968) 
(statement of R. Spencer Oliver) (emphasis added)).  
 283. What, however, should we think about privatization decisions to use contractors rather than 
soldiers not for purposes of deceiving the People, but to appease them? In other words, the ulterior aim 
may not be to conceal policymaking decisions so much as to change the substantive shape of those 
decisions and give them the contours that the People implicitly prefer. The government in this case 
would be divining the wishes of the public and sending contractors into harm’s way where U.S. 
soldiers would not be dispatched. Accordingly, an argument can be made that privatization is actually 
democratic-enhancing to the extent that the government would be accurately gauging what the public 
would find acceptable.  
 That argument, however, trivializes the importance of “process.” Public acquiescence should not 
be equated with public input, and to circumvent the process by which Congress, and through them, the 
People, are involved in the decisionmaking is to do harm to the citizens of this country and the 
institutions that represent their interests. 
 284. See HERMAN BELZ, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND EQUAL RIGHTS IN THE 
CIVIL WAR ERA 33–34 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1109, 1118. Professor Amar adds: 
In this regard it is supremely noteworthy (but rarely noticed by those who accuse Lincoln of 
acting like a dictator) that in 1864, in the middle of an all-out Civil War, Lincoln allowed a 
regular presidential election to proceed, and pledged to abide by its outcome—even though 
electoral victory for his opponent might well have led to compromise with the Confederacy 
and a negotiated dissolution of the Union that Lincoln loved . . . Lincoln’s decision in 1864 to 
submit himself and his platform to the judgment of the supreme tribunal of the American 
people deserves our highest praise . . . [and has] given the rest of the world a stunning 
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[t]he Soldier Voting Acts of 1942 and 1944 [that] not only 
guaranteed soldiers and sailors overseas the right to vote during 
World War II, but also served as an opening wedge in the battle for 
poll tax repeal and other congressional action to guarantee the 
voting rights of blacks more generally.285
More recently, the democratic linkages to war have been exemplified by 
the Vietnam era’s constitutional amendment that lowered the voting age 
from twenty-one to eighteen286 and thus addressed the perceived injustice 
of denying young soldiers and draftees a formal voice in the direction of 
war efforts.287 These tangible connections between war and democracy 
have prompted Professor Pam Karlan to assert that “virtually every major 
expansion in the right to vote was connected intimately to war.”288
Accordingly, with a built-in expectation of involvement in matters of 
war, any effort deliberate or otherwise to bypass Congress—and 
concomitantly—the People is a direct blow to the vitality of America’s 
democratic system. The unauthorized wars in Laos and Cambodia during 
the Vietnam conflict and the covert operations to prop-up anti-Communist 
regimes throughout the 1970s and 1980s in the Americas led to great 
disillusionment and distrust.289 It is the People who have been assigned the 
constitutional right and responsibility to register or withhold their 
informed consent. Anything serving to undercut that right threatens the 
legitimacy of the government. 
IV. UNDERMINING THE INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY AND STRATEGIC 
COMPETENCE OF THE U.S. MILITARY 
Even if Congress, and the People, were broadly informed and consulted 
about the shift toward privateers—and even if privatization were explicitly 
authorized by Congress—serious structural harms could still flow from the 
illustration of the true meaning of constitutional democracy—government of, by, and for the 
people.  
Id. 
 285. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Litigation, War, and Politics, By Other Means, 13 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 5, 7 (2002); see also ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 246–47 (2000). 
 286. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; see also Kenneth Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the 
Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 499, 500 (1991) (describing the connection 
between being eligible to fight at age eighteen and being able to vote at that age).  
 287. See supra note 285 and accompanying text. 
 288. See id. at 1346; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 285.  
 289. Ely, supra note 186, at 1145–48. Moreover, diluting body counts through the use of 
contractors (whose deaths are not officially tallied) also hampers Americans’ ability to make informed 
decisions about military policy. See supra note 158. 
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delegations of military functions to the private sector. In this Part, 
accordingly, I describe how contracting for the services of private troops, 
either to serve alongside U.S. military personnel or to operate by 
themselves, engenders significant institutional harms, strategic liabilities, 
and morale problems. First, because the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
does not apply to privateers, there is a greater possibility that contractors 
would distort a mission or abandon it altogether. This harm transcends the 
mere accountability concerns that can be remedied through more stringent 
oversight and more careful contracting. Indeed, it is not so much the 
possibility that privateers will fail to carry out a mission that is the 
principal concern; rather, at issue is the weakening of military justice and 
discipline on the battlefield that could upset civil-military relations and 
delegitimize democratic warmaking. Accordingly, as I will discuss below, 
to ensure military contractors comport themselves with the same discipline 
and restraint expected of regular soldiers, absent a congressional 
declaration of war, constitutional reform (not simple legislation) might be 
required. 
And, second, I also explore in this Part a concomitant harm: how 
privateers who participate in U.S. military operations might tarnish public 
perceptions of the American military and debase the iconography of 
soldiers as citizen-patriots. Indeed, placing contractors alongside (or in 
lieu) of soldiers may ultimately damage the privileged normative status the 
American military has historically enjoyed. This too is not readily 
remedied through accountability-oriented, or simple legislative reforms. 
A. Harms to the Institutional Integrity—and Comparative Excellence—of 
the American Military 
1. The Notion of “Separate Community” 
Regardless of whether she is stationed in Tikrit or Fort Dix and 
whether she is rounding up POWs or walking her dog on the base, the 
American soldier—from private to four-star general—lives in a “separate 
community.”290 Members of the U.S. Armed Forces operate within a 
 290. James M. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen’s 
Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C. L. REV. 177, 178 (1984); Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: 
The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 649 (2002) (describing the pervasiveness of military law even in matters that seem not to require 
a code of discipline distinct from the civilian laws of the United States); see also Parker v. Levy, 417 
U.S. 733, 743–44 (1974) (“[T]he military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian 
society.”). Among the rights subject to curtailment in the confines of military service are free speech, 
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unique constitutional framework of governance and discipline necessary to 
ensure that they serve as effective yet restrained actors in national 
defense.291 Simply stated: the American people entrust to their soldiers the 
awesome tools of devastating destruction, as well as an equally awesome 
democratic authority to wield them. In return, the People insist that their 
delegates on the battlefield are rigidly disciplined and handle their 
responsibilities with great humility and humanity.292 Professor James 
Hirschorn writes:  
As long as the Constitution gives the President and Congress the 
authority to determine the ends for which military force will be 
used, civilian supremacy requires a system of military discipline 
that inculcates all ranks with an attitude of active subordination, i.e., 
the will to carry out the instructions of their civilian superiors 
despite their own disagreement.293  
Therefore, since the military has a sacred duty to carry out the 
directives of civilian authorities to a tee, it is crucial (not only for the 
success of missions, but moreover, for the enduring legitimacy of 
democratic warmaking) that under no circumstances will an order be 
ignored or distorted.294 This degree of absolute and uncompromising 
sexual freedom, and religious expressions. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 
(1986) (upholding the military’s prohibition of those visible religious accoutrements that are 
inconsistent with the Air Force's dress code, on the basis of the military's need for “instinctive 
obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps”); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 350 (1980) 
(allowing a base commander to suppress written materials posing “a clear danger to the loyalty, 
discipline or morale of members of the armed forces”); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding 
that there is no constitutional right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets on a military base). 
 291. See Hirschhorn, supra note 290, at 217; Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military 
Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CAL. L. REV. 939, 953–57 (1998) (characterizing the fostering of a 
culture of discipline and integrity as a central aim of the system of military governance). 
 292. Indeed, the bedrock of a liberal democracy is civilian control over the military. See, e.g., 
MILLETT, supra note 214; Kenneth W. Kemp & Charles Hudlin, Civil Supremacy over the Military: Its 
Nature and Limits, ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y, Fall 1992, at 7. In order to ensure that democratic 
institutions control the machines of war, civilian control can permit no acts of deviation or 
insubordination that might compromise the careful orchestration of a military engagement and yield 
results not intended by the civilian authorities. See Hirschhorn, supra note 290, at 217.  
 293. Hirschhorn, supra note 290, at 217. See Lawrence F. Kaplan, Officer Politics, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2004, at 23 (describing the “principle of subordination to civilian control and 
nonpartisanship” as the essence of American military professionalism); see also SAMUEL P. 
HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 15–16 (1957) (noting that the military’s role in society is 
understood as being directed entirely by the State and its political agents); MILLETT, supra note 214, at 
2, 61; Kemp & Hudlin, supra note 292, at 7–9; Richard H. Kohn, Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-
Military Relations, NAT’L INTEREST, Spring 1994, at 3.  
 294. SINGER, supra note 20, at 191 (“Maintaining proper control of the military is a key priority of 
governance. . . .”). In what Foucault characterizes as the “microphysics of power,” constant training, 
drilling, and surveillance and supervision of activities serves to foster discipline and unity and thus 
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discipline requires a constitutionally separate governing infrastructure, far 
stricter than ordinary civil and criminal codes promulgated by civilian 
governments and necessarily entailing some loss of the ordinary and even 
constitutional rights citizens of the United States otherwise enjoy.295 In 
other words, “[a]n Army sent into combat by a democracy cannot act like 
one.”296
Accordingly, for generations, the American military community has 
been a social, legal, and economic entity onto itself;297 systems have been 
in place—in one form or another—since the dawning days of the 
American Revolution to treat members of the U.S. Armed Forces 
differently (and more restrictively).298 In 1950, Congress introduced the 
modern incarnation of this separate system: the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (“UCMJ”).299 The UCMJ represents an entirely endogenous value 
system that recognizes the weighty authority and discretion given to 
soldiers and attempts to control that authority and discretion more 
stringently than regular American constitutional and statutory law would 
ever permit. The code subjects to military discipline, and at times to court-
martial, those individuals who are, inter alia, AWOL, disobedient, 
insubordinate, malingering, misbehaving, or who render faulty 
performances of duty.300  
leaves little room for deviancy. See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE 135–58 (Colin 
Gordon et al., trans., Colin Gordon ed., 1980); THOMAS DUMM, Michel Foucault and the Politics of 
Freedom 104, in 9 MODERNITY AND POLITICAL THOUGHT (Morton Schoolman, ed.) (1996). But see 
Banerjee & Hart, supra note 96; Ricks, Probe, supra note 96; Ricks, Strains, supra note 96. 
 295. See supra note 290 and accompanying text; infra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 296. Thom Shanker, Experts See Little Defense for Troops’ Disobedience, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2004, at A12 (noting that “[o]rder and discipline required for successful combat operations cannot 
exist if subordinates are allowed to vote on their mission or second-guess superiors”). 
 297. Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002). 
 298. See RICHARD S. HARTIGAN, INTRODUCTION TO LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 1 
(1983); JAMES C. NEAGLES, SUMMER SOLDIERS, A SURVEY AND INDEX OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
COURTS-MARTIAL (1986); WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, app. X. at 961 
(2d ed. 1920) (reprinting 1775 and 1776 Articles of War); James F. Childress, Francis Lieber’s 
Interpretation of the Laws of War: General Orders No. 100 in the Context of His Life and Thought, 21 
AM. J. JURIS. 34 (1976); Hon. Walter T. Cox III, The Army, the Courts, and the Constitution: The 
Evolution of Military Justice, 118 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (1987); Alexander Holtzoff, Administration of 
Justice in the United States Army, 22 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1947); Edmund M. Morgan, The Background 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND. L. REV. 169 (1953); Edmund M. Morgan, The 
Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles, 29 YALE L.J. 52 (1919); see also 
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (“The military need not encourage debate or 
tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First 
Amendment. . . .”). 
 299. Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107. 
 300. See, e.g., UCMJ art. 85 (desertion); 86 (AWOL); 88 (using contemptuous words against the 
president); 89 (showing disrespect toward a superior officer); 91 (insubordination toward non-
commissioned officer); 92 (failure to obey an order); 113 (misbehaving); 115 (malingering); 133 
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The UCMJ is more than a simple legislative enactment, but rather has 
the effective currency of what Professors William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn call “super-statutes”301 and what Professor Gerhard Casper 
describes as a “framework statute”302 because it takes on quasi-
constitutional qualities and prescribes an entire positive code of 
regulations and conduct, respectively. Indeed, the courts have recognized 
the special and distinct qualities of this governing regime and defer to 
Congress even when the UCMJ limits soldiers’ constitutional liberties in 
ways unimaginable if ever applied to civilians.303 Given the intrusive 
scope of the UCMJ, and the courts’ emphasis on Congress’s special 
Article I powers over the Armed Forces qua Armed Forces, it may be 
(conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman); see also 10 U.S.C. § 976 (2000) (prohibiting 
members of the military from organizing or engaging in any other union activities); 18 U.S.C. § 2387 
(2000) (prohibiting interference with the discipline or morale of the armed forces); Hirschhorn, supra 
note 290, at 208; Turley, supra note 290, at 666. As Professor Diane Mazur underscores, the UCMJ is 
not simply a punitive apparatus; rather, on a day-to-day basis it provides soldiers with a guiding 
framework for carrying out duties responsibly. See Diane H. Mazur, Rehnquist’s Vietnam: 
Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law, 77 IND. L.J. 701, 709 (2002).  
 301. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 
(2001). Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn note that:  
A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new normative or 
institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time does “stick” in the public culture 
such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative principles have a broad effect 
on the law—including an effect beyond the four corners of the statute. 
Id. 
 302. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 303. See, e.g., Solario v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447 (1987) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 
453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)) (“[J]udicial deference . . . is at its apogee when legislative action under the 
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their 
governance is challenged.”); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 65 (“[I]t is difficult to conceive of an area . . . in 
which courts have less competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the 
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially . . . military 
judgments.”); U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22–23 (1955); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 
How.) 65, 79 (1857) (noting that Article I provisions “show that Congress has the power to provide for 
the trial and punishment of military and naval offenses . . . and that the power to do so is given without 
any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the 
United States; indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.”); Dinsman v. 
Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390, 403 (1851); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827) 
(refusing to review the validity of military orders or military punishments); see also Goldman, 475 
U.S. at 507; Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 350 (1980); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976); Cox, 
supra note 298, at 23 (noting that the military by necessity imposes restrictions on the lives of service 
members that are much more stringent than anything imposed on the civilian population); Hirschhorn, 
supra note 290, at 184; Karst, supra note 286, at 570 (indicating that “entry into the armed forces 
implies some separation from the norms of the larger community, including some yielding of 
individual freedoms to . . . make a fighting force effective”); Mazur, supra note 300, at 707–12; Osiel, 
supra note 291, at 953 (suggesting that key codes of military regulations are “largely distinct from, 
even at odds with, the common morality of civilian society”); id. at 1023 (noting that the Supreme 
Court “has displayed extraordinary deference toward the armed forces as a community possessed of its 
own nomos, or norm-creating and norm-sustaining mechanism”).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1001 Michaels book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
1088 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 82:1001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unlikely that these regulations could easily be extended and applied to 
civilians, even ones who serve as privateers.304  
And, beyond the formal, legal structure of discipline, the military’s 
separate community bespeaks a distinct social and moral experience. The 
cohesion of military units (and their detachment from the outside, civilian 
sphere of life) creates camaraderie and engenders an esprit de corps 
necessary for optimal performance on the battlefield—where it is said that 
individuals put their lives on the line for one another as much as for their 
nation.305 This inculcation of virtue and honor is accomplished through the 
“personal immersion” in the ongoing “collective narrative of [the] 
corps,”306 a narrative that is supplemented in part by an inward-looking 
sense of shared culture and in part by an outward-oriented aversion to 
what is perceived as the lax values of civilian life.307 Again, but for 
obviously different reasons than legal-constitutional ones, this esprit is 
difficult to extend to privateers via fiat—legislative or otherwise.308  
It is with this context and history in mind that the blithe introduction of 
civilian contractors into positions involving the exercise of sensitive 
military authority seems particularly dangerous and counterproductive—
violating the carefully crafted arrangements established over time 
precisely to minimize the possibility that agents of combat will disobey 
 304. See infra notes 444–46. 
 305. Studies suggest troop camaraderie appears to strengthen the resolve of military units more 
than any other bond (including nationalism or political ideology). See, e.g., J. GLENN GRAY, THE 
WARRIORS 27 (1959) (characterizing the strength of ties within military units as “unequaled in forging 
links among people of unlike desire and temperament”); Osiel, supra note 291, at 1053–55 
(highlighting how the basic units of military association provide core groupings for displays of loyalty, 
bravery, and self-sacrifice); cf. Ricks, Strains, supra note 96 (emphasizing differences between units of 
regular soldiers and national guard units in terms of trust and unit cohesion). 
 306. Osiel, supra note 291, at 955.  
 307. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 184, at 388 (“Military personnel perceive most of American 
society as conspicuously lacking those qualities [of duty and community.] Not surprisingly, therefore, 
they often prefer to live in their own military enclaves, complete with homes, schools, churches, 
stores, and entertainment facilities.”); Mazur, supra note 300, at 756 (“Today . . . military haircuts are 
often designed to separate a serviceman from civilian society, to define a servicemember as different 
and apart. Extremely shaved styles that would be considered inappropriate for a civilian professional 
are chosen for just that reason—they identify a servicemember as not civilian.”); Diane H. Mazur, Why 
Progressives Lost the War When They Lost the Draft, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 566–67 (2003); Adam 
Clymer, Sharp Divergence Found in Views of Military and Civilians, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1999, at 
A20; Ole R. Holsti, A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some Evidence, 
1976–96, INT’L SECURITY, Winter 1998/99, at 5–9; Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the 
Military and Society, ATL. MONTHLY, July 1997, at 66; David Wood, Duty, Honor, Isolation: Military 
More and More a Force unto Itself, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Apr. 21, 1991, at A1.  
 308. Of course, since contractors are often veterans and have self-selected to return to a martial 
vocation, perhaps the socio-cultural affinities to regular members of the Armed Forces exist even in 
the absence of any formal program of inculcation. 
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their principals’ commands and/or abandon their comrades in the heat of 
battle.  
2. Privatization’s Harms  
Civilian contractors, not similarly subject to the dictates of military law 
or to the constitutional oath of office,309 cannot necessarily be expected or 
permitted to exercise the authority, judgment, or lethal force entrusted to 
soldiers. Contractors are not governed and disciplined by the same legal 
and socio-cultural obligations of duty and loyalty required to ensure the 
effective subordination of soldiers’ own interests and to guarantee the 
success of a given endeavor.310 No legal contract between the Pentagon 
and a private firm can hope to imitate, let alone replicate, this sacred 
relationship.311 Otherwise, why would U.S. military personnel be treated 
 309. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 20, at 213 (noting that privateers do not take an oath to uphold 
the Constitution); Christopher Marquis, Inquiry on Peru Looks at a C.I.A. Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 2001, at A4 (describing how an Alabama-based private military company was responsible for the 
killing of civilians in Peru and characterizing the outrage of a government official who took note that 
the privateers were not operating under the Constitution, but rather “were just businessmen”); Singer, 
supra note 83, at 537 (noting that contractors cannot be disciplined under the UCMJ). 
 Under the 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2000), Congress 
attempted to hold contractors criminally liable for acts committed in violation of the U.S. Code on 
foreign soil. See Guillory, supra note 47. However, the law is limited in its coverage and applies only 
to civilian contractors working for the Defense Department on U.S. military facilities. It does not, 
however, expand the substantive scope of criminal liability (and thus does not attempt to extend the 
UCMJ in toto to contractors). See Joseph R. Perlak, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 
2000: Implications for Contractor Personnel, 169 MIL. L. REV. 92, 95–101 (2001); Singer, supra note 
83, at 537–46. To make the UCMJ too comprehensive and too broad in its applicability to contractors, 
could pose constitutional questions regarding Congress’s ability to regulate non-military personnel. 
See infra notes 312, 339, 444–45.  
 But see Vanessa Blum, DoD’s New War Zone Rules for Contractors, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19, 
2004, at 1. Blum notes that the Pentagon has proposed rules to place greater liability on contractors 
and also to permit military commanders to alter government contracts in the field, thus “reduc[ing] red 
tape for companies working under increasingly dangerous conditions.” Id. The increased level of 
corporate liability may, however, make it more likely that contractors, knowing the government may 
not cover losses, will flee rather than suffer personal injury as well as damage to sensitive equipment. 
Moreover, giving military commanders authority to alter contracts opens the door for even less civilian 
control and legal oversight of military privateers.  
 310. See supra notes 305–07 and accompanying text. Likewise, as noted above, see supra note 
308, since many are former members of the U.S. Armed Forces, they may very well have been 
instilled with the same esprit de corps. Yet because they no longer face the same rigid discipline and 
command structure and are no longer embedded in a separate community of soldiers, it is uncertain 
what degree of commitment and self-sacrifice exists among contractors.  
 311. See Metzger, supra note 39, at 1462 (noting that permitting a private actor to carry out tasks 
“on behalf of government is what makes . . . private delegations particularly threatening to the 
principle of constitutionally-constrained government” and suggesting that when private actors 
“effectively step[] into the government’s shoes in its dealings with third parties, private entities are 
more likely to have access to powers that are distinctly governmental”); see also DiIulio, supra note 6, 
at 155–57 (contending that in the context of prison management, the profit motive is incompatible with 
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so differently than, say, civil servants working in the Department of 
Veterans Affairs? If American servicemen and women could be trusted to 
do their job as effectively without the UCMJ, then the entire legal and 
cultural architecture of the “separate community” would be largely 
unnecessary. The fact, however, that the separate community is so 
important to maintaining order and ensuring fidelity gives us a sense of 
why merely tightening contractual obligations and increasing contractor 
oversight might be all that would be needed when the government 
outsources commercial responsibilities at Veterans Affairs, but that those 
measures may not be enough when it comes to privatizing military 
functions. 
Indeed, constitutionally speaking, it is at least questionable whether 
contractual penalties for violating many of the terms of a private military 
agreement can rise to the threat-level of an impending court-martial.312 
Thus, given, for example, the Court’s historical jurisprudence invalidating 
laws that criminalize the mere breaking of private employment contracts, 
one might suppose that there would be some resistance to penalizing 
contractors as if they were U.S. soldiers (for all sorts of small 
infractions).313
Since private agents are not controlled and disciplined by their 
governmental principals to the extent Congress requires and the Supreme 
Court allows for U.S. soldiers within the chain-of-command, it would 
seem inappropriate to delegate to private actors crucial military 
the types of non-economic services being administered); Michaels, supra note 6.  
 312. Indeed, in the wake of the horrific sex-slave scandals perpetrated by DynCorp officials in 
Bosnia, no employees—save the whistleblowers—were fired. See Singer, supra note 83, at 525, 538; 
Jennifer Murray, Note, Who Will Police the Peace-Builders?, 34 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 
475, 505–06 (2003) (noting the dismissal of a DynCorp employee for disclosing evidence that her 
colleagues were involved in sex-trafficking practices); Antony Barnett & Solomon Hughes, British 
Firm Accused in U.N. “Sex Scandal,” THE OBSERVER (London), July 29, 2001, at 4.  
 313. Courts historically have been reluctant to support statutory or private schemes whereby 
satisfactory performance of contracts can be enforced by threat of imprisonment. See Bailey v. 
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 243 (1911); Karen Gross, The Debtor as Modern Day Peon: A Problem of 
Unconstitutional Conditions, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 165, 181 (1990); Anthony Kronman, Specific 
Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351 (1978). For discussions of courts refusing to endorse any 
contractual schemes under which failure to meet the terms are grounds for imprisonment, see 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS, PART I, at 159–
72 (1970); 2 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: 
RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 801–07 (1968); 2 EMERSON, HABER, & DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 517–20 (Norman Dorsen et al. eds., 4th ed. 1979); Benno C. Schmidt, 
Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 2: The 
Peonage Cases, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 646 (1982). It may be more likely that Congress would be 
permitted to legislate directly to criminalize certain affirmative actions that happen to correspond with 
contractual breaches (such as desertion qua breach of military contract), but it is beyond the scope of 
this Article to try to resolve that question. 
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responsibilities, which require not only the careful exercise of life-and-
death discretion, but also the internalization of civilian-military protocols 
regarding fidelity to officers’ orders. In short, contractors are not 
necessarily appropriately situated within the delicately woven legal and 
constitutional fabric that both endows the military with authority to serve 
as an effective fighting force and, at the same time, severely curtails 
soldiers’ freedom to deviate in any way from their explicit charge.314  
a. Potential Strategic Liability 
First, privateers may at times prove ineffective, if not harmful. As 
already suggested, they are bound principally by contractual obligations to 
complete their missions—not by the command structure of the UCMJ nor, 
probably, by the ethos of honor and self-sacrifice cultivated within 
military units. Legal threats of punishment, or emotional appeals to 
fraternity or patriotism may not work to compel contractors to remain in 
harm’s way and accomplish their assigned tasks. Though these contractors 
may even be decorated veterans and steadfast patriots, no threats of courts-
martial or fears that they will be harshly disciplined as deserters enter into 
their minds and oblige them to complete the assignments.315 As Bianco 
and Forest observe:  
 314. The harms associated with introducing privateers into combat situations are not simply on the 
order of accountability—that contractors might distort missions on the margins. Rather, the Armed 
Forces have been regulated “separately” precisely to ensure absolute and effective discipline over its 
members in ways that have no civilian analogues for public actors such as prison guards or welfare 
caseworkers serving in any other (domestic) capacity. Without the framework of military discipline, 
privateers may not be trusted with military orders. The same cannot be said about prison guards who, 
for argument’s sake, may or may not be construed to be state actors. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. 
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 72–73 (2001); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997). Private 
guards can disobey orders to the same extent as state guards, and vice versa. Both sets of guards would 
be subject to dismissal and possibly monetary liability. But in the military context, a soldier who 
disobeys an order could go to jail—whereas a contractor, most likely, is just sent home. In other 
words, the status differentials between soldiers and contractors (or any other civilians for that matter) 
define the very nature of the U.S. Armed Services—and this constitutionally separate community is 
organized precisely to control and discipline its members in ways far more restrictive than that 
allowable in the realm of civilian law. See supra notes 296, 308–09. 
 315. As Singer notes:  
One essential difference between exit by private employees and by those in public institutions 
is that leaving a PMF post is not desertion—punishable by prosecution and even death, but 
merely the breaking of a contract with limited enforceability. The simple matter is that no 
equivalent enforcement exists for PMFs to prevent desertion by their employees. 
SINGER, supra note 20, at 159; see also id. (noting that an entire firm or a select set of employees may 
break agreements with client governments if matters become unexpectedly dangerous, with the only 
repercussion being economic); Turner & Norton, supra note 42, at 38–41; Ariel Hart, Solider Who 
Refused To Return Is Found Guilty, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A10 (describing the prosecution of 
a soldier who refused to deploy to Iraq). 
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As civilians, contract employees are not subject to military 
command and discipline. Workers who refuse an assignment can be 
fired by their employers but not tossed into the brig. The Pentagon’s 
only recourse is to sue—no comfort at all to a commander in the 
field who has been left in the lurch by vanished contractors.316
Immune from the harsh measures of military justice intended to ensure 
no soldier will prioritize self-preservation over the good of the mission, it 
is more likely that key contractors, engaged in surveillance flights, 
responsible for caravanning necessary materiel to the frontlines, or 
defending key American installations in hostile territory, will simply shirk 
their duties.317 Moreover, among contractors there may not be the same 
psycho-social urgency to display true honor as a selfless contributor in the 
military effort.318  
The Pentagon is not unaware of the fact that when contractors are 
deployed, there is a greater likelihood of desertions and refusals to obey 
orders.319 As early as 1976, when tensions flared up on the Korean 
 316. Bianco & Forest, supra note 30, at 72; see 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2000); Gibson, supra note 44; Glenn R. Schmitt, Closing the Gap in Criminal 
Jurisdiction Over Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces Abroad, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 55 (2001); 
Turner & Norton, supra note 42, at 21 (“The degree of authority a commander holds over these 
civilians is significantly different than that held over combatants. Commanders are accustomed to 
issuing orders and having unity of command over their assigned and attached personnel.”); Wayne, 
supra note 2 (describing how a commander cannot give orders to a contractor with the same authority 
he can to a soldier); see also Andrew M. Ferris, Military Justice: Removing the Probability of 
Unfairness, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 439, 446 (1994) (describing how, in attempting to combat desertion 
during the Revolutionary War, General George Washington ordered public execution of deserters with 
mandatory attendance by the members of the condemned soldier’s unit). See generally Maj. Gen. Jack 
Rives & Maj. Steven J. Ehlenbeck, Civilian Versus Military Justice in the United States: A 
Comparative Analysis, 52 A.F. L. REV. 213 (2002) (focusing on criminal remedies). 
 317. As I have repeatedly tried to remind readers, the differences are of degree, not kind. 
American military personnel have too been accused of desertions and of failing to report for duty. But 
in those situations, they are exposed to criminal punishments. See, e.g., Army Says It Will Punish 
Convoy Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at A10 (noting that a number of soldiers will be 
prosecuted as a result of the convoy incident); Banerjee & Hart, supra note 96 (noting the detention of 
eighteen reservists for refusing to go on a convoy mission in Iraq); James Dao, Soldier Who Seized 
Car in Iraq Is Convicted of Armed Robbery, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2004, at A9; Ricks, Probe, supra 
note 96 (describing how members of a South Carolina National guard unit were detained for going 
AWOL to see their families on the night before they shipped out to Iraq); see also Eric Schmitt, Its 
Recruitment Goals Pressing, the Army Will Ease Some Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at A24 
(describing the criminal charges filed against former soldiers who failed to mobilize when called up as 
members of the Individual Ready Reserve). 
 318. See, e.g., Osiel, supra note 291, at 952–55; see also MOCKLER, supra note 23 (noting that 
private contractors are often more likely to flee a dangerous situation and ignore orders/requests to stay 
by military colleagues); Barry McCaffrey, Role of the Armed Forces in the Protection and Promotion 
of Human Rights, 149 MIL. L. REV. 229, 236–37 (1995) (emphasizing the moral and legal training 
given to military officers to promote ethical practices and to deter human rights abuses).  
 319. SINGER, supra note 20, at 161 (noting that “military commanders cannot assume that PMF 
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peninsula, a number of Defense Department civilian and contract 
personnel (rendering commercial services) made a mass exodus. Military 
officers could not “order” the contractors to stay and, as a result, their 
absence—to the extent their services were missed—compromised 
American and South Korean interests.320 More recently, the Pentagon 
commissioned a study that found commercial contractors might have fled 
the Persian Gulf theater during the first war against Iraq, were gunfire to 
have intensified or were Saddam Hussein to have unleashed chemical or 
biological weapons.321  
With this historical sensitivity to civilian desertions in mind, it seems 
somewhat reckless for the current Administration to have leveraged the 
battlefield and the post-war occupation with private contractors in Iraq—
especially since this invasion was largely predicated on the U.S. 
government’s conviction that Saddam had (and was prepared to use) 
Weapons of Mass Destruction.322 As Colonel Steven Zamparelli has 
argued: 
If death becomes a real threat, there is no doubt that some 
contractors will exercise their legal rights to get out of the theater. 
Not so many years ago, that may have simply meant no hot food or 
reduced morale and welfare activity. Today, it could mean the only 
people a field commander has to accomplish a critical “core 
personnel will stay on the battlefield, or even in the theater”). 
 320. See id. at 139–40 (describing the mass civilian support staff exodus from the Korean 
peninsula when tensions flared); see also Eric A. Orsini & Lt. Col. Gary T. Bublitz, Contractors on the 
Battlefield: Risks on the Road Ahead?, ARMY LOGISTICIAN, Jan./Feb. 1999, at 130–32; Turner & 
Norton, supra note 42, at 40. For historical precedents, see SINGER, supra note 20, at 162. See also 
Lou Marano, Editorial, The Perils of Privatization; In a Crunch, Soldiers Can’t Count on Civilian 
Help, WASH POST. May 27, 1997, at A15. Marano raises concerns that the contractors supporting 
American soldiers in the Balkans could abandon their responsibilities were their lives endangered. Id. 
 321. See Guillory, supra note 47, at 140–41; see also SINGER, supra note 20, at 161 (noting the 
distinct likelihood of civilian fleeing if threatened with weapons of mass destruction such as chemical 
or biological agents); Turner & Norton, supra note 42, at 40 (describing how “[d]uring Operation 
Desert Storm, food support contractor employees refused to perform until they were provided with 
chemical attack protective equipment”). 
 322. See Bianco & Forest, supra note 30, at 70 (noting that some military contractors have 
“refused to deploy to particularly dangerous parts of Iraq [and, as a result,] that soldiers had to go 
without fresh food, showers, and toilets for months”); see also President’s Address to the Nation on 
Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 329 (Mar. 24, 2003) (emphasizing the fact that Saddam was 
stockpiling and ready to use Weapons of Mass Destruction); Henry J. Hyde, Editorial, Delivering 
Ourselves from Evil; Bush Is Laying the Foundation for a Comprehensive Root-and-Branch Approach 
to the Mortal Danger of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 20, 2004, 
at C25 (“[E]very [U.S.] intelligence agency—along with the United Nations . . . believed that the Iraqi 
regime possessed weapons of mass destruction prior to last year’s invasion. . . .”). 
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competency” task such as weapons-system maintenance . . . have 
left and gone home.323
Recently, contractors in Iraq have been put to the test and, by and large, 
have comported themselves quite admirably. Employees of Blackwater 
were besieged by insurgents and nevertheless ably defended an American 
installation without the assistance of U.S. troops.324 Obviously individuals 
who agree to serve as privateers in conflict zones are aware of the dangers, 
and companies and their employees who want to be repeat players have 
every incentive to exhibit that type of responsible, even heroic 
performance. Yet, on the aggregate, the possibility of desertions, acts of 
defiance, or reluctance to put one’s life on the line is likely to be greater 
when individuals outside the special confines of the military community 
are delegated combat responsibilities.325
 323. Yeoman, supra note 4, at 93; see also SINGER, supra note 20, at 162–63 (noting that at times 
military personnel, including cooks and secretaries, serving in rear support positions have been 
summoned to the frontlines to provide combat assistance such as during the Battle of the Bulge and, 
more recently, in Mogadishu).  
 324. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 325. The fact that many of the contractors served in the U.S. military and were trained and 
inculcated within the command structures of the U.S. military narrows the values-integrity gap. Yet, it 
is unclear whether privateers, no longer enticed with the carrots associated with being a good soldier 
(such as receiving promotions and medals) and no longer disciplined by the sticks (of, say, a court-
martial) that work to constrain the behavior of regular troops, embrace the same ethos of honor. 
Moreover, military firms may be unconcerned with promoting that ethos or even fostering an esprit de 
corps. Cf. SINGER, supra note 20, at 153–58 (noting DynCorp’s routine use of unqualified individuals 
for peacekeeping in Kosovo and for aircraft maintenance throughout the world). There may also be 
reasons why a firm would not want to encourage its agents to identify too closely with its sponsor 
nation, whether that nation be the United States or Equatorial Guinea, for fears of the contractors 
internalizing objectives outside the scope of the corporate enterprise. 
 Additionally, perhaps concerns about meshing private and U.S. troops take on heightened 
importance as we consider the possibility of “friendly fire” risks. An issue during the first Gulf War, 
see, for example, Eric Schmitt, U.S. Striving To Prevent “Friendly Fire,” N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at 
A12, perhaps it will become an issue once again in light of the much-publicized death of former 
football star Pat Tillman. See Roland Watson, All-American Icon Was Shot Dead in Blunder by Own 
Platoon, TIMES (London), May 31, 2004, at 11. Certainly, one might speculate that privateers and 
soldiers working with different equipment and acting pursuant to different sets of command structures 
may increase the likelihood of a tragic mistake occurring on the field of combat. See, e.g., Priest & 
Flaherty, supra note 4 (characterizing how difficult it has been for private military firms to 
communicate with the American military, as well as with other firms, in Iraq); see also Fay Report, 
supra note 107 (noting how some of the problems at Abu Ghraib were exacerbated by poor 
communication between the contractors and the soldiers); Taguba Report, supra note 106 (same). 
 Moreover, international law’s inhospitable treatment of armed civilians makes contractors, 
oftentimes, unlikely to carry weaponry. To do otherwise may place them in an “unprotected” status if 
captured as a prisoner of war. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 47, reprinted in THE 
LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 649 (Dietrich Schindler & Jiri Toman eds., 3d ed. 1988) (entered into 
force Dec. 7, 1978). Article 47 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 “removed 
the protection of combatant of prisoner of war status from mercenaries.” David Kassebaum, Note, A 
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b. Perceived Strategic Liability/Morale Problem 
Moreover, even if the contractors do not appreciably undermine a 
campaign, regular U.S. troops’ misgivings may not subside—and for a 
justifiable reason: there’s always the threat that the contractors will walk 
out during the next siege. For the reason expressed above, the mere belief 
that contractors may flee is enough to introduce uncertainty and distrust 
among the U.S. troops—which is probably already high given the host of 
other existing morale problems currently plaguing the service ranks.326 
And, the soldiers’ insecurity and their misgivings about privateers must be 
treated seriously; the military goes to such extensive lengths to engender 
the appropriate level of cohesion, discipline, and camaraderie327 that it 
seems inexplicable why the Pentagon would sacrifice those goals in the 
name of outsourcing.328
Parenthetically speaking, there is, of course, a real irony here regarding 
military morale. For years, while the Pentagon has been consumed with 
the fear that the presence of gay soldiers might destroy morale,329 perhaps 
it has failed to consider the negative ramifications of engaging non-U.S. 
Question of Facts—The Legal Use of Private Security Firms in Bosnia, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
581, 589 (2000); see also id. at 589 n.50; Thomas K. Adams, The New Merceneries and the 
Privatization of Conflict, PARAMETERS, Summer 1999, at 103; Wayne, supra note 2. Consequently, if 
besieged, they may prove unable to defend themselves; thus, their presence on the battlefield places an 
additional burden on the regular troops to safeguard them while still attending to their own functions. 
Bianco & Forest, supra note 30, at 70 (noting that contractors often depend on “their military 
customers for protection in combat zones”). 
 326. Neela Banerjee & John Kifner, Along with Prayers, Families Send Armor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2004, at A1; Davey, supra note 206; Bob Herbert, Editorial, War on the Cheap, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 2004, at A29; Hockstader, supra note 206; Ricks, supra note 206; see also Editorial, Ill-Serving 
Those Who Serve, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2004, at A18; Thom Shanker, Military Plans to Call Up 
Soldiers Who Left Service, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2004, at A10. 
 327. See, e.g., STEPHEN PETER ROSEN, SOCIETIES AND MILITARY POWER 268 (1996) (noting how 
the U.S. military takes steps to keep its soldiers separate from the civilian society at large). 
 328. See Bruce D. Grant, U.S. Military Expertise for Sale: Private Military Consults as a Tool of 
Foreign Policy, in ESSAYS 1998, at 89, 91 (National Defense University Press 1998), available at 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/books/books%20-%201998/Essays1998/ESSAY98.pdf (last visited Dec. 9, 
2004) (noting that military privatization has a corrupting effect on the U.S. military and creates a 
dispirited army). Introducing money differentials and separate housing installations may further 
contribute to a sense of alienation and breakdown in morale. Bianco & Forest, supra note 30, at 71, 72, 
78 (noting that members of the military have expressed doubts whether contractors would possess the 
loyalty to support frontline soldiers in times of crisis). 
 329. See, e.g., PRIEST, supra note 47, at 44 (noting that the joint chiefs, including Chairman Colin 
Powell, would have resigned if President Clinton “pursued his campaign promise to allow gays to 
serve openly in the armed forces”); David Hackworth, Editorial, The Case for a Military Gay Ban, 
WASH. POST, Jun. 28, 1992, at C4; Tom Morganthau, Gays and the Military, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 
1993, at 52. But see Nathaniel Frank, Editorial, Why We Need Gays in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
28, 2003, at A43 (indicating the ban on gay soldiers is counterproductive, harms morale, and 
undermines national security). 
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military personnel in essential positions alongside regular troops when 
those private actors have not labored through basic training nor spent years 
drilling and dwelling with their military counterparts.330 Soldiers are aware 
that not only do privateers often get compensated at a higher rate, but that 
they also can leave if the fighting gets too intense—hardly factors working 
in favor of community-building.331  
An additional cause of concern from a morale and confidence-
damaging perspective is the possibility that privateers will comport 
themselves in an unbecoming manner. Unhinged from the narrative of 
military honor, privateers may never have internalized the ethos of honor 
and dignity that is inculcated in American GIs.332 (And, even if the 
contractors are themselves veterans, that esprit may have long since 
diminished and been superseded by the mores of the marketplace.) As one 
recent observer of DynCorp’s behavior in Kabul noted, “[c]ontractors do 
not live by the same constraints as active-duty soldiers . . . . [T]heir 
blurring of the military-civilian line serves as a reminder that military 
discipline not only keeps up morale, but encourages moral behavior.”333 
American soldiers today (though admittedly not all model citizen-soldiers 
themselves) are taught the lessons of, for example, the My Lai massacre, 
and are told that those who helped stop the bloodshed were given medals; 
but that those who orchestrated it (and even those who just followed 
 330. Jeffrey W. Anderson, Military Heroism: An Occupational Definition, 12 ARMED FORCES & 
SOC’Y 591 (1986); Karst, supra note 286, at 573 (focusing on the extent to which bonding and 
camaraderie in military units engenders acts of heroism and self-sacrifice); Osiel, supra note 291, at 
1053–55 (commenting on how the cohesive bonds of military communities help prepare soldiers for 
the difficulties of battle and fortify their courage so as not to disappoint their colleagues); see also 
CRAIG M. CAMERON, AMERICAN SAMURAI 192 (1994) (noting that small military units foster a shared 
sense of purpose that helps individuals perform well under intense duress). 
 331. Singer, supra note 83, at 536–37; The Baghdad Boom, supra note 103 (“[T]he rising 
profitability of private sector [military] work is tempting unprecedented numbers of [Britain’s elite 
soldiers] to leave.”); Dao, supra note 4 (noting that private military firms “are offering yearly salaries 
ranging from $100,000 to nearly $200,000 to entice senior military Special Operations forces to switch 
careers. Assignments are paying from a few hundred dollars to as much as $1,000 a day”); Eric 
Schmitt & Thom Shanker, Big Pay Luring Military’s Elite To Private Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 
2004, at A1. 
 332. See Addicott & Hudson, supra note 245, at 154 (“[T]he American military has an incredible 
reservoir of noble and fantastic figures to draw from—men whose military proficiency and ethical 
conduct in combat have maintained an impeccable American reputation for both battlefield excellence 
and strict adherence to the laws regulating warfare.”); Osiel, supra note 291, at 955–56 (describing the 
military’s efforts to instill an ethos of honor and dignity in its soldiers); see also David L. Englin, 
Troop Movement, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 18, 2004, available at http://www.tnr.com/ 
doc.mhtml?i=express&s=englin081804 (last visited Dec. 12, 2004) (describing how the U.S. military’s 
“[m]andatory briefings, military public service announcements, and admonishments from commanders 
and teachers [serve] constantly [to] remind [soldiers and their families] that they are ambassadors of all 
things American”). 
 333. Craig S. Smith, The Intimidating Face of America, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at A4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/6
p1001 Michaels book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY 1097 
 
 
 
 
 
 
orders), were court-martialed.334 Situating soldiers in a storied tradition of 
honor may not eradicate all instances of criminal or excessively brutal 
behavior, but that educational process may inform the soldiers of the 
institutional condemnation that will be affixed to any such 
transgressions.335 It should not therefore be surprising that privateers, 
though hardly alone, were nevertheless at the center of the Abu Ghraib 
scandal in Iraq—involving the brutal torturing of Iraqi civilian prisoners—
not just as participants, but as supervisors.336 Whereas courts-martial 
quickly followed for the U.S. soldiers involved,337 thus signaling (albeit 
belatedly) the government’s intolerance toward such behavior,338 it was 
reported that even after the news of the scandal broke and courts-martial 
 334. See WALTER E. BOOMER ET AL., FACING MY LAI: MOVING BEYOND THE MASSACRE 153 
(David L. Anderson ed., 1998) (describing the U.S. military’s use of moral teachings gleaned from 
failures in Vietnam); Addicott & Hudson, supra note 245, at 154. 
[T]he United States military can take full credit for its commendable record in adhering to the 
law of war largely because of its commitment to institutionalizing the lessons learned from 
My Lai. Accordingly, every American soldier must understand the significance of the My Lai 
massacre and steadfastly must keep it in the forefront of his or her conscious. 
Id. at 160–61 (describing the government’s attempt to punish such transgressions by way of military 
investigations and courts-martial); McCaffrey, supra note 318, at 232 (emphasizing the important 
lessons inculcated in soldiers to prevent any reoccurrences of human rights violations such as occurred 
in My Lai); Steve Sheppard, Passion and Nation: War, Crime, and Guilt in the Individual and 
Collective, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 779 (2003) (noting that “the only saving grace from this 
sordid passage [in My Lai] is that the U.S. military . . . established training regimes to enhance 
compliance with the laws of land warfare”); see also Colin Powell, The Day We Stopped the War, 
NEWSWEEK, Jan 20, 1992, at 18 (suggesting that it would be “un-American and unchivalrous” to 
attack retreating Iraqis during the first Gulf War).  
 335. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Editorial, Beyond the Law: The Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners by US 
Personnel Shows that Outsourcing Military Jobs Has Gone Too Far, GUARDIAN (London), May 3, 
2004, at 16 (“We’re appalled [by the prison abuse scandals]. These are our fellow soldiers . . . they 
wear the same uniform as us . . . these acts may reflect the actions of individuals but, by God, it 
doesn’t reflect my army.”) (quoting Brigadier General Mark Kimmit); see also Addicott & Hudson, 
supra note 245, at 180 (noting that “civilized societies will not provide the necessary homefront 
support for an army that it perceives to be acting in violation of the law of war”); Cox, supra note 298, 
at 10–11 (noting that during World War II, over two million courts-martial were commenced, 
indicating the importance of the UCMJ in regulating military behavioral patterns). 
 336. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 337. See, e.g., Tom Bowman, Soldier Guilty in Iraq Abuses, BALT. SUN, Oct. 21, 2004, at 1A; 
Dexter Filkins, G.I. Pleads Guilty in Court-Martial for Iraqis’ Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2004, at 
A1; Thom Shanker & Dexter Filkins, Army Punishes 7 with Reprimands for Prison Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A1; Jackie Spinner, MP Gets 8 Years for Iraq Abuse, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 
2004, at A20; see also Hendren & Mazzetti, supra note 22 (noting the ease with which soldiers can be 
punished relative to contractors).  
 338. See Fay Report, supra note 107; Schlesinger Report, supra note 108; Taguba Report, supra 
note 106; see also Ann Scott Tyson, US Military in Afghanistan Overhauls Prison Procedures, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 23, 2004, at 7 (noting the number of official reports generated and 
suggesting that the “commanders’ willingness to exercise their prerogative to undertake investigations 
demonstrates how seriously they take any hint of wrongdoing”). 
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were being convened, the contractors were still on the job,339 just as was 
the case with those DynCorp employees who ran a sex-slave operation in 
Bosnia.340 In the wake of that travesty in the Balkans, the only 
prophylactic measure taken by the company was to insist that each 
employee sign a statement saying she understands “human trafficking and 
prostitution are ‘immoral, unethical, and strongly prohibited.’”341 Recall, 
too, that DynCorp summarily fired rather than rewarded the whistleblower 
in that case.342 Since misdeeds like what happened at Abu Ghraib redound 
through the regular ranks of the military and lead to disillusionment and 
demoralization,343 the government, at least by staging investigations and 
courts-martial, can at least try to embrace a zero-tolerance policy and hope 
to rebuild confidence among the rank and file and offer credible 
reassurances to Iraqis and the global community that such behavior is not 
condoned.344  
c. Perverse Incentives To Prolong/Expand War 
An additional harm, which I discuss even though it may seem to be 
simply a conventional accountability concern, is the possibility that the 
incentive differential between soldiers and contractors could lead to 
 339. See Editorial, Abuse by Outsourcing, WASH. POST, May 26, 2004, at A26 (noting how much 
quicker the Pentagon could act to prosecute the accused soldiers at Abu Ghraib than it could work to 
dismiss the private contractors); Avant, supra note 109; Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contract 
Workers Implicated in February Army Report on Prison Abuse Remain on the Job, N.Y. TIMES, May 
4, 2004, at A6; Farah Stockman, Civilians ID’d in Abuse May Face No Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May, 4, 2004, at A1; see also Adam Liptak, Who Would Try Civilians From U.S.? No One in Iraq, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at A11 (characterizing how difficult it would be to prosecute civilian 
contractors for even the most flagrant of violations overseas). 
 340. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 341. Singer, supra note 83, at 538; see also Crewdson, supra note 83. 
 342. See supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
 343. See, e.g., Addicott & Hudson, supra note 245, at 180–81 (characterizing how easily a few 
transgressions threaten the confidence and assuredness of the entire military forces); see also Sherri 
Day, Near Reservists’ Base, Disappointment at Accusations of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2004, at 
A11. 
 344. See Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Restoring Our Honor, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A35 
(noting that the Bush administration must take decisive steps to regain the trust and confidence of the 
world community); Paul Krugman, Editorial, America’s Lost Respect, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2004, at 
A27 (“[B]oth the revelations and the cover-up [in Abu Ghraib] did terrible damage to America’s . . . 
authority. To much of the world, America looks like a place where top officials condone and possibly 
order the torture of innocent people, and suffer no consequences.”); Editorial, The Roots of Abu 
Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2004, at A22 (blaming civilian leaders in Washington for the prisoner-
abuse scandal); Thom Shanker, At Iraqi Prison, Rumsfeld Vows To Punish Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 
14, 2004, at A1; cf. Dao, supra note 317 (characterizing the court-martial of a soldier allegedly ordered 
to commandeer a car as designed to “send[] a message to both American troops and Iraqi authorities 
that [the military] will not tolerate soldiers who violate the rights of Iraqi civilians”). 
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mission distortions. Such an incentive differential (and the corresponding 
threat of policy distortions) is common, of course, in any number of other 
policy domains in which privatization has been introduced.345 Money after 
all is the reason contractors show up, and monetary considerations may 
skew the aims of the mission.346 Whereas presumably many regular 
soldiers would gladly forgo their “danger pay” to be stateside with their 
families and out of harm’s way, contractors’ livelihoods depend on the 
continuation—if not exacerbation—of conflict. Indeed, it is reported that 
military contractors have referred to the current administration’s reliance 
on military outsourcing as the “Iraq Gold Mine”347 and have likewise 
mused (quite presciently) that the fallout from September 11 would prove 
to be a privateer’s windfall.348  
Outfits paid a per diem may prefer to prolong the engagement, perhaps 
not working as swiftly or efficiently as they otherwise should.349 There 
have, for instance, been allegations that Halliburton has run additional but 
 345. Although the tangible harms may manifest themselves in ways similar to what we expect 
(and observe) in more conventional privatization realms, underlying those harms in the military 
context are deeper, structural concerns that are qualitatively unlike those found in domestic domains. 
Again, this point turns on an appreciation of the constitutional distinctiveness of the military 
community—and of how the legitimacy of the military in good part depends on its unique status in the 
larger American legal and social order. Accordingly, whereas profit motives may equally distort the 
incentives of private sanitation workers as well as military privateers, only in the latter case do those 
distortions threaten to undermine the entire architecture of civil-military relations. 
 346. Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess., 
Agenda Item 9, at 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/23 (1994) (noting that financial considerations may 
motivate paid combatants to prolong the war); Paul W. Mourning, Leashing the Dogs of War: 
Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 589 (1982); Sapone, supra 
note 50, at 4 (“[B]ecause the business of mercenaries is war, they have no incentive to encourage the 
peaceful resolution of the conflict.”). 
 347. See The Baghdad Boom, supra note 103 (describing the upsurge in demand for privatized 
military services since the outbreak of conflict in Iraq); Singer, supra note 28. 
 348. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 232 (noting how privateers have viewed the events of 
September 11 as both increasing demand for their services and increasing the public’s willingness to 
accept contractors undertaking national security responsibilities). 
 349. See id. at 157 (noting how contractors tasked with clearing minefields are likely to ignore 
rural roads that involve greater danger, expense, and effort); Grant, supra note 328 (suggesting that 
military privatization has a corrupting effect on the U.S. military and creates a dispirited army). 
Moreover, as Professor Howe describes, soldier-of-fortune “[p]ilots for Nigeria during the Civil War 
(1967–1970) deliberately failed to bomb Biafra’s single airport: since their salaries were based on 
months and not results, their prolongation of the war procured financial gain.” Howe, supra note 44, at 
4. Of course, this moral hazard exists in any contractual relationship—but usually does not take on a 
life-and-death gravity.  
 There also may be an impulse toward self-preservation at play: in the late 1990s, when the 
Ethiopians hired a Russian firm to conduct aerial offensives in its war with Eritrea, the fighters would 
bomb civilian targets, but would studiously avoid engaging the Eritrean air force in combat. See 
SINGER, supra note 20, at 158.  
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unnecessary supply convoys through Iraq because it gets paid by the 
trip.350 If true, this wasteful practice not only endangers the lives of 
Halliburton employees, but also U.S. troops, who may be dragged into the 
fray were an insurgent attack to occur. Hence, just as in other privatization 
contexts where monitoring is difficult or costly, private military 
contractors may deliberately take longer, say, to train and certify the 
competency of a domestic police force; or they may slow down their rate 
of coca-burning work to get paid for a few extra days or weeks.351 
Alternatively, instead of sitting on their hands, they may have the 
converse—but no more acceptable—agenda: to be as destructive as 
possible. In this scenario, there may be an impulse to level rather than 
preserve since oftentimes it is the same (or related) firms providing 
security services in a zone of conflict that are also key players in physical 
reconstruction.352 A particularly devastated area may create the need for a 
government to issue contracts for road-building, public works projects, 
and security-training. As Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, a high-ranking 
official with the United Nations, has noted:  
Once a greater degree of security has been attained, the firm 
apparently begins to exploit the concessions it has received by 
setting up a number of associates and affiliates which engage in 
such varying activities as air transport, road building, and import 
and export, thereby acquiring a significant, if not hegemonic, 
presence in the economic life of the country in which it is 
operating.353
Again, this is not to say perverse incentives are unique to a military-
contracting context. But because flying surveillance missions, destroying 
coca-fields, and providing security details abroad are not linear tasks that 
lend themselves to precise contractual regimentation and oversight, the 
agreements between the government and the firms must necessarily be 
somewhat open-ended;354 recognizing the uncertainties of dangerous 
assignments and crediting the service providers with the ability to adapt 
 350. See Cooper, supra note 22. 
 351. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 151–57 (describing how particularly difficult it is to monitor 
contracts when the assignments are complex and standards of performance are not easily designed). 
 352. See id. at 158 (noting that a client’s interests may be subordinated when the private firm has 
some commercial incentive to create more work for itself or for an affiliated private firm). 
 353. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, UN Press Release 5 Nov. 1996, U.N. Doc. GA/SHC/3376 
(1996); see also G.A. Res. 47/84 U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 84, at 165, U.N. Doc. A/47/84 
(1992).  
 354. Blum, supra note 309 (characterizing proposals to make military contracting more open-
ended by giving military commanders authority to change the terms of a military contract).  
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and change course when exigencies require doing so leaves the 
government vulnerable to more than economic abuses of the contractual 
relationship. (Among such non-economic concerns would be (1) the 
erosion of confidence among regular, U.S. soldiers, who do not trust the 
motives or reliability of self-interested contractors,355 and (2) extra 
violence, if it is profitable but otherwise unnecessary to be more violent.)  
B. Debunking the Normative Iconography of the Citizen-Soldier 
The introduction of private contractors—and their attempted 
integration into the American fighting forces—may also create a gap, a 
breach in America’s storied civic republican narrative such that now, 
perhaps, military service to the State will be even more disassociated with 
notions of citizenship than it already has begun to be in this era of an all-
volunteer military; indeed, taking up arms will be viewed even more 
widely as yet another commercial relationship, not totally unlike catering 
or maintaining public grounds.356  
Historically, Americans have looked to the moral authority of their 
country’s foreign policy and based it, on no small part, on the willingness 
of its citizens to put down their ploughshares and fight (and die) for a 
cause. To disaggregate that connection and commodify the role of a 
soldier as for-profit contractor may further separate the bounty of 
citizenship from the obligations that membership entails. That is, at a time 
when that connection is already tenuous—due in part to the replacement of 
a universally conscripted military with one comprised of volunteers—
further disassociation through the practice of contracting out may prove 
quite disruptive. 
1. First Among Equals: Traditional Laurels for Citizen-Soldiers 
Many believe that military service is inextricably linked to citizenship, 
and vice versa.357 Accordingly, although this nation’s conception of 
 355. See SAVAS, supra note 3 (suggesting that the more difficult a task is to define clearly and 
authoritatively, the more difficult it will be for there to be effective oversight); Trebilcock & 
Iacobucci, supra note 8, at 1444–45 (indicating that it is very difficult to design contracts that 
effectively constrain contractors’ behavior when the assignments call for a broad delegation of 
responsibilities). 
 356. See Freeman, supra note 6, at 161. 
 357. See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 367 (1918) (“[T]he very conception of a 
just government and its duty to the citizen includes the duty of the citizen to render military service in 
case of need and the right of the government to compel it.”); MORRIS JANOWITZ, MILITARY CONFLICT 
70–88 (1975) (characterizing military service as a constitutive right and duty of citizenship); Sebastian 
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service has changed over time, American soldiers and veterans have 
almost always enjoyed a preeminent status in our society. In a country of 
equals, founded on the rejection of titles, inherited or even merited,358 U.S. 
military officers are, perhaps uniquely, addressed by their command ranks 
long after their tenure in the military ends—a testament to their esteem in 
the eyes of the State and its citizenry as well as to the value of those titles 
above all others. True patriots from generals like Washington359 to grunts 
like Truman360 have taken up arms when their country has needed their 
service. And, like the ancient Cincinnatus, they returned home to civilian 
life when the fighting was done.361 This restraint, this willingness (if not 
eagerness) to beat their swords back into ploughshares and resume the 
business of ordinary living, has marked the American military as 
exceptional and amateurish in the noblest sense of that latter term.362  
Thus, in many circles, to be an American citizen is to be an American 
solider.363 Anything short of that demonstrated commitment to the safety 
De Grazia, Political Equality and Military Participation, 7 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 181, 185 (1981) 
(“The possessor of equal political rights, . . . the citizen, was in origin a soldier. . . .”); Karst, supra 
note 286, at 501 (noting the special, privileged place the Armed Forces occupy in the United States); 
Linda K. Kerber, “A Constitutional Right To Be Treated Like . . . Ladies”: Women, Civic Obligation 
and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 95, 119 (noting the ancient connection 
between arms-bearing military service and citizenship). 
 358. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And 
no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, accept of any . . . Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign 
State.”). 
 359. As Gordon Wood notes:  
George Washington, of course, was the perfect Cincinnatus, the Roman patriot who returned 
to his farm after his victories in war. . . . The greatest act of [Washington’s] life, the one that 
gave him the greatest fame, was his resignation as commander in chief of the American 
forces. . . . Washington stunned the world when he surrendered his sword to the Congress on 
December 23, 1783, and retired to his farm at Mount Vernon.  
GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 205 (1991). 
 360. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 27, at 102–04, 142–43. 
 361. See John Withrop Hackett, The Military in the Service of the State, in WAR, MORALITY, AND 
THE MILITARY PROFESSION 107, 110 (Malham W. Wakin ed., 1979) (noting the ethos within 
democratic nations that the military exists to serve the state rather than for any other self-aggrandizing 
purpose); Clark, supra note 45 (describing the American military across generations as a citizen army 
that achieved victory and then “wanted to go home”).  
 362. Indeed, unlike elsewhere across Europe as well as across the developing world, American 
soldiers have not used their military resources and popular appeal to seize control over the political 
institutions of government and stage a coup. 
 363. See, e.g., LINDA KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 236 (1998) (citing the 
toast proposed by John Jay’s wife, Sarah: “May all our Citizens be Soldiers, and all our Soldiers 
Citizens.”); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 544 (1975) (describing the American tradition of intimately 
connecting citizenship and military service); see also Philip Gold & Erin Solaro, Editorial, PMCs in 
the Arsenal, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2003, at A14 (noting strong historical link between citizenship and 
participation in the national defense). 
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and security of the Republic relegates one to a lower rung of society,364 
especially if one is an able-bodied male who intentionally avoided military 
service.365 Among other reasons, it is the reality of this socio-political 
hierarchy in America that makes the Pentagon’s refusal to permit gays into 
the military and to permit women into combat (not to mention a bitter 
history of discrimination against blacks) particularly painful and 
debilitating to those excluded.366  
I do not want to overstate this point as “soldier-worship,” especially in 
the post-Vietnam climate, when military service has lost some of its 
imperative and much of its status as an intuitive obligation of 
citizenship.367 But, throughout the longer history of this country (and 
perhaps increasingly again today368), it is undeniable that the military 
“man”—be he a patriot-planter of the Eighteenth Century, a universal 
 364. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 194 (1963) (citing 
Theodore Roosevelt as suggesting the “good American” would possess the hardy virtues of a soldier: 
“the virile fighting qualities without which no nation . . . can ever amount to anything”); id. at 195–96 
(indicating the principal demonstration of patriotism and heroism is through military service); 
KERBER, supra note 363. 
 365. See Dan Balz, Citing His Vietnam Service, Kerry Assails Cheney, Rove, WASH. POST, Apr. 
17, 2004, at A4; Adam Nagourney & Jodi Wilgoren, Kerry Questions Bush Attendance in Guard in 
70’s, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at A3; Katharine Q. Seelye, Cheney’s Five Draft Deferments During 
the Vietnam Era Emerge as a Campaign Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at A1; see also Michael 
Duffy, How Well Did He Serve?, TIME, Feb. 23, 2004, at 22 (describing the potential importance of 
President George W. Bush’s military record in his reelection bid). 
 366. KERBER, supra note 363 (describing how women’s lack of military experience disadvantages 
them in the workforce and more dramatically in their quests for elected office); William N. Eskridge, 
Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and Rights of Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1744 
(2001) (“[L]ike prior exclusions [by the U.S. Armed Forces] of women and people of color, the 
exclusion of GLB people in effect disrespects them as second-class citizens. All citizens should be 
able and obliged to serve and help defend this country.”); Karst, supra note 286, at 500, 516–18, 525, 
545–49 (noting the larger symbolic effects of excluding women, minorities, and homosexuals from full 
participation in the U.S. military); Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on 
Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 175, 190 (1982) (noting how not giving 
women opportunities to be drafted and to serve in combat details deprives them of taking part in some 
of the principal responsibilities of citizenship); see also Mimi Kelber, Combat in the Erroneous Zone, 
NATION, July 25–Aug. 1, 1981, at 71 (describing a NOW legal brief that detailed how women’s 
exclusion from the draft and combat duty “injures their self-perception, reinforces the stereotypes of 
women as weak” and also noting how failing to serve in the military diminishes women’s social and 
economic standing in the United States).  
 367. See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 184, at 365–66 (noting that since Congress ended the draft, 
service is no longer considered to be a near-universal obligation); Mazur, supra note 307, at 606; Eliot 
A. Cohen, After the Battle: A Defense Primer for the Next Century, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1991, at 19; 
see also Charles Moskos, From Citizens’ Army to Social Laboratory, WILSON Q., Winter 1993, at 83, 
86–87 (insisting that military service is no longer a rite of passage for American politicians). 
 368. See, e.g., Mazur, supra note 307, at 569 (suggesting that as the military shifts toward being 
an all-volunteer outfit, Americans’ admiration for it may actually grow); Pamela Paul, Attitudes 
Toward the Military, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Feb. 2002, LEXIS, News & Business, News; Robin Toner, 
Trust in the Military Heightens Among Baby Boomers’ Children, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2003, at A1 
(noting Americans’ close symbolic and emotional connection to the military). 
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conscriptee in World War II or Korea, a draftee in Vietnam, or a volunteer 
from today—has been treated as a paragon of civic virtue for dutifully 
embracing this gravest of responsibilities of citizenship.369 For their 
patriotism and sacrifices, they have been duly rewarded, not through the 
currency of the marketplace, but rather through the currency of the polis. 
Hence, in addition to the honorific awards associated with rank and 
merit,370 military service has also been directly rewarded with the 
wholesale expansion of the franchise, the furthering of civil rights, and the 
development of a welfare system that in part predates and in some 
instances has even outclassed that afforded to America’s widows and 
children.371  
In the Founding years of the Republic, it was non-property holding 
veterans of the War of Independence who sought and were given the 
franchise372—well before the Jacksonian Revolution ushered in an era of 
universal (white) manhood suffrage;373 it was black soldiers’ service in the 
 369. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 20, at 204. Singer writes: 
In the United States, the military is the most respected government institution in the American 
public’s judgment, consistently ranking among the highest esteemed professions. This stems 
from the perceived integrity and values of the soldiers within it and the spirit of selfless 
service embedded in their duty on behalf of the country. 
Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Gallup Organization, Military on Top, HMOs Last in Public 
Confidence Poll (July 14, 1999), available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990714.asp (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2004); Dunlap, supra note 184, at 354 (quoting a Harris poll spokesperson reporting in 
1993 that “no other major institution, profession, or interest group comes close to the military” in 
terms of public approval ratings); Dunlap, supra note 146, at 101 (“To Americans, those wearing 
uniforms collectively are the most trusted part of the citizenry well ahead of organized religion, 
universities, and every branch of government.”); Mazur, supra note 307, at 569 (describing how 
Americans “romanticize and idealize the military” and reserve a “special pedestal for those who serve 
in uniform”); Marano, supra note 320 (describing the unsung heroism of military cooks during the 
Vietnam War as something unique to the Armed Forces); Steven V. Roberts & Bruce Auster, Colin 
Powell, Superstar, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 20, 1993, at 48 (“[A]t a time when a growing 
number of Americans are disillusioned with government . . . the military stands in singular 
counterpoint to that disillusionment.”).  
 370. See, e.g., PETER KARSTEN, THE NAVAL ARISTOCRACY: THE GOLDEN AGE OF ANNAPOLIS 
AND THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN AMERICAN NAVALISM 64–68 (1972); CHRISTOPER MCKEE, A 
GENTLEMANLY AND HONORABLE PROFESSION: THE CREATION OF THE U.S. NAVAL OFFICER CORPS, 
1794–1815, at 296 (1991); Nicholas Parrillo, Deprivatization of American Warfare (June 2004) 
(working draft, Yale University) (on file with author).  
 371. For an examination of the connections between military service and civil rights, see MARY L. 
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS (2000); PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE 
UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999). For an 
examination of political rights, see KERBER, supra note 363. And, for an examination of economic 
rights, see THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS (1992).  
 372. See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 285, at 14, 46, 342–43; Karlan, supra note 282, at 1346–48; 
Scarry, supra note 267, at 1304. 
 373. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 75 (1991); KEYSSAR, supra note 285, at 32–52; 
CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO DEMOCRACY 190 (1960).  
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Civil War that, at least in part, paved the way for many of the rights 
associated with Reconstruction;374 and it was the battlefield contributions 
of the great-grandchildren of these freemen soldiers, again, in the Second 
World War, Korea, and Vietnam that helped spark and sustain the Civil 
Rights Movement.375 Moreover, despite generally lagging behind men in 
the achievement of political rights, a lag attributable to some extent to 
their lack of military service,376 it was women’s participation and 
sacrifices as part of the war effort in World War I that helped solidify 
support for female voting during critical stages of the suffrage 
movement.377 And, importantly from the social-citizenship perspective,378 
the range of public-benefits programs created for servicemen and their 
 374. As W.E.B. Dubois said: “Nothing else made Negro citizenship conceivable, but the record of 
the Negro soldier as a fighter.” W.E.B. DUBOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 104 (1935). 
As Linda Kerber has stated:  
The Emancipation Proclamation itself merged emancipation and arms-bearing, welcoming 
into the armed service of the United States the people whom Lincoln declared free. For 
enslaved blacks, arms-bearing for the Union was an experience that came before citizenship 
and helped to set the terms for it. Black men risked their lives for the Union long before the 
Thirteenth Amendment, and the claim that they had bought their rights with their blood 
suffused constitutional debate and also the discourse of Reconstruction. 
KERBER, supra note 363, at 243; see also KEYSSAR, supra note 285, at 88 (“General William 
Tecumseh Sherman himself noted, ‘when the fight is over, the hand that drops the musket cannot be 
denied the ballot.’”); Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 932 (1998) (“[B]lacks as individuals had earned the right to vote by their 
participation in Union armies during the war. No country with integrity could accept a person's service 
in arms to save the nation and then repudiate that same individual by denying him the right to vote.”); 
Karst, supra note 286, at 513 (“The moment was ripe for a triumphant ending in which the wartime 
sacrifices of black men vindicated the claims of black people to full citizenship. . . . After the war three 
constitutional amendments and a package of Reconstruction civil rights acts not only abolished 
slavery, but promised black Americans equal citizenship, including the equal right to vote.”). 
 375. DUDZIAK, supra note 371, at 9–10, 87–88 (describing how the moral messages associated 
with fighting for the freedom of other peoples and the exemplary service of black soldiers pushed the 
Civil Rights Movement forward); Karlan, supra note 285; Karst, supra note 286, at 502 (“The issue of 
full citizenship for black people was never far below the surface of the question of black participation 
in the Army and the militia.”); id. at 518–20 (describing civil rights advancements linked to 
participation in World War II and the Korean War). 
 376. KERBER, supra note 363, at 221 (describing how the political laurels of military service fell 
disproportionately on men and noting how even when women volunteered to serve, their participation 
was understood outside the bounds of the normal civic republican narrative).  
 377. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 374, at 963 (characterizing President Wilson’s support for 
the Nineteenth Amendment as grounded in part in his appreciation of women’s service during World 
War I); Karlan, supra note 282; see also KERBER, supra note 363 (describing the legal battles fought 
by Helen Feeney to be treated on the same footing for employment opportunities as those who served 
their country in the Armed Services).  
 378. See, e.g., T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950); William E. Forbath, 
Constitutional Welfare Rights, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821 (2001); Charles A. Reich, The New 
Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Jon D. Michaels, Note, To Promote the General Welfare: The 
Republican Imperative To Enhance Citizenship Welfare Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457, 1485 (2002).  
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families have often been more comprehensive and popularly supported 
than those designed to aid the country’s poor and infirm.379  
These servicemen have also been feted and elevated to the highest 
ranks of political prestige: on the hustings, a congressional medal of 
honor, a purple heart, or even an officer’s title often trumps the biggest 
campaign war chest.380 Being a war hero is not just a proxy for possessing 
acuity in foreign policy and national defense, but it also is a marker of 
unparalleled service and self-sacrifice. As Professor Ross Baker has noted, 
“It’s the aura of heroism, the idea that this is someone who is prepared to 
sacrifice, someone who has demonstrated bravery . . . [t]hose are qualities 
 379. During World War II, Congress passed the G.I. Bill and rewarded veterans with pensions, 
housing and education subsidies, as well as health-care benefits. See, e.g., Servicemen’s Readjustment 
Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944) (providing education stipends, favorable loans for 
home and business purchases, and generous unemployment benefits). And prior to that, Civil War 
veterans were offered “an entire edifice of honorable income supplements and institutional 
provision[s].” SKOCPOL, supra note 371, at 7. Indeed, even the National School Lunch Program—and 
improving the nutrition of low-income families more generally—was championed by General 
Hershey, who was the director of the Selective Service during World War II, to help soldiers. See 
Susan Lynn Roberts, Note, School Food: Does the Future Call for New Food Policy or Can the Old 
Still Hold True?, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 587, 593–94 (2002) (noting that America’s war efforts were 
severely hampered by high rates of malnutrition among entering conscriptees). But see Stephen Barr, 
Advocates for Activated Guards, Reserve Troops Renewing Calls for Pay Relief, WASH. POST, Nov. 
11, 2004, at B2; Barbara Ehrenreich, Bush’s Odd Warfare State, PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 2004, at 24 
(noting that many soldiers require food stamp supplements to make ends meet and indicating that 
President Bush had suggested the possibility that he would propose cutting soldiers’ combat pay); Ian 
Williams, Bush’s War Against the Military, IN THESE TIMES, Nov. 15, 2004, at 22 (noting the 
Administration’s recent cutbacks in disability benefits and pensions for veterans). 
 380. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 119, at 111–12 (describing Senator Bob Kerrey in 1992 as an 
ideal presidential candidate because of his war record, which included a Congressional Medal of 
Honor); JAMES M. PERRY, TOUCHED WITH FIRE: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE CIVIL WAR BATTLES 
THAT MADE THEM (2003); John Wheller, Coming to Grips with Vietnam, FOREIGN AFF., Spring 1985, 
at 74 (noting how important military service in Vietnam has been to office-seekers despite the fact that 
the Vietnam War remains politically divisive and unpopular); Frank Bruni, There’s Something About a 
Candidate in Uniform, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at D3; James Carney, Playing the POW Card, 
TIME, Sept. 6, 1999, at 44; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A War Is Nice on the Resume, But It May Not Get You 
the Job, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2003, at D3; see also The Search for the Perfect President, ECONOMIST 
[H.W.], Nov. 18, 1995, at 93. The Economist writes:  
In all, seven generals have reached the White House. At least ten have been declared papabile 
by the population at large. A raft of presidents, besides, have used a stint of soldiering to 
burnish their resumes. Teddy Roosevelt’s jungle-hopping imperialism was much enhanced by 
his earlier adventures with the Rough Riders and his charge up San Juan Hill. George [H.W.] 
Bush derived what profit he could from being the youngest American pilot on second-world-
war service in the Pacific. Bob Dole’s withered arm, shot up in Italy, is his most reliable 
campaign credential. The reason is clear. Soldiers do difficult things despite appalling danger; 
they, above all others, should be able to cut through the tape of bureaucracy and take faint-
hearted nations by the scruff of the neck. When they are heroes, they are charismatic to the 
level of film stars. 
Id. 
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that are esteemed by Americans, and these qualities can be transferred to 
politics.”381
In short, the normative treatment of the soldier is as a public figure and 
hero. Victorious or slain, he (and increasingly she, too) is one of our 
“boys” (or “girls”) in the field.382 The military of today may no longer be 
comprised of citizen-militias, but the resonance of its members’ public 
service cannot be ignored.383 Empirically speaking, it is of course still 
unclear how privateers will affect this conception of citizen-soldiers; but 
one might presume, as a starting point, that profit-seeking contractors 
would diminish the normative standing of soldiers in general. 
2. The Marketplace Debases the Polis  
We do know (or rather, we think we know) this: Contractors are not per 
se battling for their country and their countrymen. They are not fighting to 
defend some ideal, vindicate some set of rights, or achieve national honor. 
As mentioned earlier, they are not even looking to lay down their weapons 
and go home.384 Instead, when objectives are achieved, privateers almost 
by definition look forward to the next lucrative engagement.385 Hence, to 
 381. Stolberg, supra note 380; see also Kaplan, supra note 293 (noting the importance politicians 
place on securing the endorsement of retired military leaders). 
 382. See Adams, supra note 325 (“A military force that is drawn from the people of a given nation 
and dedicated only to the defense of that nation is seen as an expression of the consent of the 
governed. They legitimize their government by their desire to defend it.”); Karst, supra note 286, at 
501 (“Our popular culture repeatedly confirms our attachment to this democratic, unifying ideal [of the 
U.S. military]. Consider the typical war movie, in which the soldiers’ faces tacitly represent our ethnic 
diversity, and the roll call reminds us more explicitly that our many cultures add up to one nation: 
Abrams, Anderson, Arenella, Crenshaw, Dukeminier, García, Graham, Matsuda, Munzer, Warren.”); 
Paul, supra note 368; Toner, supra note 368; World News Tonight with Peter Jennings (ABC News 
television broadcast, Apr. 30, 2004) (quoting a spokesperson for the Veterans of Foreign Wars as 
saying that “[w]e need to memorize those faces [of the killed soldiers], know their names . . . America 
should get down on their hands and knees and give thanks for them.”). 
 383. See Rosky, supra note 6, at 922–23 (emphasizing the salience of symbols and rituals within 
citizen-military culture); Clark, supra note 45 (capturing the moral symbolism of America’s all-
volunteer army as “citizens first, soldiers second”); Michael J. Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The 
Moral Limits of Markets, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 112–14 (1998), available 
at www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/sandel00.pdf (last visited June 27, 2004) (contending that 
there are great civic virtues in citizen armies that cannot be replicated when armies become for-hire 
institutions).  
 384. See Dunlap, supra note 146, at 100 (“[T]he persisting ideal of the American-at-arms is the 
altruistic yeoman farmer who lays down his plow to take up arms for the duration, always nevertheless 
intending to return to the responsibilities of family and farm at the very first opportunity. It would be a 
great mistake to underestimate how deeply embedded this archetype still remains in American 
culture.”) (emphasis added). 
 385. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 216 (noting that private soldiers “directly benefit from the 
existence of war and suffering; it is a precursor to their hire”). Of course, this is a difficult proposition 
because one would suspect that many American privateers would identify themselves as patriots of the 
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transform and possibly dilute386 the public service of national defense by 
introducing profit-motivated contractors may very well debase and 
commodify what has been the highest civic calling this or any other 
republic has known.387  
Whether it actually does so or not, privatization appears to weaken this 
connection between soldier and citizen—a connection that might, as 
suggested above, already be tenuous in a military era characterized by an 
all-volunteer fighting force, which includes many who enlist, at least in 
part, for financial reasons. Simply stated, the outbreak of war constitutes 
an economic windfall for contractors. With this profit-motive comes a 
perversion: As Colonel Thomas Dempsey has put it, when an American 
soldier kills, it is “‘because [his] president told [him] to’. . . . If a 
contractor shoots someone, it’s for another reason: ‘to get paid.’”388 This 
distinction, though perhaps overstated here, may not be lost on the 
American people, especially given the tenor of the news coming out of 
Iraq in 2004. During the same week that Pat Tillman, a former NFL 
standout died in Afghanistan,389 news broke of the central role privateers 
first order, and who signed up with DynCorp or Blackwater to get another chance to see combat duty. 
The differences between soldiers and contractors, then, may be largely perceptual: We can, after all, 
imagine some contractors being infinitely more “gung-ho” about an additional tour of duty than 
members of the volunteer Army—ostensibly the epitome of the patriot-citizen—who may be second-
guessing their decision to sign up for military service mainly to get the government to pay for their 
schooling.  
 386. To an extent, we can draw a parallel between the idealization of the citizen-soldier and the 
family farmer. Like the soldier who protects both our ideals and physical security, the farmer feeds our 
people and nourishes our psychic connections to our agrarian, Jeffersonian roots. The farmer too, is 
often given special and preferential economic and political treatment. The decline of the family farmer, 
and his replacement by commercial, corporate agro-businesses, such as Archer Daniels Midland, is 
greeted with a similar sense of frustration and a felt loss of something that had previously been more 
pure. Cf. Jedediah Purdy, The New Culture of Rural America, AM. PROSPECT, Dec. 20, 1999, at 26; 
George Scialabba, How the Other Half Votes, NATION, June 14, 2004, at 50; Joseph Weber, Will 
Agribusiness Plow Under the Family Farm?, BUS. WK., Oct. 23, 2000, at 50.  
 387. See RICHARD GABRIEL, TO SERVE WITH HONOR: A TREATISE ON MILITARY ETHICS AND THE 
WAY OF THE SOLDIER 58 (1982) (noting that “[t]he military’s loss of some of its traditional values and 
their replacement with the values of the economic marketplace can lead to the abandonment of ethical 
precepts . . . to the point that combat effectiveness itself is affected.”); Sapone, supra note 50, at 5–7 
(describing the inalienability and non-commodification of military power as exercised by the State and 
by actors serving the State); see also W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE CRISIS WRITINGS 259 (1972) (describing 
the preeminent obligation of blacks to serve in World War I even though many were not afforded the 
equal rights of American citizenship). 
 388. Pape & Meyer, supra note 2 (quoting Col. Thomas Dempsey); see also SINGER, supra note 
20, at 204 (“[A]rmed forces’ professionalism must not be associated with or compromised by 
commercial enterprise. To do so potentially endangers the fabric of community loyalty.”); Sapone, 
supra note 50, at 6–7 (comparing the military’s extensive connections to the national community 
against those of the private industry).  
 389. See, e.g., Dirk Johnson & Andrew Murr, A Heroic Life, NEWSWEEK, May 3, 2004, at 26 
(reporting on the heroism of slain soldier Pat Tillman); Bill Pennington, Ex-N.F.L. Player Is Killed in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/6
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had in abusing Iraqi prisoners. The contrast between an All-American 
gridiron hero who gave up millions of dollars and his prime years as a 
professional athlete to enlist in the Army and an unscrupulous contractor 
brutalizing Iraqi detainees could not be starker.  
The damage here could run beyond morale concerns just on the 
frontlines; Americans’ pride in their “boys and girls” may be dampened 
not just by the dismay felt at the appalling acts of brutality perpetrated 
under the American flag (by soldiers and contractors alike), but also by 
what they may view as the commodification of war, killing for money.390 
In large part, the laurels bestowed on soldiers are premised on their 
endangering their lives to promote an ideal, preserve justice, or introduce 
freedom.391 Even knowing that, for many, their service is economically 
driven, i.e., performed with an eye toward learning trade skills or seeking 
the military’s help to pay for further education, we still consider today’s 
soldiers to be citizen-patriots. But we do not as readily reconcile economic 
self-interest and public service when it comes to contractors.392 If soldiers 
serve as liberators while incurring great personal sacrifices, then they are 
heroic; if they instead do so for profit, then they might tarnish the entire 
enterprise.393 Moreover, if the country’s pride and respect for its military 
Combat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2004, at D1 (same); Gary Smith, Code of Honor, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, May 3, 2004, at 40 (same); Mike Wise & Josh White, Ex-N.F.L. Player Tillman Killed 
in Combat: Army Ranger Turned Down Millions To Serve His Country in Afghanistan, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 24, 2004, at A1.  
 390. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 226 (noting that with the increase in a private market for 
military services, perceptions about power belonging to the rich—rather than righteous—will 
multiply); Mourning, supra note 346; Chaffin, supra note 109 (acknowledging the possibility that 
private soldiers will perform certain acts that would not be asked of soldiers); Grant, supra note 328, at 
106 (opining that when retired soldiers sell their military skills in the marketplace, the entire 
profession loses the high moral ground). 
 391. See Addicott & Hudson, supra note 245, at 154 (highlighting the proud traditions of military 
service and military restraint that characterizes the U.S. Armed Forces and noting that the “military 
proficiency and ethical conduct in combat have . . . [earned American soldiers a] reputation for both 
battlefield excellence and strict adherence to the laws regulating warfare”); McCaffrey, supra note 
318, at 233–34 (describing honorable values of American soldiers to protect and promote human 
rights); Sheppard, supra note 334, at 777–78 (characterizing military traditions in America dating back 
to the Union Army as fighting to uphold and preserve dignity). But see SINGER, supra note 20, at 204 
(suggesting that the traditional ethos of the military as an honorable calling rather than just a job may 
be waning in the United States as soldiers increasingly view the military as a stepping stone for private 
sector opportunities). 
 392. See, e.g., Rosky, supra note 6, at 969 (“Sometimes, private purposes exist within a larger 
institutional framework of public purposes and public responsibility . . . . Our . . . soldiers are not 
drafted, and they do not work for free. They are a volunteer corps that applies to work and gets paid 
for it. Presumably, these payments introduce some private purposes into our public . . . armies. [But, 
a]s a society, however, we dismiss these [self-interested] purposes as culturally irrelevant.”). But see 
supra note 385.  
 393. See Grant, supra note 328, at 91 (“Ultimately, the privatization of US military services under 
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wanes, perhaps more than the stature of GIs will fade. Perhaps veterans’ 
benefits will be cut—justified by the somewhat cynical expectation that 
those who serve in the armed forces are likely to find gainful employment 
afterwards as military contractors (even if many veterans consider the idea 
of private combat anathema).394  
Thus, strangely, a public disillusioned by military privatization might 
end up forcing citizen-soldiers into post-military careers as privateers.395 
Even more significantly, American support for idealistic military 
endeavors, if those endeavors are perceived as being “corrupted” by the 
presence of profiteers, might similarly wane—and the notion of American 
intervention, humanitarian or otherwise, would then become less popular 
domestically as the public takes stock of who is fighting and for what 
reasons.396  
Or, returning to a point made earlier in this Article, a transition toward 
using greater numbers of private troops might engender the opposite 
result—more indifference to casualties and the lowering of the public’s 
apprehensions about waging war. If those fighting are not America’s boys 
and girls risking their lives to defend core interests of the State, but rather 
agents who voluntarily contract to perform explicitly dangerous missions, 
maybe the libertarianism of the market will outweigh the paternalism felt 
toward America’s soldiers and thus ultimately lower inhibitions against 
armed conflict.397 But in either case—if Americans are disillusioned with 
direct foreign contract corrupts our military both in the eyes of society and from within the ranks.”). 
 394. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 205 (“Those in service also fear that the military pension 
system might be called into question; profit is being incurred from the very same service for which the 
public is paying retired personnel back.”). 
 395. Already, even before the advent of military privatization, economic pressures to leave the 
military for the private sector were strong. The existence of lucrative contractor assignments may 
encourage qualified, dedicated soldiers to opt for life in the private military sector. If the best soldiers 
can make up to $250,000 a year as contractors, then they have strong financial incentives to leave the 
military—taking with them their expertise, commitment to service, and years of training. See, e.g., 
Barstow et al., supra note 4 (describing the concern that the ranks of Special Forces will be drained by 
the lure of private contracts); James Glanz, Modern Mercenaries on the Iraqi Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 4, 2004, at D5 (noting the comparative salary boost private military firms can offer members of 
the U.S. Armed Forces). 
 396. We have seen this happen at other moments in time, when faith in the military was low, and 
thus America retreated from an interventionist posture. Cf. Dunlap, supra note 184, at 349–51 
(describing deep disillusionment and anti-militarism in America in the wake of Vietnam); George C. 
Herring, America and Vietnam: The Unending War, FOREIGN AFF., Winter 1991, at 104 (emphasizing 
the “extent to which Vietnam continued to prey on the American psyche [for many] years after the fall 
of Saigon” and suggesting that only with the victory in the first Gulf War did the disillusionment that 
accompanied the morass of Vietnam begin to abate).  
 397. Cf. Richard A. Posner, An Army of the Willing, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 2003, at 27 
(highlighting the benefits of a market-based army system as opposed to one based on coercion and 
conscription). 
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military action as illegitimate or if they become desensitized to combat 
losses—privateers could tarnish the luster of American foreign policy and 
spark immoderate feelings that may not match the goals and values of 
balanced, reasoned foreign policy. Again, tighter regulations or other 
reforms aimed at curtailing contractor discretion and contractor 
mismanagement are not, by themselves, capable of addressing these broad 
symbolic and cultural incidents of military privatization.  
V. INTERNATIONAL LAW/DIPLOMACY HARMS 
Having canvassed the constitutional, legal, and democratic harms in 
Parts III and IV, I turn now to the international/diplomatic harms 
privatization may cause. These harms pose considerable consequences for 
American foreign policy, for American credibility abroad, and for the 
interests of containing the proliferation of even less well-regulated military 
profiteering practices around the world.  
A. Alienating Friends and Foes Alike  
Contracting out allows the U.S. government to purchase strategic 
outcomes at a much lower political cost than if the boys and girls of 
America’s volunteer army were dispatched. Indeed, an overseas 
engagement involving contractors might, accordingly, produce neither an 
official body count nor much political opposition.398 But, the security and 
flexibility the United States gains without expending domestic political 
capital and/or the lives of servicemen and women may, however, serve to 
validate the perception that the American agenda is driven by dollars 
rather than ideals; that decisions are made in private, smoke-filled 
backrooms rather than openly on the floors of Congress. It also invites 
concerns that the United States is represented in zones of hostilities by 
individuals who are not subject to the same standards of legal conduct and 
ethical restraint that this nation and the international community expects of 
the U.S. Armed Forces. 
1. Allies 
Among America’s allies, when the private cavalry is dispatched instead 
of the U.S. military, they may think that their particular crisis is outside of 
core American interests. This suspicion or sense of being slighted can 
 398. See supra notes 153–57. 
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breed resentment and a weakening of ties, a response not altogether lost on 
American leaders. Congressmen Tom Lantos and Henry Hyde had this 
precise concern in mind when they questioned the wisdom of contracting 
out President Karzai’s security detail. In a joint statement, they noted: 
“[T]he presence of commercial vendors [protecting Karzai] would send a 
message to the Afghan people and to President Karzai’s adversaries that 
we are not serious enough about our commitment to Afghanistan to 
dispatch U.S. personnel.”399  
Other allies too may be dissatisfied by the conduct of military 
engagements by private troops. No doubt the Bosnians would have 
preferred to receive the help of DynCorp contractors, without their 
extracurricular involvement in sex-trafficking operations. Moreover, 
perhaps pro-American leaders in the Middle East similarly feel betrayed, 
today, by the conduct of American privateers toward Iraqi prisoners.400 
Leaders who endorse American foreign policy aims, often at great 
domestic peril,401 are then placed in an even more difficult situation at 
home when forced to defend their support in the face of American acts of 
brutality.402 Of course, transgressions by American soldiers certainly do 
occur. But, at least those acts can be reported up the chain of command 
and, in turn, can be swiftly punished, thus demonstrating the U.S. 
government’s commitment to justice and self-restraint;403 as we have 
discussed, comparable firmness with contractors is much more difficult to 
achieve.404
 399. Tepperman, supra note 13, at 12; see also Ghafour, supra note 94 (noting growing concerns 
about how DynCorp employees’ brash behavior in Kabul is damaging the Afghan people’s perceptions 
of Americans, describing how these contractors drive their vehicles aggressively and randomly point 
their weapons at onlookers, and suggesting that “[w]hen American private contractors behave 
aggressively, it confirms the worst suspicions in the minds of some Afghans”).  
 400. Alan Cowell, Powell, on Trip to Mideast, Vows Justice on Iraq Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2004, at A18; Neil MacFarquhar, Arab Meeting Expected To Produce Mostly Criticism of U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A3; see also Friedman, supra note 344 (recommending that President Bush 
convene a summit of world leaders at Camp David to apologize for what transpired in Abu Ghraib).  
 401. See, e.g., Carlos H. Conde, Manila Starts Withdrawing Troops from Iraq; U.S. Criticizes 
Step, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2004, at A7; David E. Sanger, Blow to Bush: Ally Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 2004, at A1.  
 402. See also Alan Cowell, Bush’s Words Do Little To Ease Horror at Prison Deeds, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2004, at A12; Christine Hauser, Many Iraqis Are Skeptical of Bush TV Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 6, 2004, at A16; Neil MacFarquhar, Revulsion at Prison Abuse Provokes Scorn for the U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, May 5, 2004, at A18. 
 403. See supra notes 341–44. 
 404. See supra notes 294–319. 
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2. Would-Be Allies 
Let us also not forget that American military personnel are, 
increasingly, serving as diplomats, humanitarian providers, political 
consultants, and “liberators.”405 Their conduct on such missions could 
leave as large of an impression on their hosts as would any tangible project 
or aid package they deliver. Therefore, if the United States is dispatching 
private actors, who are not comporting themselves well, the conduct of 
these privateers will inevitably be imputed to all soldiers, if not all 
Americans, and the goods and services they provide will be, in the long 
run, devalued. As P.W. Singer notes, a “key realization of contracting is 
that a firm becomes an extension of government policy and, when 
operating in foreign lands, its diplomat on the ground. As such, the firm’s 
reputation can . . . implicate the government[’s] as well.”406  
And, finally, America acts not just as an intervenor or liberator, but 
also as an occupier. While on the ground, in Kabul or Baghdad, the U.S. 
personnel must work to win the hearts and minds of the locals.407 If 
American contractors were to act in an undignified, or offensive manner, it 
would only hamper the process of gaining the trust of the people. (Again, 
this assumes that because of the UCMJ and because of the military’s ethos 
of honor, soldiers are less likely to act inappropriately.) 
 405. See PRIEST, supra note 47, at 44–47, 112–13 (describing military personnel during the 
Clinton administration serving, in addition to their conventional responsibilities, as diplomats, guides 
to improve civil societies, overseers of de-mining, disarmament, and humanitarian projects); see also 
Englin, supra note 332 (characterizing American military families stationed overseas as “front-line 
ambassadors of American values and culture,” and arguing that moving American soldiers out of 
Western Europe will further strain relations with long-time allies because “[t]here is no easy public-
relations substitute for 100,000 Americans . . . serving as ambassadors to and from their host 
countries”); Robert D. Kaplan, The Man Who Would Be Khan, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1, 2004, at 55 
(describing the role of a U.S. Army colonel in forging strong military and political ties with 
Mongolia). But see Smith, supra note 333 (quoting a former DynCorp employee as calling DynCorp 
“the worst diplomat our country could ever want overseas”).  
 406. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 236; see also Dexter Filkins, A Prison Tour with Apologetic 
Generals, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A16 (describing the disillusionment and shame felt by 
members of the U.S. Armed Forces in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal); Smith, supra note 333 
(noting DynCorp’s bullying tactics in Kabul and suggesting that “[t]hese days . . . belligerent men with 
sunglasses and guns are America’s most visible civilian representatives in some parts of the world”); 
supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
 407. See, e.g., Robert Kagan, America’s Crisis of Legitimacy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2004, at 
65 (noting widespread European distrust and opposition to the war in Iraq and to American foreign 
policy in general); see also PRIEST, supra note 47, at 386 (describing the military objective to win the 
“hearts and minds” of the people of Iraq and Afghanistan). 
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3. Adversaries 
And, among those who already consider America a corrupting force in 
the world, the privatization of military might, especially in efforts to 
circumvent U.N. agreements and arms embargoes, only further fan the 
flames of international dissent and discontent.408 The maniacal bombers of 
September 11 undertook diabolical deeds purportedly in the name of the 
disgruntled who viewed the World Trade Center and the Pentagon as the 
West’s twin evil exports. Amalgamating and conflating those formerly 
distinct entities via privatized war makes it that much harder to disabuse 
the world of its perceptions of the United States as an evil economic-
military imperialist.409  
 408. See, e.g., Editorial, The Anger of Arab Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug, 15, 2002, at A22; Thomas L. 
Friedman, Editorial, Under the Arab Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002 at A23 (describing the hostility 
against American and Western interests); Neil MacFarquhar, Arab Protestors Focus Ire on U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A1. 
 409. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 226–27 (noting that with the introduction of private firms, 
“[p]olitics are now directly and openly linked with economic interests . . . which can lead to 
breakdown of respect for governmental authority, and also delegitimizes its right to rule”). 
 Finally, should consideration be given to the interests of the foreign nationals, on whose turf these 
quasi-private operations take place? Intuitively speaking, we might think foreign countries and their 
citizens have no say over what the status of the troops is whom we airlift into a battlefield. But, in very 
important ways, they do (or should). The Westphalian nation-state is a, if not the, defining feature of 
international relations in the modern era of world history; underlying that system is an explicit 
understanding that nations and national armies, not bands of mercenaries, fight wars. This 
understanding is reaffirmed in the modern, Weberian notion of a state possessing a monopoly over the 
use of force and in the Geneva Convention’s definitive statement regarding who can legitimately 
engage in combat. Moreover, it is a central feature of the United Nations Charter that only states can 
lawfully take up arms (and only then under limited circumstances). To indicate that adversaries have 
no formal say regarding the composition of the contingent that takes up arms against them is to 
disregard centuries of work trying to regulate and “civilize” the course and conduct of war. For the 
United States to employ private agents may be for it to reprise the role of the illegitimate colonial 
empires and business interests that retained coercive power over other sovereignties and thus served to 
de-legitimate the concept of a world (and family) of nations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; U.N. 
CHARTER art. 2, para. 5; U.N. CHARTER art. 51; Sapone, supra note 50, at 4 n.22 (cataloguing the 
array of UN resolutions condemning the use of mercenaries generally and with respect to particular 
conflicts); id. at 36–41 (describing the UN resolutions more thoroughly); Schmitt, supra note 47, at 
1086 (describing the centrality of legal international norms even during times of conflict and war); 
Adams, supra note 325, at 103; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative 
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S 85; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 
12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 
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B. Flaunting the Ideals and Undermining the Institutions of Collective 
Security and Global Governance 
The U.N. Security Council is widely viewed as the principal venue for 
deliberating on matters of collective security.410 Though hamstrung by 
internecine fighting among the permanent members during most of the 
Cold War,411 the Security Council emerged as an authoritative and 
relatively effective body in the early 1990s,412 serving as the centerpiece of 
what the first President Bush dubbed the “New World Order.”413
For the most part, this renewed faith in the Security Council has been 
affirmed by member nations;414 but not entirely. Facing opposition on a 
proposal to intervene in Kosovo in 1999 and again, in 2002-03, on a 
decision to invade Iraq, the United States has forsaken the imprimatur of 
the Security Council and sought legitimation elsewhere.415 For Kosovo, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD (1996) (describing ways in which 
national armies are instructed and expected to preserve human life and refrain from excessively 
destructive practices while waging war). 
 410. F.H. HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF PEACE 225–37 (1963); HANS KELSEN, 
COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); Charles A. Kupchan, The Case for 
Collective Security, in COLLECTIVE SECURITY BEYOND THE COLD WAR 41 (George W. Downs ed., 
1994); Fowler & Fryrear, supra note 66, at 305; Gene M. Lyons, A New Collective Security: The 
United Nations and International Peace, 17 WASH. Q. 173 (1994); see generally INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., 
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 106–07 (1962). 
 411. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 407, at 74 (“During the four decades of the Cold War, the 
Security Council was paralyzed by the implacable hostility between its two strongest veto-wielding 
members.”).  
 412. Inis L. Claude, Jr., The Gulf War and Prospects for World Order by Collective Security, in 
THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS: POWER IN THE POST COLD WAR WORLD 23, 24 (Robert F. Helms II & 
Robert J. Dorff eds., 1993) (“[T]he ending of the Cold War, creating the expectation of a United 
Nations Security Council no longer paralyzed by conflict between the superpowers, has inspired the 
suggestion that the Council can now become what it was presumably intended to be, an agency for the 
collective enforcement of the ban on aggression.”); Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The 
United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 608 (2003) (“[F]or one dazzling moment in the 
1990s, the end of the Cold War seemed to revive faith in the [U.N.] Charter system, almost giving it a 
rebirth.”). 
 413. See, e.g., LAWRENCE FREEDMAN & EFRAIM KARSH, THE GULF CONFLICT, 1990–91: 
DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (1993); Transcript of President’s State of the 
Union Message to Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1991, at A12 (“[T]onight we lead the world in facing 
down a threat to decency and humanity. . . . [I]t is a big idea—a new world order where diverse 
nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind: peace 
and security, freedom and the rule of law.”). 
 414. See Michael Barone, Taking the U.N. Seriously, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 23, 2002, 
at 43; Philip Gourevitch, The Optimist, NEW YORKER, Mar. 3, 2003, at 50 (describing the heightened 
importance of the UN in the aftermath of the Cold War). 
 415. Todd Gitlin, America’s Age of Empire: The Bush Doctrine, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 1, 2003, at 
34; G. John Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambition, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 44; John B. 
Judis, Two Steps Backward; Unilateralism Revisited, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 12, 2002, at 10; Fareed 
Zakaria, The Trouble with Being the World’s Only Superpower, NEW YORKER, Oct. 14, 2002, at 72; 
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America secured NATO’s approval;416 and for Iraq, the United States 
cobbled together a band of allies, euphemistically called the “Coalition of 
the Willing.”417 In the process of circumventing the United Nations, 
however, the United States has damaged the Security Council’s authority 
and called into question the credibility of collective security writ large.418  
Privatization only makes bypassing the U.N. easier and even more 
insidious than patching together an alternative source of collective 
authorization. At least with respect to small-scale interventions, where 
private troops could act in lieu of public soldiers, the United States could 
nominally remain a good global citizen and nominally recognize the 
supremacy of the Security Council, while still achieving those desired 
aims that the Council refuses to endorse. This would allow the United 
States to avoid the political backlash it felt (vis-à-vis Kosovo and 
especially Iraq) when it publicly eschewed the Security Council in favor of 
a more compliant authorizing community.419 For instance, say the United 
States or another member proposes a resolution in support of intervening 
in a small country, perhaps besieged by a humanitarian crisis or laboring 
see also Kagan, supra note 407. For a discussion of efforts to circumvent the Security Council, see 
Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations To Use 
Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 124 (1999). 
 416. See W. Michael Reisman, Kosovo’s Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 860 (1999); Ruth 
Wedgwood, NATO’s Campaign in Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 828 (1999); John R. Bolton, U.S. 
Foreign Policy Doesn’t Require the Permission of the Security Council, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 4, 
1999, at 13; Roger Cohen, Europe’s New Policeman; NATO Shatters Old Limits in the Name of 
Preventing Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, at D3; Michael Hirsh, Washington’s Self-Defeating 
Assault on the U.N., FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 2; see also Jane E. Stromseth, Future 
Implications of the Iraq Conflict: Law and Force After Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 628, 632 (2003) (contrasting the legitimacy bestowed on the coalition-building efforts to liberate 
Kosovo with the utter lack of such approbation vis-à-vis the Iraq campaign in 2003). 
 417. See Franck, supra note 412, at 617 (questioning the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
Coalition of the Willing and characterizing it as including “a sizable contingent from Britain, a few 
hundred policemen from Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria (at least until their nations are integrated into 
the European Union), a few soldiers from Australia and Albania, and good wishes from Israel”); Clark, 
supra note 45; Ivo H. Daalder & James M. Lindsay, Bush’s Flawed Revolution, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 
2003, at 43; Francis Fukuyama, Editorial, U.S. vs. Them: Opposition to American Policies Must Not 
Become the Chief Passion in Global Politics, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 2002, at A17; Kristof, supra note 
99; James Traub, The Next Resolution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 50.  
 418. See, e.g., Franck, supra note 412, at 617–19 (suggesting that the current American foreign 
policy’s use of alternative sources of multilateral consent could effectively “disable the United 
Nations” and its endorsement of preemptive uses of force “stand[s] the [U.N.] Charter on its head”); 
Roger Cohn, Editor’s Note, MOTHER JONES, Jul./Aug. 2003, at 37 (noting that the United States’s 
decision to go to war in Iraq without Security Council authorization signaled its disregard for the 
United Nations and dealt it a “stunning blow”). 
 419. See Kagan, supra note 407; see also Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2003, at 16–18, 23–24 (noting that the military intervention in Iraq 
undermined the U.N. Charter and signaled the end of “the grand attempt to subject the use of force to 
the rule of law”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol82/iss3/6
p1001 Michaels book pages.doc3/29/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY 1117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
under civil war. Such a resolution fails.420 The United States can abide by 
the decision not to intervene formally, yet can still make available to the 
country in question a private American outfit to carry out the objectives 
that the Council rejected.421
While this avenue of clandestine circumvention is, probably, 
unavailable in most instances where an effective force would have to be 
quite large, there are still opportunities in certain situations where small, 
discrete units would suffice. For example, small forces might prove 
especially useful in the nascency of attempted coups or during the early 
stages of civil unrest in the likes of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, or even 
Rwanda, where experts have now suggested that if intervention had 
occurred early enough, a crack outfit could have helped prevent genocidal 
civil war without the need for an overwhelming show of force.422 With the 
use of contractors, therefore, the U.S. government could also achieve some 
of its foreign policy ends, while not taking any responsibility for 
promoting them. 
But the problem with contracting to avoid a Security Council veto is 
bigger than the mere issue of avoiding responsibility in any particular 
engagement: What is worse is that the nation would be turning its back on 
the legitimate collective security apparatus it helped found and promote, 
and would not even be doing so in a transparent way, i.e., calling for 
reforms to the Council’s procedures and operations or publicly shaming 
obstinate members. It would be more honest and responsible for the 
United States, if it were dissatisfied with some aspect of the Security 
Council, to seek direct reform.423 Such reform efforts would demonstrate 
 420. In addition to the political rivalries among Security Council members that serve to stymie 
U.N. authorization, there is a general unwillingness to support intervention, out of fear (especially 
among non-Western nations) that such precedents will ultimately lead to further scrutiny of their own 
domestic situations. See Kagan, supra note 407. Other concerns that dampen enthusiasm for 
intervention include financial costs, danger to soldiers, and insufficient strategic interests. See, e.g., 
Milliard, supra note 23, at 16; Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, The International Trial of the Century? 
A “Cross-Fire” Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal, 29 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 635 (1996).  
 421. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 213 (noting the scandal involving Britain’s use of Sandline in 
Sierra Leone was viewed by critics as a way to circumvent the UN arms embargo—as well as British 
troop limitations—and ultimately almost forced the resignation of then-Foreign Minister Cook). 
 422. See Milliard, supra note 23, at 18–19; Des Forges, supra note 119, at 142 (noting that a small 
contingent of peacekeepers and a team otherwise assigned to evacuate westerners in Rwanda “could 
have deterred the killings had they acted promptly); Michael Hirsh, Calling All Regio-Cops: 
Peacekeeping’s Hybrid Future, FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2000, at 2 (suggesting that much bloodshed 
could be stopped relatively easily if intervention happened quickly enough); Kaufmann, supra note 
119, at 143 (suggesting that “[o]f all the genocides since World War II, this would perhaps have been 
easiest to stop”). 
 423. See Michael J. Kelly, U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for a 
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the United States’s faith in the system of collective security and 
international law. But, to continue to operate outside its bounds, either via 
makeshift coalitions or private operations, while still purporting to respect 
the institution is to make a mockery of the Security Council and, 
moreover, to jeopardize the integrity of America’s foreign policy.424
C. Setting Bad Precedents and Encouraging the Global Growth in Private 
Military Forces and Capabilities 
Compared with foreign mercenaries operating elsewhere around the 
globe, U.S.-based privateers are relatively restrained. To satisfy both the 
generals in the Pentagon and the investors on Wall Street, American 
private military firms maintain a level of professionalism and decorum425 
not always shared by their counterparts operating in other regions of the 
world.426 According to those who have surveyed privateers from a 
comparative perspective, there are major military firms based overseas, 
that lack the professional scruples that American companies appear to 
possess; simply stated, those firms are more likely to work for despotic or 
repressive regimes.427  
For example, major international military firms such as Executive 
Outcomes, Stablico, and Omega Support have each worked at various 
times on both sides of the Zaire-Congo conflict in the late 1990s.428 
Twenty-First Century Council, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 319 (2000); Stromseth, supra note 416, at 
641–42 (highlighting ways in which the United States’s leadership could help improve Security 
Council governance); Richard N. Haass, What To Do with American Primacy, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept./Oct. 1999, at 37 (emphasizing the importance of American efforts to persuade the Security 
Council to be a more effective institution in enforcing collective security norms); Dmitri V. Trenin, 
Editorial, If the U.N. Were Being Created Today: Veto the Veto, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at B9 
(suggesting that the dramatic types of reform the U.N. Security Council needs today must be 
spearheaded by the United States).  
 424. This analysis is equally applicable in any multilateral context, such as in the Balkans. See 
supra notes 66–84 and accompanying text. 
 425. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 426. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 20; Howe, supra note 44; Gaul, supra note 53. 
 427. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 222–23 (noting that since neither the international marketplace 
nor home governments have effectively regulated private military firms, contractors have taken on 
clients “about whom the home state government or public had normative concerns”); Howe, supra 
note 44 (indicating that some private firms will accept offers from roguish clients, including neo-
colonial groups in Africa); Singer, supra note 83, at 523 (describing how some private firms accept 
contracts with “dictatorships, rebel armies, terrorist groups, and drug cartels”); Gaul, supra note 53; 
Zarate, supra note 20, at 93–104 (characterizing non-American firms as more likely to engage in 
offensive enterprises and as also more likely to work for morally questionable client states). 
 428. SINGER, supra note 20, at 224; see Philip Winslow, Why Africa’s Armies Open Arms to Elite 
Fighters From S. Africa, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 19, 1995, at 7 (quoting South African Deputy 
Foreign Minister Pahad as saying “[T]oday they’re there to defend you, tomorrow those forces will be 
there to overthrow you”).  
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Executive Outcomes also helped the Sierra Leone government fend off 
rebel advances in 1995–96,429 and then had a hand in appointing an interim 
head of government—one reportedly with whom the South African-based 
firm could “work.”430 Evidence also points to the fact that Executive 
Outcomes considered the possibility of assisting the Rwandan Hutu 
government in 1994—not too far in advance of the time that the Hutus 
were planning to unleash their murderous campaign against the Tutsis—
and that Sandline came similarly close to working for the Mobutu regime 
in Zaire, despite its widespread notoriety as repressive and corrupt.431 
More recently, a failed military coup in Equatorial Guinea involved 
privateers financed by, among others, the son of Margaret Thatcher. The 
goal, apparently, was to install a more business-friendly leader as head of 
the oil-rich state.432
Private military firms help prop up rogue regimes, resist struggles for 
self-determination, and contribute to the proliferation and diffusion of 
weaponry and soldiers around the world—axiomatically a destabilizing 
and thus undesirable phenomenon.433 The existence of armaments held by 
stateless groups complicates the task for responsible countries who (for 
purposes of self-defense and collective security) keep track of and seek to 
contain the spread of weapons. The availability and acceptability of 
contractors makes it more difficult for countries to assess the relative 
strengths of rival nations, since one phone call to a group of out-of-work 
Ukrainian fighter pilots could radically alter a region’s balance of 
power.434 Of course, the existence of one such outfit also spawns greater 
 429. Sapone, supra note 50, at 22; Christo Johnson, Troops Foil Coup in Sierra Leone, 
INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 4, 1995, at 15. 
 430. SINGER, supra note 20, at 112–13; see id. at 115 (noting Sandline’s contract to reinstate the 
government after Executive Outcomes left and a coup was staged).  
 431. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 225. In fairness, even the American-based MPRI has taken on 
as a client the military dictatorship of Equitorial Guinea. See id. at 132, 223. 
 432. See David Leigh et al., Pentagon Link to Guinea Coup Plot, GUARDIAN, Sept. 27, 2004, at 
11; see also Michael Wines, An African Foul-Up, With an Intriguing Cast of Britons, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 3, 2004, at A4 (noting that the coup was engineered by those who wanted to enhance their 
business prospects in the country). 
 433. Id. at 170; Sapone, supra note 50, at 2–3 (noting private military firms’ participation in 
Chechnya, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kashmir, Sierra Leone, and East Timor); Kevin Whitelaw, 
Have Gun, Will Prop Up Regime, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 20, 1997, at 47.  
 434. See SINGER, supra note 20, at 174–75 (“[I]t was already difficult to access a rival’s 
capabilities or force postures. Now with PMFs, the combination of an openly accessible military 
services market and the new heterogeneity of military actors makes this appraisal even more difficult. 
When externalized onto an ever-changing market, a rival’s potential capabilities or force postures are 
highly variable and able to transform rapidly. Thus, seemingly predictable power balances and 
deterrence relationships are now made unstable.”); Singer, supra note 83, at 522 (noting how private 
firms helped to win wars in Angola, Croatia, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sierra Leone).  
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demand—as every government would like the security of a few Ukrainian 
fighter pilots on retainer.435 Moreover, to the extent that privateers, 
especially those operating in Africa, may frequently be foreign nationals, 
the political and human costs of war may be quite low.436  
All of these factors point toward dangerous forms of military 
proliferation and thus threaten peace and stability. By all accounts, this 
global trend should be one the United States vociferously condemns. But 
can it do so credibly with thousands of its own privateers under contract? 
Even if the United States were to draw distinctions and make exceptions 
for its “professional” contractors, it probably still would be unable to lead 
a campaign against privateers. Therefore, privatization by the United 
States helps set a bad, enduring precedent and lends the global practice an 
unwarranted veneer of legitimacy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given my analysis in the preceding parts, I might be tempted to 
conclude with the utmost of economy—and use only three letters: Q.E.D. 
However, despite the litany of structural (not to mention accountability-
based) harms that private contractors introduce onto the national security 
landscape, it is doubtful that this new phenomenon—however much 
decried—will quickly fade away. Indeed, the combination of America’s 
extensive overseas military commitments, its already taxed store of 
reservists, and its inability to stomach a universal draft will probably 
ensure the continued need for an elastic supply of private troops for the 
foreseeable future.437 Hence, although this inquiry would rather conclude 
by way of proscription than prescription, realism preaches the latter 
approach might prove more prudent. 
Appreciating the staying power of military privatization, critics and 
apologists alike have started to propose reforms centered on greater 
 435. See, e.g., SINGER supra note 20, at 52 (describing how all sides in the Angolan Civil War 
secured private military assistance); id. at 164–65 (noting that at times private firms have become so 
powerful that they can influence internal political decisions in the client’s country); id. at 172 (positing 
how small, population-light countries can build up military strength overnight through contracting 
out); id. at 175 (predicting that the combination of heightened uncertainty regarding rival nations’ 
forces and increased availability of military resources in the marketplace could spawn overnight arms 
races).  
 436. Id. at 174 (noting that leasing a foreign army lowers the cost of war: “A new international 
market of private military services means that economic power is now more threatening.”); 
Kurlantzick, supra note 20 (suggesting that “the fact that states could hire PMCs relatively cheaply to 
prosecute their battles made them less willing to come to the bargaining table and more willing to 
continue fighting”); see also Posner, supra note 397. 
 437. See supra notes 22, 96–100, and 206 and accompanying text. 
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contractual control and oversight. These measures should, of course, be 
applauded as steps in the right direction. But, on their own, these reforms 
do not penetrate deeply enough to reduce the battery of structural harms 
military privatization creates; in other words, they do not go beyond 
accountability. Effective reform to combat the harms identified in this 
Article must accordingly look beyond tightening contracting law and 
enforcing accountability norms. Reform instead must attack the underlying 
status discrepancies that distinguish contractors from U.S. troops. If there 
were no gaps in the way troops and privateers were governed, disciplined, 
and publicly perceived, then many of the institutional, legal, and symbolic 
distortions that threaten the vitality of America’s democratic institutions, 
the integrity of its fighting forces, and the legitimacy of its international 
relations would be greatly reduced.  
Accordingly, by way of conclusion, I offer just a few words in service 
of sketching out a blueprint for reform.438 Irrespective of the particular 
details, any such blueprint to alleviate the structural problems raised in this 
Article must promote symmetry and parity between contractors and 
American troops in three distinct ways. First, reform must give Congress 
the regulatory and warmaking authority over privateers that is 
commensurate with what it enjoys over the U.S. Armed Forces. Achieving 
parity here, of course, would help minimize the democratic and 
constitutional harms that may exist today in situations where the legal 
status differentials between private contractors and U.S. troops can be 
exploited to circumvent Congress and the American people. Second, 
reform must enable the federal government to exercise the same amount of 
control and discipline over privateers as it does over members of the 
Armed Forces. Eliminating this disparity would help alleviate the concern 
that private troops representing American interests are—unlike public 
soldiers—not effectively constrained by civilian and political officials. 
And, third, reform must somehow serve to lessen the symbolic differences 
between contractors and soldiers, differences that currently can be 
leveraged to deploy privateers in zones of hostility where the American 
people would not as readily commit public soldiers.  
The crucial questions this reform agenda ultimately invites, then, are 
two-fold. Can these status disparities actually be eliminated? And, if so, 
does achieving parity reduce, if not altogether destroy, military 
privatization’s raison d’etre?  
 438. I do not, however, take a strong position necessarily endorsing or rejecting any of these 
measures. I simply proffer them as a set of policies that might help address some of the concerns raised 
in this Article. 
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A. Achieving Parity: Leveling the Asymmetries Between the Public and 
Private 
1. Restoring Equilibria in the National Security Constitution 
For Congress to establish similar levels of control over privateers to 
that which it possesses over public troops, it must draft a comprehensive 
framework statute. Such a statute would both assert Congress’s authority 
over privateers and formalize the processes by which the national 
legislature is kept informed of their activities. This statute, for instance, 
might create a department within a federal agency, e.g., the Military 
Privatization Office of the Department of Defense (“MPO”), that Congress 
designates as the focal point for all military contracts and that has one 
assistant secretary in charge. The MPO would be guided by a set of clear 
regulations, one of which would necessarily be: no federal money can be 
disbursed to any contractor whose employees carry or fire guns overseas 
unless (1) the corresponding contract is routed through the MPO and (2) 
the recipient registers (like a lobbyist would439) and discloses information 
about its employees, its clients, and its engagements. The MPO would be 
required to share this data with Congress and the public, as well as to 
report more generally—on, say, a quarterly basis—on the location, 
number, and activities of all contractors serving abroad as part of federal 
contract work. Moreover, the assistant secretary would have to advise 
Congress within 48 hours if any of the contractors engage in gunfights 
and/or if there are any contractor casualties abroad.  
Concomitantly, the statute would formalize a process by which 
Congress can officially authorize privateers to participate in conflicts. This 
could be achieved simply by extending the application of the existing War 
Powers Resolution beyond members of the Armed Forces to include 
contractors. Such a measure would work both to ensure congressional 
authority over privateers commensurate with the powers it possesses over 
U.S. military personnel and to increase the level of public awareness and 
transparency required not only for prudential, accountability reasons, but 
also to comport with the normative imperatives of democratic governance 
and popular sovereignty.440 Obviously, such legislation would probably be 
 439. See, e.g., Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified at 2 
U.S.C. §§ 1602–1603 (2000)); see also Guttman, supra note 3, at 888 (noting that federal conflict-of-
interest rules are more lax with regard to contractors than with federal employees). 
 440. Moreover, the greater the degree to which privateers are incorporated into the legal 
architecture of congressional regulation and authorization, the less likely it is that such contractors 
could in any way be considered independent from the U.S. government. Hence, the status differential 
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imperiled by the threat of a presidential veto and, perhaps, even a 
constitutional challenge (at least with respect to congressional insistence 
on its power to authorize contractor-led military engagements).441  
2. Disciplining Contractors As Soldiers 
The next step would be for Congress to reduce the status disparities 
between U.S. troops and private contractors in the context of military 
discipline and control. Currently, these disparities generate reliability and 
dependability gaps: the government cannot impose the requisite discipline 
and penalties on privateers to ensure that they do not deviate from, 
undermine, or otherwise jeopardize a military mission through acts of 
insubordination and desertion. Such conduct disparities also spawn 
broader, structural concerns for the effective control and subordination of 
the U.S. military to the civilian federal government. As discussed at length 
in Part IV, whereas the UCMJ creates for U.S. troops an entire framework 
of discipline, under pains of severe punishment, there are no comparable 
disincentives that exist in the realm of contract law. The threat of a civil 
breach, even if its consequences ever run to the breaching privateer (and 
not just to the firm), cannot compare to the threat of being thrown in the 
brig.442
Congress, of course, can extend the jurisdictional reach of the codes of 
American criminal law to contractors overseas—and has already done so 
with the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000.443 But for a 
variety of constitutional reasons, it may have more difficulty extending 
some of the unique rights-infringing provisions of the UCMJ to private 
contractors, or to any other civilians for that matter (at least in the absence 
of a concomitant congressional declaration of war).444 I have in mind here 
for purposes of exploiting legal gaps to circumvent collective security agreements would also be 
reduced.  
 441. For strategic and political reasons, however, Congress would be unlikely to undo extant 
presidential deployments. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 193, at 52–53; Louis Fisher, Congressional 
Abdication: War and Spending Powers, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 931, 1006 (1999); John O. McGinnis, 
Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of 
Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 301–06 (1993); 
Treanor, supra note 168, at 701. At best, and explaining away any constitutional challenges for the 
moment, Congress would probably have to wait for a conflict to abate and than legislate in its wake. 
See, e.g., Spiro, supra note 199, at 726 (noting that Congress can rarely criticize and legislate to limit 
the president during the course of military engagement, only afterward); see also Koh, supra note 186.  
 442. See supra notes 309–18 and accompanying text. 
 443. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.  
 444. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957) (“[A] statute cannot be framed by which a civilian 
can lawfully be made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace.”); see also Grisham v. 
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those behaviors or practices such as insubordination, criticism of military 
policy, and desertion that alone are not criminal acts (and arguably could 
not, constitutionally speaking, be criminalized) if applied to civilians, but 
which the Supreme Court has allowed Congress, in essence, to criminalize 
vis-à-vis active members of the Armed Forces precisely because of the 
military’s special, subordinated positioning in the architecture of 
American governance.445  
To narrow this gap, therefore, would probably require more dramatic 
measures than could be achieved through ordinary legislation. Perhaps, a 
constitutional amendment limiting the rights of overseas military 
contractors, an explicit step to “deputize” contractors and incorporate them 
into the larger fold of the American military community, or a 
congressional declaration of war, which definitely extends military law to 
contractors working overseas with members of the Armed Forces,446 
would be required to achieve effective control on par with what currently 
disciplines U.S. military personnel.  
3. Cultural Conflation: Publicization of Contractors 
The final step, then, would be to smooth out the symbolic differences 
between public and private troops. This would require (1) instilling in 
contractors a sense of their public charge (what Professor Jody Freeman 
has called “publicization”447) and (2) conveying to the American people 
the sense that soldiers and contractors, symbolically speaking, are one and 
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960). These latter two cases hold 
that the UCMJ applies to contractors only in instances of congressionally declared wars. See Perlak, 
supra note 309, at 97–100. Hence, in Vietnam, contractors were not held subject to the Uniform Code 
even though the United States was in a de facto state of war. See Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 
(D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Averette, 19 C.M.A. 363 (1970).  
 445. Efforts to do so may run afoul of a contractor’s constitutional rights not only on procedural 
grounds (soldiers are not entitled to a grand jury indictment, a jury trial, or an Article III judge), see 
Gibson, supra note 44, but also some substantive ones. To criminalize the breach of contract per se 
would pose an interesting challenge to the long-held anti-peonage jurisprudence of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219 (1911); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 20 (1906); Perlak, supra note 309, at 118–19; 
Schmidt, supra note 313 (“Because the UCMJ does not apply to contractor employees (except 
potentially in a declared war), and because the [Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction] Act addresses 
only civilian criminal statutes, it appears there is no relationship that could result in ‘discipline’ over a 
contractor. Clearly, the options that the government has to ensure proper performance by contractors 
do not include any actual ability to punish individual contractor employees.”) (emphasis added).  
 446. See, e.g., Grisham, 361 U.S. at 278; McElroy, 361 U.S. at 281; Averette, 19 C.M.A. at 363; 
Perlak, supra note 309, at 98. Note that in many situations it would simply be imprudent to declare 
war, and certainly not worth the status-reveling advantages. 
 447. Freeman, supra note 3. 
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the same. Accomplishing these twin aims might increase morale among 
public troops worried that their private compatriots will not perform ably 
and reduce the status disparities that currently allow the president to 
overcommit forces for a given engagement, respectively.  
In some ways, of the three sets of reforms, this is the most difficult 
task, because it is quite difficult for policymakers to legislate a change in 
perceptions (either among the contractors or among the American public 
more generally). It would be pointless, or at least inefficacious, to regulate 
how people go about valuing one life compared to another when any such 
exercise is inherently subjective and, likely, also idiosyncratic. But, on the 
other hand, perhaps the “publicization” follows closely—and somewhat 
effortlessly—on the heels of the foregoing tangible reforms.448 Perhaps 
with the incorporation of private soldiers into the regulatory framework 
already established for the Armed Forces, with the combining and 
conflating of soldier and contractor casualty counts, with comparable 
requirements of oversight and formal authorization, and, moreover, with 
some measures taken to discipline contractors like soldiers, contractors 
could feel more closely aligned with the American military and embrace 
its esprit; and the public, in turn, might begin to view contractors as more 
closely integrated into the American military community. Indeed, it may 
be the case that the symbolic differences are largely a function of status 
differences, and to the extent privateers are limited in their ability to act 
(comparatively speaking) ultra vires, they may not see themselves—or be 
perceived—as all that distinct from members of the Armed Forces.  
Of course, some residual disparities of no small import will remain. For 
example, the social and emotional bonds forged while training and serving 
in military units, emphasized above as instrumental in fostering 
selflessness, valor, and an esprit de corps,449 cannot be transmitted to 
privateers just because they would now be governed by the same 
disciplinary standards and counted as soldiers for purposes of calculating 
force projections and body counts. Nor can the public be immediately 
persuaded that contractors and soldiers are one and the same just because 
they are similarly regulated. Ultimately, therefore, additional affirmative 
steps to integrate the two distinct cultures, such as by having privateers 
eat, train, and live with soldiers, by minimizing salary differentials, and by 
circumscribing opportunities for privateers to serve foreign clients 
 448. See id. 
 449. See supra notes 332–38 and accompanying text. 
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(tereby minimizing reasons for the public to perceive them as mercenaries) 
would be necessary to reduce further the symbolic differences in a more 
meaningful way.  
B. Coming Full Circle: Arriving at a Place Where Issues of 
Accountability and Efficiency Are (Again) Paramount 
Assuming arguendo that the difficulties associated with devising and 
implementing the reform measures are overcome—and a comprehensive 
set of prescriptions do help eliminate many of the structural distortions 
that currently correspond with military privatization initiatives—there is 
an additional concern: Would closing these structural gaps destroy military 
privatization’s raison d’etre? In other words, does military outsourcing 
exist principally to leverage status differentials? 
Closing the status gaps would indeed add to the “publicization” of 
private contractors. As mentioned above, if regulated and disciplined like 
U.S. troops and if the American people start thinking of them as 
comparable to U.S. troops, contractors may not be used as readily (or 
successfully) to exploit legal and symbolic asymmetries. This means, 
however, that policymakers could not rely on them to accomplish military 
objectives otherwise difficult to obtain, if not unobtainable, using U.S. 
soldiers. Yet room would still exist for private actors on the national 
security landscape: The economic-efficiency virtues of privatization would 
largely remain unaffected by the structural sets of policy reforms. Indeed, 
it is possible that contractors from the private sector could still offer the 
Pentagon high-quality services and lower prices. They could also provide 
the Defense Department with force-multiplying and specialization 
capabilities if additional troops are needed.450
Arriving at that point, where the principal reasons for privatization 
center on economic efficiency gains, would, actually, permit scholarly 
analysis to come full circle as well. Once military privatization is stripped 
of its potential to be structurally damaging, it could then be scrutinized 
principally on accountability and efficiency grounds. That is, once the 
legal, constitutional, and symbolic concerns are allayed, we can be in a 
position to evaluate the true economic virtues of privatization (and the 
“inherently governmental” tradeoff), an inquiry I expressly bracketed for 
 450. But see DONAHUE, supra note 5, at 37–56; Beermann, supra note 57, at 1736; Freeman, 
supra note 3, at 1339. These scholars suggest that there is some argument to be made that, as Professor 
Freeman puts it, “Adherence to public law norms might be costly for private providers, and those costs 
might undermine the potential for efficiency gains to some extent.” Id. 
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the purposes of this Article. It is then—and perhaps only then—that 
conventional discussions centering on costs and benefits, transparency, 
and accountability (all of which are very important) should resume in 
earnest.  
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